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The doctrine posits that God is one being, but three persons.  The orthodox parameters for 
affirming the Trinity are found in the early Ecumenical Creeds of Christendom, especially the 
Nicene and Athanasian Creeds.  Four primary affirmations emerge as a summary of the essential 
content of the doctrine: (ONE): There is one God; (THREE): The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit 
are distinct divine persons; (FATHERSOURCE): The Father is the source of the Son and the 
Holy Spirit (perhaps with the Son, perhaps not); and (EQUALITY): The three persons in the 
Trinity are ontologically equal; none is greater than any of the others.  These four desideratum 
reveal a logical tension that must be alleviated to consistently uphold the doctrine.  This 
dissertation argues that the doctrine of the Trinity is logically coherent and seeks to reconcile the 
tension between ONE and THREE by means of the Composition as Identity (CAI) thesis, and 
seeks to reconcile the tension between FATHERSOURCE and EQUALITY by presenting as 
will-independent the generation of the Son and the Holy Spirit.  The motivation for the doctrine 
comes from both a posteriori analysis of Christian Scriptures and creeds, and from a priori 
Perfect Being Theology.  This dissertation presents an a priori argument for the Trinity based on 
the concept of love.  If God is the Greatest Conceivable Being, it is argued that God must possess 
the great-making property of love to a maximal degree.  It is argued that only a being who 
efficiently and essentially engages in all four aspects of love—self-love, love-given, love-
received, and love-shared—is perfect, and that only a triune being can efficiently and essentially 
love maximally.  This dissertation presents and defends a positive Social Trinitarian model of the 
Trinity which argues that God is identical to the Trinity, and that incorporates CAI and 
emphasizes the will-independent generation of the Son and Holy Spirit.  Because the doctrine 
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The doctrine of the Trinity is one of the most fascinating and intriguing notions in all of 
philosophy.  Its study requires philosophical analysis, and it has prompted many fruitful 
scholarly debates over the last 20 centuries.  The doctrine is significant to the study of 
philosophy of religion in general, and to the Christian faith in particular.  This dissertation will 
defend the Trinity against the charge of logical incoherence, consider and defend a priori 
motivation for the Trinity, including the presentation of an a priori argument for the Trinity, and 
will defend a particular model of the Trinity as the best explication of the doctrine. 
The traditionally accepted orthodox description of the Trinity is found in the early 
ecumenical creeds of the church, especially the Nicene and Athanasian creeds.   
 The Nicene Creed states: 
We believe in one God, the Father, the Almighty, maker of heaven and earth, of 
all that is seen and unseen. We believe in one Lord, Jesus Christ, the only Son of 
God, eternally begotten of the Father, God from God, light from light, true God 
from true God, begotten, not made, one in Being with the Father… We believe in 
the Holy Spirit, the Lord, the giver of life, who proceeds from the Father [and the 
Son]. Who with the Father and the Son is worshiped and glorified. Amen. 
 
The Athanasian Creed states: 
Now this is the catholic faith: That we worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in 
Unity; Neither confounding the Persons; nor dividing the Essence.  For there is 
one Person of the Father; another of the Son; and another of the Holy Spirit.  But 
the Godhead of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, is all one; the Glory 
equal, the Majesty coeternal.  Such as the Father is; such is the Son; and such is 
the Holy Spirit.  The Father uncreated; the Son uncreated; and the Holy Spirit 
uncreated.  The Father unlimited; the Son unlimited; and the Holy Spirit 
unlimited. The Father eternal; the Son eternal; and the Holy Spirit eternal.  And 
yet they are not three eternals; but one eternal.  As also there are not three 
uncreated; nor three infinites, but one uncreated; and one infinite. So likewise the 
Father is Almighty; the Son Almighty; and the Holy Spirit Almighty.  And yet 
they are not three Almighties; but one Almighty.  So the Father is God; the Son is 
God; and the Holy Spirit is God.  And yet they are not three Gods; but one God.  
So likewise the Father is Lord; the Son Lord; and the Holy Spirit Lord.  And yet 





to acknowledge every Person by himself to be God and Lord; so are we forbidden 
by the catholic religion; to say, there are three Gods, or three Lords.  The Father is 
neither made, nor created, nor begotten.  The Son is neither made, nor created; but 
begotten of the Father alone. The Holy Spirit is neither made, nor created, nor 
begotten; but proceeds from the Father (and the Son). So there is one Father, not 
three Fathers; one Son, not three Sons; one Holy Spirit, not three Holy Spirits.  
And in this Trinity none is before, or after another; none is greater, or less than 
another.  But the whole three Persons are coeternal, and coequal.  So that in all 
things, as said earlier; we must worship the unity in Trinity, and the Trinity in 
unity.   
 
This dissertation will follow Thomas Senor’s summary of the traditional creedal affirmations: 
Monotheism (ONE): There is one God. 
Three Persons (THREE): The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are distinct divine persons. 
Father/Son/Holy Spirit Relationship (FATHERSOURCE): The Father is the source of the  
 Son and the Holy Spirit (perhaps with the Son, perhaps not). 
Equality of the Persons: (EQUALITY): The three persons in the Trinity are ontologically  
 equal; none is greater than any of the others. 1 
 
These four affirmations which comprise the essential content of the doctrine involve a 
good deal of mystery, but the charge of outright incoherence is regularly levied against the 
Trinity.  A significant tension exists between ONE and THREE and between FATHERSOURCE 
and EQUALITY.  How is it that three distinct divine persons are one God?  How can the divine 
persons be equal if one of those persons is in some sense the source of the other two?  Michael 
Martin alleges that the Trinity results in numerous logical contradictions.   
In simple terms the incoherence can be understood as follows: There are three 
divine persons: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. The Father is God, the 
Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God. Yet these three divine persons are 
supposed to be distinct from one another: the Father is not the Son, the Father is 
not the Holy Spirit, and the Son is not the Holy Spirit.  However, there is exactly 
one God.  According to this doctrine, [1] Christ must be his own father and his 
own son.  [2] The Holy Ghost is neither father nor son, but both.  [3] The son was 
begotten by the father, but existed before he was begotten.  [4] Christ is just as old 
                                                          
1 Senor. Thomas. 2013. “The Doctrine of the Trinity is Coherent,” in Debating Christian Theism  







as his father, and the father is just as young as his son.  [5] The Holy Ghost 
proceeded from the Father and Son, but he is the same age as the other two.2 
 
Martin’s conclusions are typical of the charge of logical incoherence lodged against the 
Trinity.  1 and 2 both allege contradictions based on identity.  According to this line of 
reasoning, if there is exactly one God, and the Father is God and the Son is God and the Holy 
Spirit is God, then either there must be three Gods, which contradicts there being exactly one 
God (ONE), or the three persons are not actually distinct, which contradicts the Father not being 
the Son nor the Holy Spirit and the Son not being the Holy Spirit (THREE).  1 and 2 both opt for 
the latter horn of dilemma and draw the conclusion that the persons are not distinct, resulting in 
the supposed contradictions above.   
 3-5 allege contradictions based on claimed equality, despite an apparent hierarchy and 
inequitable ages.  If the persons are coequal in eternity and if the Son is begotten by the Father 
and if the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, then either the three persons have 
staggered ages since Martin holds that begetting and proceeding both assume coming into 
existence and a hierarchy, which contradicts (EQUALITY), or the persons are the same age, 
which contradicts the Son and the Holy Spirit being sourced by the Father (FATHERSOUCE).  
3-5 opt for the former horn of dilemma and draw the conclusion that the persons cannot be equal, 
resulting in the claimed contradictions. 
 For the logical problem of the Trinity to succeed in demonstrating the actual incoherence 
of the doctrine, however, it must be the case that there is no (acceptable) way to reconcile ONE, 
THREE, FATHERSOURCE, and EQUALITY as a self-consistent set.  There exists a rich 
                                                          
2 Michael Martin presents this argument in his review of Hugo Meynell’s book Is Christianity 
True? (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1994).  See 





history of trinitarian theorizing that seeks to provide such (acceptable) reconciliations.  Some 
attempts resulted in unacceptable notions, however.  The early church condemned those notions 
as heretical at the ecumenical councils.  A central theme of the first ecumenical council, the 
Council of Nicea (325 AD), was to establish appropriate parameters of trinitarian theorizing. 
 An important outcome of the church councils was the clarification of three great heresies 
to be avoided: Modalism, Tritheism, and Subordinationism.  While it would be simple to escape 
the charge of incoherence by identifying the Father as the Son and Holy Spirit, similarly to 
identifying Superman as Clark Kent, this solution does not suffice as it merely indicates that one 
individual can merit multiple descriptions as he plays multiple roles in life.  The claim that the 
“Father,” the “Son,” and the “Holy Spirit” are really one person revealing himself in three 
different roles, or modes, is the heresy of modalism.  Nor does it suffice to claim that the 
distinctness of the persons is also a distinctness of being, for then the heresy of tritheism is 
affirmed.  Nor does it suffice to place the persons in a hierarchy whereby the Father is 
ontologically superior to the Son and the Holy Spirit in virtue the Father generating them, since 
such a claim is the heresy of subordinationism.   
 The four essential summary desideratum of creedal commitments form the orthodox 
description of the Trinity and directly oppose heretical views.  ONE stands in direct opposition to 
tritheism.  THREE stands in direct opposition to modalism.  EQUALITY stands in direct 
opposition to subordinationism.  FATHERSOURCE affirms creedal commitment to the biblical 
data and supports THREE. 
 Any acceptable explication of the doctrine must satisfy all four of these creedal 
affirmations.  An important starting point when addressing the charge of logical incoherence is to 





“God” is meant in the same sense in all creedal usages, then obvious contradiction abounds.  The 
term “God” is not univocally employed, however.  The minds that wrestled with the 
philosophical notions surrounding the Trinity and compiled the creeds were not incapable of 
noticing blatant contradictions.  On the contrary, they were apt to engage in rigorous logical 
analysis.  When the Athanasian Creed states that, “the Father is God; the Son is God; and the 
Holy Spirit is God, and yet they are not three Gods; but one God,” the term “God” is not 
univocal.  “God” can mean “the Trinity” or refer to a single divine person.    Affirming “one 
God” affirms that there is only one Trinity of divine persons.  Only one of the Trinity of divine 
persons is the Father and only one is the Son and only one is the Holy Spirit.  Affirming “the 
Father is God” affirms that that Father is one of the divine persons of the Trinity.  Linguistic 
ambiguity provides the leeway to blunt the charge of contradiction, but what positive explanation 
can be given to reconcile the four essential creedal affirmations?   
 The offering of analogies for the Trinity has long accompanied attempted explanations of 
the doctrine.  In fact, analogies often play an important role in the proposed models of trinitarian 
theorizing.  Of course, all analogies are inadequate when describing God, and all analogies of the 
Trinity break down if pressed too hard.  Yet, they regularly attend intellectual understanding of 
the creedal affirmations.   
Two main types of analogy have been offered historically: the psychological type and the 
social type. According to the psychological type, famously employed by Augustine, the three 
divine persons are compared to various faculties of the human mind or soul.  Augustine’s 
primary example notes that the memory, the understanding, and the will, though distinct 
faculties, form one, indivisible psyche.  The social analogy is traced back at least as far as 





the three divine persons are comparable to three human persons.  It may best be illustrated by a 
father, mother, and child who, while being three individuals, form one family, or by three human 
men, who are all distinct individuals, but can comprise a single committee.  Although both types 
of analogy have their uses, both can be misleading, even heretical, if over-pressed.  
Psychological analogies can suggest modalism.  Social analogies can suggest tritheism.  No 
trinitarian analogy adequately represents God.  Each is a description that must be qualified in 
various ways if it is to provide conceptual clarity for the doctrine.   
 Other recent analogies importantly differ from these ancient offerings by escaping the 
bounds of psychological or social descriptions.  William Lane Craig proposes making sense of 
four creedal affirmations by understanding God as a single being or soul who supports three 
centers of consciousness—the three divine persons.  He offers an analogy in the form of 
Cerberus, the mythical three-headed guard dog of Hades.  According to this analogy, Cerberus is 
a single dog with three heads and thus three brains: Spike, Bowser, and Rover.  The reason that 
Spike, Bowser, and Rover are all identified as a single dog is obvious: they share a body.  This 
allows Hercules to state with equal accuracy to one friend, “Spike bit me” and to another friend, 
“Cerberus bit me.”  But suppose Hercules stabs and kills Cerberus.  It seems that the now 
disembodied Spike, Bowser, and Rover could still exist as a single entity by virtue of sharing a 
soul.  God, likewise, could exist as a single being, but with three centers of consciousness.   
 Jeremy S. Begbie provides an analogy, not from a philosophical background, but from a 
theological and musical background.  A musical chord is essentially composed of three different 
notes—the first, third and fifth notes of a given musical scale.  For example, the chord of C 
major is composed of the notes C (the root of the chord), E (the third from the root) and G (the 





likewise a “sound.”  A musical chord is essentially three sounds in one sound, or one sound 
essentially composed of three different sounds (each of which has an individual identity as well 
as a corporate identity).  When middle C (the root of the chord) is played, it “fills” the entire 
“heard space.”  When the E above middle C is played at the same time, that second note 
simultaneously ‘fills’ the whole of the ‘heard space’; yet one can still hear both notes distinctly. 
When the G above middle C is added as well, a complete chord exists; one sound composed of 
three distinct sounds.  Begbie conceives of God, similarly, as three divine persons in one divine 
tri-personal being, or one divine personal being essentially composed of three divine persons.   
What could be more apt than to speak of the Trinity as a three-note-resonance of 
life, mutually indwelling, without mutual exclusion and yet without merger, each 
occupying the same ‘space,’ yet recognizably and irreducibly distinct, mutually 
enhancing and establishing each other?3 
 
 Senor proposes thinking of the Trinity as a single particular divine nature that is 
multileveled, but necessarily and deeply interdependent.  The fundamental level is the Father, the 
second the Son, and the third the Holy Spirit, making the Father the ontological ground of the 
others, even though Senor stresses that such a multileveled understanding does not imply that the 
Father creates the Son or Holy Spirit since their production is “will-independent.” Senor’s 
offered analogy is that of emergentism.  According to this view: 
[H]uman beings are biological entities composed only of parts that are the 
province of the natural sciences.  Yet in another sense people can’t be reduced to 
their biological properties because their material parts give rise to an emergent 
mind that has causal powers that are more than the sum of its material parts.  So, 
suppose the truth about human mentality is this: (1) the brain is the only 
ontological/causal source of human thought and action; (2) the mind is the 
product of the causal activity of the brain; (3) the mind is emergent, and this 
implies that the causal powers of the mind are not identical with the causal powers 
of the brain—the mind has powers that depend on the brain but that are distinct 
from it.  Given the emergence of the nonepiphenomenal mind, there will be 
events that are causal products of the mind.  Suppose such a mind freely decides 
                                                          





to go see the Cubs play the Cardinals.  The causal history of this decision includes 
the causal activity of the emergent mind that produces the decision to go the 
Cubs-Cardinals game as opposed to the going to see a local production of 
Macbeth happening the same night.  All three of these entities (the brain, the 
mind, the decision) are aspects of a single unified person.4  
 
Craig, Begbie, and Senor offer analogies that are different from those proposed 
throughout the history of trinitarian theorizing as important conceptual aids to their trinitarian 
models.  More detailed treatments of Craig’s and Senor’s models will follow.  Understanding the 
essential content to affirm and the heretical notions to avoid, along with a recognition of the 
ambiguous nature of creedal language, allows for appropriate, contradiction-free explications of 
the doctrine of the Trinity.  Analogies, historical and contemporary, help philosophers to 
conceptualize the Trinity in coherent ways, but the heavy intellectual machinery in all acceptable 
trinitarian theorizing is in the models of the Trinity. 
 Traditionally, two broad approaches are taken when advancing defensible models of the 
Trinity.  The starting point for these approaches is to emphasize either ONE or THREE.  The 
first approach is typically identified as Social Trinitarianism, which places greater emphasis on 
the diversity of the divine persons.  The second approach is identified as Latin Trinitarianism or 
as Anti-Social Trinitarianism, which stresses the unity of God.  It is somewhat misleading to 
refer to the approach which stresses the unity of God as “Latin” since important Latin speaking 
church fathers Tertullian, Hilary, and Athanasius were each Social Trinitarians.  The starting 
point for Social Trinitarianism is the distinct self-consciousness, intellect, and will of each divine 
person.  The three persons each possess the generic divine nature as an attribute and are thus 
each fully divine.  The persons are robustly distinct, constituting a genuine “others.”  This means 
that God is like a community but in virtue of perichoresis (the interpermeation or mutual 
                                                          





indwelling of the persons) is not an actual community, which would constitute tritheism.  The 
starting point of Anti-Social Trinitarianism is that there is only one God whose intellect and will 
is composed by the diversity of persons, but there is only one divine substance.  On this view, the 
persons are not robust—the persons are not three centers of consciousness, intellect, and will.  
God is not like a community at all. 
 Within both approaches, the unity of God has traditionally been expressed by the Greek 
word ousia (substance or essence) or its Latin equivalent substantia, both of which are usually 
translated into English with the word “substance.”  The doctrine states that persons of the Trinity 
have one substance, or essential divine nature.  The distinctiveness of the divine persons has 
traditionally been expressed by the Cappadocian Fathers with the Greek word hypostasis and by 
the Latin fathers with the Latin word persona.  So the Trinity has been described in the East by 
the phrase, “three hypostases in one ousia,” and in Latin Christianity by the phrase, “three 
persons in one substance.”  Both groups of Christians agree that there are three persons in the 
Trinity and that the Trinity is one God.   
Anti-Social Trinitarians typically follow Latin-speaking theologians like Augustine and 
Aquinas.  Augustine is frequently interpreted as arguing that the persons of the Trinity are 
various relations subsisting in God.  Augustine claims that the distinction between Father and 
Son is a matter neither of different essential properties nor of different accidental properties, but 
that the persons are distinguished in virtue of the relations in which they stand.  Because 
“Father” and “Son” are relational terms implying the existence of something else, Augustine 
thinks that properties like “begotten by God” cannot belong to anything’s essence since only 
intrinsic properties constitute something’s essence.  But if being begotten is not part of the Son’s 





for the Son to be begotten.  But it could still be possible that there are possible worlds in which 
the person who is, in the actual world, the Father, does not beget a Son and so is not a Father.   
Augustine could instead claim that “Father” and “Son” imply internal relations between 
the persons of the Godhead, so that there is no possible world in which they do not stand in that 
relation.  The Father and Son would share the same intrinsic essential properties, but they would 
differ in virtue of their differing relational properties or the different internal relations in which 
they stand.  Augustine importantly does not say that the Father and Son just merely are relations.  
Augustine seems uneasy about the phrase “three persons” because this implies three instances of 
a generic type and, hence, seems to imply three Gods (De Trinitate 5.9.10; 7.4.7-8).   
Thomas Aquinas advances the Augustinian analogy.  Aquinas holds that there is a 
likeness of the Trinity in the human mind insofar as it understands itself and loves itself (Summa 
Contra Gentiles 4.26.6).  In the mind is the mind itself, the mind conceived in the intellect, and 
the mind beloved in the will.  According to Aquinas, since God knows Himself, there is in God 
the one who knows and the one who is known.  The one known exists in the one knowing as His 
Word.  They share the same essence, but they are relationally distinct (4.11.13).  Aquinas holds 
that the different divine persons just are the different relations in God—being father of and being 
son of (Summa Theologiae 1a.40.2).  Since the one knowing generates the one known and they 
share the same essence, they are related as Father to Son.  Since God loves Himself, God as 
beloved is relationally distinct from God as loving (4.19.7-12) and is called the Holy Spirit.   
Contemporary Anti-Social Trinitarians offer different models, but still emphasize the 
unity of God and still seek to avoid modalism.  Brian Leftow offers what he calls Divine Life 
Stream Trinitarianism.5  According to this model, God eternally lives his life in three streams.  
                                                          





Each stream constitutes a person and God lives his life-streams which are united by their being 
causally connected in the right way—the lives of each of three persons count as being streams of 
the life of God in the same way that a time traveling dancer may repeatedly travel back in time to 
dance on the stage, resulting in a whole company of dancers. 
Leftow holds that if time travel is possible, a self/being may have multiple instances at a 
given time. His theory is that the Trinity is like this, but without the time dimension.  God, in 
timeless eternity, lives out three life-streams.  In one life-stream, God is the Father, in another the 
Son, and in another the Holy Spirit.  These three life-streams ostensibly are all lived by one self, 
one God, three times repeated.  It is unclear that this constitutes three distinct persons. 
Leftow rebuffs the charge of modalism by noting that “Nothing in my account of the 
Trinity precludes saying that the Persons’ distinction is an eternal, necessary, non-successive and 
intrinsic feature of God’s life, one which would be there even if there were no creatures.”6  
Leftow argues that terms like “Father” or “Son” are temporally non-rigid, so they only refer to 
God during that particular life-stream.  “Father” refers to the God who is in a life-stream 
unbegotten and “Son” refers to the God who is in a life-stream begotten.  It is unsettled whether 
these life streams still collapse into one person (modalism) since they are all lived by the 
(numerically) same self.   
Social Trinitarian models began with the Cappadocian Fathers, including Basil the Great 
(330-379), Gregory of Nyssa (330-395), and Gregory of Nazianzus (329-389).  They explained 
the difference between substance and essence as the difference between a generic essence, say 
man, and particular exemplifications of it, say Andrew, Simon, and Paul.  This leads to an 
obvious question: if Andrew, Simon, and Paul are three men each having the same nature, then 
                                                          





why would not the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit similarly be three Gods each exemplifying the 
divine nature? 
Gregory of Nyssa sought to answer this question and emphasized the primacy of the 
universal nature, which is one and unchangeable in each of the three men.  He advises speaking 
of one man, rather than speaking of three Gods.  But the problem remains.  Even if the universal 
is primary reality, there are still three exemplifications of that reality in three distinct beings/men.  
They are distinct beings/men since one of the men could cease to exist without the others ceasing 
to exist.  Likewise, even if the single divine nature is the primary reality, it is apparently 
exemplified by three hypostases, each of whom seem to be an instance of deity—three Gods. 
 Gregory seeks to avoid this implication by positing the ineffability of the divine nature 
and that the operations of the Trinity toward creation involve the necessary participation of all 
three persons, whereby each operation originates in the Father, proceeds through the Son, and is 
perfected by the Holy Spirit.  Even if this is so, it may well be the case that the operations are 
done by three cooperatively acting individuals who each exemplify the divine nature.  The most 
pressing task of contemporary Social Trinitarians is to find a more convincing answer to why, in 
their view, there are not three Gods.   
 Numerous contemporary Social Trinitarian models attempt to strengthen the ancient 
view.  Peter van Inwagen offers a Relative Identity model, whereby identity is always relative to 
a sortal, or kind.7  The proper way to speak about identity is not with statements such as 
“Superman is Clark Kent,” but with statements such as “Superman is the same person as Clark 
Kent.”  The reason for this is that a pair might be identical relative to one sortal, but non-
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identical to another sortal.  According to this model, the Father is the same being as the Son, but 
not the same person as the Son.  So there is exactly one God; there are exactly three divine 
persons; there are three divine Persons in one divine Being.  Relative identity is widely rejected 
as superfluous since Superman is a person, Clark Kent is a person, and Superman = Clark Kent, 
where “=” expresses classical identity, so there will not be a case where two items are identical 
relative to one sortal but not to another.  It is not clear that relative identity helps explicate the 
Trinity. 
 Richard Swinburne offers a Functional Monotheism model.8  He argues that the creedal 
claim “there is only one God” is not asserting that there is only one divine individual, as that 
would contradict the creedal commitment to there being three divine individuals.  He suggests 
that the creeds should be read as “denying that there were three independent divine beings, any 
one of which could exist without the other; or which could act independently of each other.”9  As 
a collective, these three beings function as a single God.  While Swinburne’s account is 
provocative, it seems that despite a high degree of unified function, there still exists three divine 
beings, which is tritheism.   
 Another Social Trinitarian model offered by William Lane Craig is called Trinity 
Monotheism.10  This model argues: 
God is very much like an unembodied soul; indeed, as a mental substance God 
just seems to be a soul. We naturally equate a rational soul with a person, since 
the human souls with which we are acquainted are persons. But the reason human 
souls are individual persons is because each soul is equipped with one set of 
rational faculties sufficient for being a person. Suppose, then, that God is a soul 
which is endowed with three complete sets of rational cognitive faculties, each 
sufficient for personhood. Then God, though one soul, would not be one person 
                                                          
8 Swinburne, Richard. The Christian God. New York: Oxford University Press., 1994. 
9 Ibid, 180. 
10 Craig, William Lane, and Moreland, J.P. Philosophical Foundations for a Christian 





but three, for God would have three centers of self-consciousness, intentionality, 
and volition, as Social Trinitarians maintain. God would clearly not be three 
discrete souls because the cognitive faculties in question are all faculties 
belonging to just one soul, one immaterial substance. God would therefore be one 
being which supports three persons, just as our individual beings each support one 
person. Such a model of Trinity Monotheism seems to give a clear sense to the 
classical formula “three persons in one substance.”11 
 
Trinity Monotheism has many attractive features, but can be strengthened in light of 
particular objections raised against it.  A fuller analysis, evaluation, and reformulation of Trinity 
Monotheism will follow. 
 The charge of logical incoherence raised against the doctrine of the Trinity can be 
answered, and a tenable model of the Trinity can be defended.  While the creedal affirmations 
detail the orthodox understanding of the doctrine, such a posteriori sources are not the only 
motivation for belief in the Trinity.  On the contrary, it is possible to believe in the necessity of 
the Trinity on a priori grounds.  Such an argument, based on the Anselmian notion of God as the 
greatest conceivable being, and based on the nature of love, will follow.   
  
Part I—The Logical Coherence of the Trinity 
 
Section I—Common Language as an Opening Move to Understanding the Trinity 
 
The traditional understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity is summed up with the 
following four statements of creedal orthodoxy: 
ONE: There is one God. 
THREE: The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are distinct divine persons. 
FATHERSOURCE: The Father is the source of the Son and the Holy Spirit (perhaps with  
          the Son, perhaps not). 
EQUALITY: The three persons in the Trinity are ontologically equal; none is greater  
           than any of the others. 
 
                                                          





These four affirmations which comprise the essential content of the doctrine of the 
Trinity possess mystery, to be sure, in how the natural tension between ONE and THREE and 
between FATHERSOURCE and EQUALITY is best explained.  Tension, to some, gives way to 
the charge of outright incoherence concerning the two pairs of statements.  How is it that three 
distinct divine persons are one God?  How can the divine persons be equal if one of those 
persons is in some sense the source of the other two?  These questions are central to the majority 
of the critiques raised against the logical coherence of the doctrine.  This section, along with the 
next two sections, will address the tension between ONE and THREE and the final section of 
this part will address the tension between FATHERSOURCE and EQUALITY. 
When the charge of logical incoherence is levied against a doctrine, there are two primary 
methods to employ in response.  The first is to show that the very conceptual nature of two 
supposedly contradictory statements are, in fact, not contradictory.  This will involve an 
exploration of the statements in their context and an exploration of possible readings for each.  
This method looks for general and conceptual coherence between two affirmations, but does not 
present a particular model of the doctrine itself.  The second method is to demonstrate the 
coherence of two affirmations by presenting a model of the doctrine that positively unifies them.  
The advantage to the second method is that logical coherence is assured if an actual model can 
be defended.  The potential pitfall to the second method is that if there are reasons, independent 
of logical incoherence, to reject the model, the incoherence charge can once again be lobbed at 
the doctrine.  The advantage to the first method is that a variety of particular models can later be 
considered so long as they make use of the conceptual and general understanding needed to 
alleviate potential incoherence.  The disadvantage of the first method is that it leaves the doctrine 





will need to be presented as a positive demonstration of the doctrine fully fleshed out before 
wholesale endorsement of the Trinity is warranted.   
In addressing the coherence of ONE and THREE the first method will be employed with 
a particular trinitarian model presented later.  In addressing FATHERSOURCE and EQUALITY 
the second method will be employed and the model presented there in rough sketch will be 
explored more fully later.  The reason for use of the first method concerning ONE and THREE is 
that the majority of arguments against the logical coherence of the doctrine highlight the tension 
between them.  If these two affirmations are generally compossible conceptually, then all of the 
arguments alleging logical incoherence based on them can be addressed simultaneously.   
Consider ONE and THREE.  Einar Bohn follows an interpretation of the Athanasian 
Creed that begins with the following set of propositions12: 
1. God = the Father 
2. God = the Son 
3. God = the Holy Spirit 
4. The Father ≠ the Son 
5. The Father ≠ the Holy Spirit 
6. The Holy Spirit ≠ the Son  
 
Bohn explains that this set “is inconsistent in the sense that it leads to paradox in virtue of 
the classical logic of identity.”13  This logic of identity is given by the following two axioms: 
7. For any x and y, if x = y, then x and y share all properties  
8. For any x, x = x  
 
From which one can trivially prove the following two theorems: 
9. For any x and y, if x = y, then y = x 
10. For any x, y, and z, if x = y and y = z, then x = z 
 
                                                          
12 Brower, J. E., & Rea, M. “Understanding the Trinity” in Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought 
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This implies what Bohn calls the Trinitarian Paradox: by propositions 1 and 9 it immediately 
follows that 
11. The Father = God 
By propositions 11, 2, and 10 it immediately follows that 
12. The Father = the Son 
The conjunction of propositions 12 and 4 is a direct contradiction.  Such a contradiction, 
unless able to be resolved, demonstrates that the propositions under consideration form an 
illogical set and either the interpretation of the creedal data must be altered or else the doctrine of 
the Trinity itself must be jettisoned to the illogical/contradictory philosophical scrap heap.  
With no further restrictions on one’s concept of God, the paradox might be taken to have 
the trivial polytheistic solution that there are in fact three gods, not one.  But remember that an 
orthodox solution must adhere to the four essential summary desideratum of the creedal 
statements describing the Trinity: 
ONE: There is one God. 
THREE: The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are distinct divine persons. 
FATHERSOURCE: The Father is the source of the Son and the Holy Spirit (perhaps with  
                                  the Son, perhaps not). 
EQUALITY: The three persons in the Trinity are ontologically equal; none is greater  
                       than any of the others. 
 
The Athanasian Creed notes that the Christian must “worship one God in Trinity and 
Trinity in Unity,” and according to which “yet there are not three Gods, but one God,” yielding 
another proposition: 
13. There is one and only one God  
Any solution to the Trinitarian Paradox must be compatible with 13 in order not to 
violate orthodoxy.  Proposition 13 seems to produce another paradox which Bohn calls the 





Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, each being distinct from each other. But by 13, God is one 
in number, not three.  Hence, God is one in number and God is not one in number.”14  These two 
paradoxes form the heart of the charge of logical incoherence raised against the doctrine of the 
Trinity. 
Consider first the Paradox of Cardinals.  Bohn employs referential counting15 but does 
not label it as such.  Instead, he opts to describe the procedure not in logical terminology, but as 
primitive, pointing to the very common practice among non-logicians. 
Consider my body. Referring to it, one might say with equal truth both that it is a 
body and that it is two arms, two legs, one head and a torso. In so doing one isn’t 
referring to two distinct referents, or portions of reality, but rather to one and the 
same portion of reality divided up in two different ways. One such way is as one 
body, while the other is as two arms, two legs, one head, and a torso. Or, as Quine 
(1960:91) puts it with another, but similar example: ‘shoes’ and ‘pair of shoes’ 
range over exactly the same scattered stuff, and differ from one another solely in 
that they divide their reference differently.  The important point for our purposes 
isn’t exactly how we manage to divide one and the same portion of reality in two 
(or more) different ways, but rather that we in fact do so all the time. And we 
obviously do. For example, we say things like: The team was awesome today! 
They played amazingly well. And: that (one) kilometer is a thousand meters. And: 
my body just is those particles arranged body-wise. What’s happened in such 
cases is that on the one hand we have referred to one thing, while in the next 
breath referred to that very thing as a plurality of things instead. No one should 
claim that in such cases we must always switch referent from first be talking about 
some one thing to then be talking about some many things, which aren’t the same 
portion of reality as the one thing. That would be incredible.  Rather, one should 
claim that what has happened is just that there is a switch between the way we 
thought of, or conceptualized one and the same portion of reality, not in what 
portion of reality we referred to.16 
 
                                                          
14 Ibid. 
15 Relative counting maintains that a person cannot determine how many things there are until 
she has been given a sortal (a concept or kind) under which to count by.   





Bohn follows a distinguished list of thinkers, who can both logically analyze identity in 
singular/plural hybrid terms, but can also employ very common usage of the practice. Gottlob 
Frege provides another example: 
While looking at one and the same external phenomenon, I can say with equal 
truth both “It is a copse” and “It is five trees”, or both “Here are four companies” 
and “Here are 500 men”. Now what changes here from one judgment to the other 
is neither any individual object, nor the whole, the agglomeration of them, but 
rather my terminology. But that is itself only a sign that one concept has been 
substituted for another.17 
 
Thomas Aquinas contends that:  
A single real (geometrical) point may truly correspond to several conceptions we 
frame of it: conceived of in itself, conceived of as a (circle’s) centre, conceived of 
as the end of a line.  All these conceptions are in the mind as subject, yet in the 
point itself as giving a basis to the truth of the conceptions.18 
 
It is also how Rene Descartes thinks of the relation between corporeal substances 
and regions of space: “There is no real distinction between space, or internal place, and 
the corporeal substance contained in it; the only difference lies in the way in which we 
are accustomed to conceive of them.”19 
The implication of variously numerically conceiving of the same portion of reality is that 
it seems that numerical properties are relational properties.  A portion of reality’s numerical 
property (cardinality) depends on how it is conceptualized.  When conceptualizing some portion 
of reality as two arms, two legs, one head, and a torso, it has the numerical property “six” 
holding true of it, but when conceptualizing the same portion of reality as a body, it has the 
                                                          
17 Frege, Gottlob. The Foundations of Arithmetic: A Logico-Mathematical Enquiry into the 
Concept of Number. J. L. Austin, Trans. Blackwell Publishing. 1980. §59. 
18 Aquinas (1253-55). Selected Philosophical Writings. T. McDermott, Ed. Oxford Press, 1993. 
P. 240. 
19 Descartes, Rene. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes Vol. I. Cottingham et al., Trans. 





numerical property “one” holding true of it.  It seems that independently of being conceptualized, 
a certain portion of reality has no particular numerical property holding true of it at all.  Bohn 
continues: 
Likewise with God: conceptualizing the portion of reality that is God as the 
Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, we have conceptualized it as being three in 
number, but it is nonetheless the same portion of reality as what we might 
conceptualize as God, and hence as being one in number. Numerical properties 
aren’t properties holding of it independently of how it is being conceptualized. 
This is of course not saying that one conceptualization cannot be better somehow 
than another, nor that they cannot be equally good. It is only saying that, better, 
worse, or equal, it is a conceptualization of one and the same portion of reality 
either way.20 
  
This understanding solves the Paradox of the Cardinals since it is not the case that God is 
one in number and that God is not one in number, simpliciter.  Rather, it is the case that God is 
one in number relative to one way of conceptualizing that portion of reality that God is, and not 
one in number relative to another way of conceptualizing that same portion of reality. This seems 
to be what ONE and THREE demand.  Such an understanding of ONE and THREE can be 
described using the logical form: One(x,y) & not-One(x,z), which is not a contradiction since ‘x’ 
ranges over portions of reality and ‘y’ and ‘z’ ranges over the concepts ‘God’ and ‘Father, Son, 
Holy Spirit’, respectively.  Merely absolving the numerical paradox, however, does not show the 
doctrine of the Trinity to be logically consistent.   
Next, consider the Trinitarian Paradox.  Propositions 1–3 can collapse into the following 
proposition:  
14. God = the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit. 
‘God’ is a singular term, and ‘the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit’ is a plural term, both 
referring to the same portion of reality, just conceptualized differently.  It is important to read ‘=’ 
                                                          





collectively, not distributively. That is to say, God is identical with neither the Father nor the Son 
nor the Holy Spirit, but to say that God is identical with all of them taken together.  God = the 
Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit collectively.  This distinction between a collective and a 
distributive reading of predicates is common in natural languages as well as in standard plural 
logic.21  
Bohn provides the following example to clarify the collective/distributive divide: 
Consider three things a, b, and c surrounding one thing x. It is then true that a,b,c 
taken together or collectively surround x, but not true that a surrounds x, and it is 
not true that b surrounds x, and it is not true that c surrounds x. To solve the 
Trinitarian Paradox, we simply treat identity like that; hence, the collective 
reading of proposition.22 
 
Such an understanding seems to be what creedal orthodoxy demands.  Note the pattern in 
the Athanasian Creed:  
Such as the Father is; such is the Son; and such is the Holy Spirit.  The Father 
uncreated; the Son uncreated; and the Holy Spirit uncreated.  The Father 
unlimited; the Son unlimited; and the Holy Spirit unlimited. The Father eternal; 
the Son eternal; and the Holy Spirit eternal.  And yet they are not three eternals; 
but one eternal.  As also there are not three uncreated; nor three infinites, but one 
uncreated; and one infinite. So likewise the Father is Almighty; the Son 
Almighty; and the Holy Spirit Almighty.  And yet they are not three Almighties; 
but one Almighty.  So the Father is God; the Son is God; and the Holy Spirit is 
God.  And yet they are not three Gods; but one God.   
 
The creed repeats the predicative form The Father is G, the Son is G, and the Holy Spirit 
is G. And yet they are not three Gs, but one G, where G is uncreated, unlimited , eternal, 
Almighty, and God, respectively.  Since the predicative pattern is clear in the first four cases, it 
seems inconsistent to read the last case, according to which each of three persons are God, as 
being a case of numerical identity.  Following the clear predicative pattern, it seems most 
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consistent to read the last instance as being a case of the is of predication, rather than the is of 
identity.  The properties ‘uncreated,’ ‘unlimited,’ ‘eternal,’ and ‘Almighty’ are each predicated to 
each of the persons such that the persons collectively share in them, not that each person is a 
separate instance of them.  The reason why there are not three uncreated, nor three infinites, nor 
three eternals, nor three Almighties is because the persons collectively are one singular being.  
Since each person is a part of the one being, each person has those properties predicated of each 
of them.  The pattern, likewise, holds with the term ‘God.’  Each person is God in virtue of being 
a part of the one being who is God. The very next sentence of the creed seems to demand such an 
interpretation to avoid contradiction: “And yet they are not three Gods, but one God.”  Saying 
that each person is God is not a sudden shift to the use of the is of identity.  Saying that each 
person is God is the next usage of the is of predication, just as it was similarly employed for the 
previous four predicated attributes.  Claiming that the creed suddenly shifts its use of ‘is’ 
misinterprets the clear predicative pattern the creed employs.  Each person is a part of ‘God.’  It 
is not the case that each person distributively/individually is numerically identical to ‘God.’   
This solution to the Trinitarian Paradox avoids contradiction among the following set of 
propositions: 
14. God = the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit (collectively) 
15. (restatement of 4). The Father ≠ the Son 
16. (restatement of 5). The Father ≠ the Holy Spirit 
17. (restatement of 6). The Holy Spirit ≠ the Son 
  
This is a consistent set of propositions that adheres to the classical laws of identity as 
long as proposition 14 is read collectively, not distributively.  This set of propositions is 
consistent with the creedal summary statements ONE and THREE.  It is when conceptualized as 
God that He is one, undivided in substance.  It is when conceptualized as the Father, the Son, 





The logical problem involving the Trinity is to explain how the creedal summary 
statements are logically consistent.  A powerful opening move to addressing the logical problem 
of the Trinity is to identify the one and only God with the three persons collectively, thus noting 
the two different ways of conceptualizing the same portion of reality.  By doing so, the trinitarian 
neither takes his starting point in God nor in the three persons.  The battle over whether Latin 
Trinitarian models or Social Trinitarian models provide the best explanation of the creedal 
summary statements will be decided when one endorses a particular trinitarian model.  
Addressing the logical problem by noting that the one God is identical with the three persons 
(collectively), and that the three persons (collectively) are identical with the one God is a non-
contradictory way to demonstrate consistency between ONE and THREE.  Demonstrations of 
this sort align with common sense and ordinary language use.   
Of course, such a move is not merely the purview of ordinary language and pre-theoretic 
common sense.  Recall the passages mentioned above from Aquinas, Descartes, Frege, and 
Quine.  Because of their controversial nature, numerically hybrid identity claims occupy a space 
in high-level metaphysical and logical theory.  Claiming that identity is a one-one relation that 
anything bears to itself and to nothing else, but that this account employs a one-many/many-one 
relation, and thus that this account is flawed, does not demonstrate that the doctrine of the Trinity 
is illogical.  A deeper analysis of plural identity claims is needed and is the content of the 
following section.  The account described heretofore has deliberately steered away from the 
philosophical understanding of the mereological notions of composition, parthood, proper 
parthood, etc., establishing the primitive notion of plural identity before forging into an analysis 
of composition as identity.  Such a move is consistent with how a non-logician would describe 





Section II—Composition as Identity—a Philosophical Second Move Conceived 
 
If God is triune as traditional Christian theism supposes, then it stands to reason that God 
is necessarily triune.  If God is necessarily triune, then God just is the Trinity and God cannot be 
other than the Trinity.  If God just is the Trinity, then some sort of composition is at play.  The 
Trinity composes God and God is composed by the Trinity.  An oft maligned notion within 
metaphysics is the Composition as Identity (CAI) thesis which claims that the composition 
relation is the identity relation.  Such a position strikes some as obvious and others as obviously 
false.  What is clear is that identity and composition are highly complex notions.   
Composition as Identity is an important thesis to use in understanding the logical 
coherence of the doctrine of the Trinity.23  Is CAI itself consistent?  What are the issues that play 
into accepting or rejecting CAI?  It is best to wade into shallow waters when beginning an 
analysis of these issues. 
Consider ordinary objects, such as tables and mallets.  Often ordinary objects have parts.  
Mallets, for example, have a handle and a head as parts.   The simple analysis that ordinary 
objects have parts opens the door to a variety of philosophical issues.  Suppose the mallet in 
question is comprised of only two parts—the handle and the head—and is the only physical 
object in the world.  How many physical objects are there in this world?  Some may be inclined 
to say one as there is just one mallet.  But the mallet is composed of a handle and a head.  So it 
seems that the handle and head must be counted, too.  Does this mean there are three things?  
Three does not seem right.  There is one mallet, which is comprised to two parts (a handle and a 
head), but to say that three things exist seems to count something twice.   
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If one believes the mallet is a distinct thing from the handle and the head, thus rejecting 
Composition as Identity, then one is committed to co-located objects.  The mallet is a material 
object that occupies region, R.  The handle and the head are material objects that also occupy 
region R.   This is an example of compete spatial overlap.  There is no place that the mallet is and 
the handle and head are not, and there is no place that the handle and the head are that the mallet 
is not.  Complete spatial co-location is a bizarre philosophical commitment, and it may be the 
case that handle and the head are not actually distinct from the mallet.  If this is so, some may be 
inclined to say there are only two objects in this world—the handle and the head.  But then what 
happened to the mallet?  This seemingly simple world containing an ordinary object and its parts 
looks more complicated that initially thought.  It is unclear even how many objects there are 
without first taking stock of important philosophical notions.   
Does the notion of complete spatial overlap hold true for all cases of material 
composition, that is, to all ordinary objects and their parts?  What about the co-location of 
wholes and parts?  Can some objects compose another object?  Is composition ontologically 
innocent?24  Do composite objects gain and lose parts over time?  Can composite objects 
possibly gain or lose parts?  Are composite objects causally redundant?  These are questions that 
help philosophers develop notions of metaphysics that may be applicable to trinitarian 
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restrict wholes from being “nothing over and above” the parts taken together, or fusions.  Lewis 
says, “Given a prior commitment to casts, say a commitment to cat-fusions is not a further 
commitment.  The fusion is nothing over and above the cats that compose it.  It just is them.  
They just are it…the cats are the same portion of Reality either way…if you draw up an 
inventory of Reality according to your scheme of things, it would be double counting to list the 






theorizing.  One of the most vital notions to consider as possibly applicable to trinitarian 
theorizing is that of Composition as Identity.   
Composition as Identity is the view that the composition relation is the identity relation.25  
Bohn defines Composition as Identity as “the thesis that a whole and all its parts collectively is 
the same thing under two different modes of presentation.”26  One of the alleged virtues of the 
thesis is that it entails unrestricted composition, which Bohn defines as the  
                                                          
25 There are various ways to understand Composition as Identity.  Lewis rejects the above 
definition of CAI. His endorsement of Weak Composition as Identity Theory (WCT), as opposed 
to Strong Composition as Identity defined above, commits him to the claim that composition is 
only analogous to identity.  WCT claims that composition does not obey Leibniz’s Law of the 
Indiscernibility of Identicals (Lewis 1991: 87). Megan Wallace believes that this gets Lewis out 
of all of the arguments based on Leibniz’s Law, but it does so at the “cost of blatant false 
advertising: if composition does not obey the Indiscernibility of Identicals, then despite what 
other redeeming features such a relation has, composition is simply not identity.  Claiming that a 
relation is very similar to but not identity entails that such a relation is not identity. And if 
composition is not identity then it is a mystery how it reaps the theoretical benefits of CAI” 
(Wallace, Megan. “Composition as Identity Part 1” in Philosophy Compass. Vol. 6. No. 11. 
2011. P. 809.) 
Donald Baxter (“Identity, Discernibility, and Composition,” in A. J. Cotnoir and Donald 
L.M. Baxter, eds. Composition as Identity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.) endorses a 
radical view of Composition as Identity, which rejects the Indiscernibility of Identicals, which 
also allows him to escape from arguments against Composition as identity based on Leibniz’s 
Law. If Composition as Identity requires giving up well-entrenched principles of identity, then it 
seems that Composition as Identity should be abandoned, not well-entrenched principles of 
identity.  
 Here is a formalized definition of CAI which can describe CAI in terms of a definition of 
identity: (CAI): xxCy =df xx=y), but some (Sider 2007) prefer to formulate CAI in terms of the 
material biconditional: (CAI*): xxCy ↔ xx=y). But opting for a biconditional formulation seems 
too weak. Bohn notes, “For all CAI* says, it could be the case that ‘C’ and ‘=’ express two 
distinct relations that just happens to be such that their extensions overlap, but which might, in 
other possible worlds, fail to be thus related. We thus open up all the room for doubt about 
composition really being a relation of identity. Merely necessitating CAI* doesn’t seem to fully 
resolve the worry of the two relations being distinct. I therefore prefer the stronger formulation in 
terms of a definition. This way there is no room for doubt as to whether ‘C’ and ‘=’ express the 
same relation”  (‘Unrestricted Composition as Identity’ in Composition as Identity, Donald 
Baxter and Aaron Cotnoir (eds.), Oxford University Press, 2014. P.144). 
26 Bohn, E. Unrestricted Composition as Identity” in Composition as Identity, eds. D. Baxter & 






thesis that any plurality of things composes something: the composed is the same 
thing as the composers so if the composers exist, ipso facto so does the composed. 
This provides us with a lot more entities that can play the role of denotation for 
our ordinary and theoretical terms, and so at no extra ontological cost.”27   
 
There may be other virtues of CAI as well.  Megan Wallace contends that “if composition 
is identity, there will be no co-location problem of parts and wholes.”28  There may be a mallet 
occupying region R, and there may be a handle and head occupying region R, but this is not a 
problem for CAI because the parts taken collectively (the handle and the head) are identical to 
the whole (the mallet).  Wallace continues, “Co-location of parts and wholes is no more of a 
problem on this view than co-location is a problem for Superman and Clark Kent—the object(s) 
under discussion are identical, so there are no distinct objects to co-locate.”29 
Composition as Identity is far from a straightforward position, however.  Trenton 
Merricks30 argues that composite objects produce rampant overdetermination if composition is 
not identity.  Suppose a baseball causes a window to break and suppose that the baseball is 
composed of a right half and a left half.  If composition is not identity, then it seems that both the 
baseball (as a whole) caused the window to break and the right and left half (collectively) cause 
the window to break.  The difficulty about how many objects there are also exists when 
considering how many causes and effects there are.  The difficulty dissolves if composition is 
identity.  Overdetermination of a baseball and its parts is no more a problem than 
overdetermination is a problem for Superman and Clark Kent—the object(s) under discussion are 
identical, so there are no distinct objects to over determine anything.   
                                                          
27 Ibid. 
28 Wallace, Megan. “Composition as Identity Part 1” in Philosophy Compass. Vol. 6. No. 11. 
2011. P. 805. 
29 Ibid. 






The advantages CAI provides, however, are purchased at too high a price according to 
CAI’s critics.  Harold Noonan and Ben Curtis identify three primary challenges to CAI.31  The 
first two present different syntactic difficulties while the last pits CAI against Leibniz’s Law.  
The first challenge facing the CAI theorist is the syntactic problem that “hybrid identity 
statements are ungrammatical in English.”32   
Consider the following statements: “Superman = Clark Kent” and “The hunters = the 
gatherers.”  Both of these identity statements are well-formed since the predicates on each side of 
the “=” share either singularity or plurality.  The “=” represents is identical with when the value 
of that on each side of the “=” is singular (Superman/Clark Kent).  The “=” represents are 
identical with when the value of that on each side of the “=” is plural (hunters/gatherers).  The 
order of predicates does not matter so long as the value on each side of the “=” is equivalent.  
Superman = Clark Kent is equivalent to Clark Kent = Superman.  The statement “the bricks = 
the wall” and its inverse “the wall = the bricks” seems not to be well formed since the “=” takes 
on the singular (is identical with) when the wall is on the left of the “=” and the “=” takes on the 
plural (are identical with) when the bricks are on the left of the “=”.  English does not allow 
hybrid identity statements according to Peter van Inwagen.33 
Second is the semantic problem of providing coherent truth-conditions for hybrid identity 
statements.  The standard way to provide the truth-conditions for the classical identity relation is 
to say that an identity statement of the form “p=q” is true iff “p” and “q” have the same referents.  
                                                          
31 Noonan, Harold and Curtis, Ben. "Identity" on The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). 
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32 Ibid. 






But this account clearly does not work for hybrid identity statements since there are not singular 
referents for plural terms.  Likewise, the standard way to provide the truth-conditions for plural 
identity statements does not work for hybrid identity statements either.  Noonan and Curtis 
explain:  
To say that “x is one of the ys” is to say that x is (classically) identical with one of 
the things in the plurality, i.e., that x is identical with y1, or identical with y2… or 
identical with yn. But then “the bricks = the wall” is true only if the wall is 
(classically) identical with one of the bricks, i.e. with b1, or with b2… or with bn, 
which it isn’t.34   
 
The third challenge is “the most troublesome of all.”35  The problem is that Leibniz’s 
Law (and its contrapositive) appears to be crucial to an appropriate understanding of identity and 
distinctness, but it seems that the CAI theorist must deny this.  After all, the bricks are many, but 
the wall is one. “The onus is thus on the defender of strong Composition as Identity to explain 
why we should think the “are” in hybrid identity statements really expresses the relation of 
identity.”36  The second and the third challenges are thought by those Noonan and Curtis 
reference to be “insurmountable.”37  
  Most of the critiques against CAI will address one of these challenges in some way.  If 
CAI cannot adequately address these challenges, then it is a non-starter for explaining the logical 
coherence of the doctrine of the Trinity.  How is a CAI theorist to respond to these challenges? 
RESPONSE TO FIRST CHALLEGE: 
The first challenge is that hybrid identity statements are ungrammatical in English.  Such 
a position is far from certain, however.  Common usages of hybrid identity statements are 
                                                          









employed regularly in English.38  Other languages such as Norwegian and Hungarian39 make use 
of hybrid identity statements, so this challenge merely seems to call for what Noonan and Curtis 
refer to as “a mild form of grammatical revisionism.”40  Philosophy also makes use of formal 
logical languages that do allow hybrid identity claims.  More on hybrid identity statements will 
come in response to the second challenge.   
RESPONSE TO SECOND CHALLENGE: 
The second challenge is providing coherent truth-conditions for hybrid identity 
statements.  Formal logical languages (in addition to Norwegian, Hungarian, and colloquial 
English) can make use of hybrid identity statements.  Identity is the primitive relation everything 
bears to itself and to nothing else, uniquely characterized by the following two laws: 
(R): ∀α(α=α)      [Relation anything bears to itself] 
(LLII): ∀α∀β(α=β→∀X(Xα↔Xβ))   [Leibniz’s Law of the Indiscernibility of  
 Identicals] 
 
In LLII ‘α’ and ‘β’ are first-order variables, and ‘X’ is a second-order variable ranging 
over (extensional) properties.   Bohn explains how numerical hybrid identity statements follow: 
Let ‘α=β’ be the form of our atomic (first-order) well-formed formula (wff) of 
identity, but with each one of ‘α’ and ‘β’ admitting values of any cardinality.  
Without this last admission, composition as identity is a non-starter.  But with that 
assumption on board, we can isolate, or define, various sub-types of expressions 
of identity.  For example, the instances in which both ‘α’ and ‘β’ take singular 
values we mark as the expressions of identity from classical first-order singular 
logic: x=y. The instances in which both ‘α’ and ‘β’ take plural values we mark as 
the expressions of identity from first-order plural logic: xx=yy. The instances in 
which ‘α’ takes a plural value and ‘β’ a singular value we mark as the expressions 
of what we might call numerically hybrid identity: xx=y.41   
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39 Sider, Tomas. “Parthood” in Philosophical Review Vol. 116. P. 51-91. 
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With numerically hybrid identity in place, a formalized definition of Composition as 
Identity can now be presented: 
(CAI): xxCy =df xx=y  
where ‘C’ is the predicate expressing composition.  So in this case xx taken collectively 
composes y and xx is identical to y.  Of course, since identity is reflexive, y is identical to xx, but 
importantly, composition is not reflexive.  Any formalized system must provide the appropriate 
restrictions to prevent arriving at yCxx (read ‘y composes xx’) which is mereological nonsense.  
Identity is two-way, but composition is one-way.  The composition relation, even though one-
way, is the identity relation since xx collectively and y pick out the same portion of reality, but 
no plurality of objects can be composed of a singular object.  CAI permits only substitutions of 
the following sort: ‘xx=y’/‘y=xx’ can be substituted for ‘xxCy’ (xx compose y), but not for 
‘yCxx’ (y composes xx).   
So what are the truth-conditions for hybrid identity statements?  The standard way to 
provide the truth-conditions for the classical identity relation is to say that an identity statement 
of the form α=β is true iff ‘α’ and ‘β’ have the same referents.  But hybrid identity statements of 
the form xx=y must have different referents (since there are not plural referents for singular 
terms).  Let ‘v’ be a primitive value assignment.  Since ‘α=β’ is satisfied iff v(α) is identical with 
v(β), ‘xx=y’ is satisfied iff v(xx) is identical with v(y).  CAI says that the truth-condition for 
‘xxCy’ is satisfied iff v(xx) is identical with v(y).   
CAI allows for the definitions the rest of the mereological predicates as well. 
Parthood: x<y=df∃zz(zz,xCy) 
Proper Parthood: x<<y=df x<y&x≠y 
Overlap: xOy =df ∃z(z<x&z<y) 





Each of these mereological predicates is entailed by (CAI): xxCy =df xx=y.  Claiming that 
the bricks = the wall is true only if the wall is (classically) identical with one of the bricks, i.e. 
with b1, or with b2… or with bn, makes the critical error of understanding identity distributively, 
not collectively.  CAI understands identity collectively and explains the truth-conditions for 
hybrid identity statements of the form ‘xx=y’ as being satisfied iff xx (collectively) is identical 
with y.   
Adopting a language that includes irreducibly plural terms, which refer to objects 
collectively, as opposed to only distributively, removes the bizarre need for the wall to be 
identical with any particular brick, which clearly it is not.  Suppose that o1, o2…, on are the parts 
of a composite object O.  A merely singular language construes identity distributively: 
(Merely Singular Language reading) o1 =O &o2 =O & … & on = O.  
In contrast, CAI accepts the claim that the parts taken collectively are identical to the 
whole:  
(CAI Plural Language reading) o1,o2, …, on = O  
The CAI theorist can use ‘,’ as a way of concatenating singular terms, where, for example 
‘x,y’ means ‘x and y, taken together.’   
RESPONSE to THIRD CHALLENGE: 
The third challenge to CAI invokes Leibniz’s Law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals.  
Leibniz’s Law is a stalwart concept of philosophy and so any theory that violates it must either 
demonstrate that Leibniz’s Law is not applicable to it or the theory must be jettisoned.  CAI 
states that the composition relation is the identity relation for all composite objects.  A composite 
object O is identical to its parts o1, o2, o3, …, on collectively: ((CAI): o1, o2, o3, …, on Compose O 





Leibniz’s Law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals (LLII) states for any object x and any 
object y, x = y, if any property P holds of x, then P must also hold of y and vice versa: (LLII): 
∀x∀y(x=y→∀P(Px↔Py)). 
Arguments against CAI based on LLII can (generally) be formalized as follows: 
1. If CAI, then o1, o2, o3…on = O.                [CAI]  
2. If o1, o2, o3…,on = O, then for any property P, o1, o2, o3, …, on have P if O has P.       [LLII]  
3. For some property R, either (o1, o2, o3, …, on have R and O does not) or  
  (O has R and o1, o2, o3, …, on do not).           [Premise]  
4. So, o1, o2, o3, …, on ≠ O.                 [2, 3 MT]  
5. So, CAI is false.                  [4, 1 MT]  
  
Arguments against CAI based on LLII are presented in various sorts, each differing 
importantly by how premise 3 is filled out.  Most such arguments cash premise three out in terms 
of NUMBER, TEMPORAL, or MODAL presentations.  
NUMBER: If CAI is true, then the parts are (strictly) identical to the whole. But if this is 
so, then by LLII, any property the parts have the whole must have as well.  But the parts are 
many, while the whole is not. So, the parts are not identical to the whole. So, CAI is false.42 
For TEMPORAL and MODAL imagine some Lego bricks, scattered and in no particular 
order, at t1.  At t2 someone makes a Lego wall out of the Lego bricks, such that the Lego bricks 
compose the Lego wall at t2.  Also imagine that Lego bricks can survive being scattered (after 
all, they are scattered and survive at t1), but that the Lego wall cannot survive being scattered.  
TEMPORAL: If CAI is true, then the Lego bricks are (strictly) identical to the Lego wall. 
But if this is so, then by LLII, any property the Lego bricks have the Lego wall must have as 
well.  But the Lego bricks existed at time t1, while the Lego wall did not.  So, the Lego bricks are 
not identical to the Lego wall. So, CAI is false.  
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MODAL: If CAI is true, then the Lego bricks are (strictly) identical to the Lego wall.  
But if this is so, then by LLII, any property the Lego bricks have the Lego wall must have as 
well.  But the Lego bricks could have survived being scattered, while the Lego wall could not.  
So, the Lego bricks are not identical to the Lego wall. So, CAI is false.   
Are such arguments based on LLII decisive against CAI?  The only rule of inference 
needed in each is modus tollens, which is classically valid.  Each of the remaining premises is 
justified by definition, an accepted rule of identity, or by a seemingly obvious empirical claim.  
How should the CAI theorist respond to such arguments?   
The CAI theorist can maintain that many of the arguments based on LLII above are 
invalid by noting that many of the arguments commit the formal fallacy of equivocation.  The 
equivocation becomes clear after introducing plural language and after including numerically 
hybrid identity.  In arguments that make no equivocation, a CAI theorist must seek to deny the 
truth of premise 3.   
First consider objections of the NUMBER sort.  Some might suspect that CAI is simply 
incoherent when considered in light of LLII.  Assume a,b compose c. By CAI, a,b=c. By LLII, 
any property of a,b is then a property of c, and vice versa.  But, (1) a,b has a cardinal property 
greater than one, which c does not; (2) a,b form a many-membered set, which c does not; and (3) 
a,b has the property of having b as one of them, which c does not.  So, by virtue of LLII, CAI 
seems to be incoherent as a,b have properties that c does not.   
What goes wrong for (1), (2), and (3) is that the mode of presentation, or concept under 
which the things of which predications are made, is not considered.  No ordinary thing has a 
particular cardinality independent of how it is conceptualized.  Frege demonstrates this 





thought of as one poem, or as twenty-four Books, or as some large Number of verses; and a pile 
of cards can be thought of as one pack or as fifty-two cards.”43  Frege concludes that cardinality 
is a property that “attaches to” concepts, not the things falling under those concepts.  A person 
can hold one and the same thing in her hand and truly say of it that is one deck of cards, four 
suits of sets, but 52 cards.  One and the same thing is thus one when thought under, or picked out 
by, the concept deck of cards, four when thought under, or picked out by, the concept suits of 
sets, but 52 when thought under, or picked out by, the concept card.   
This process is called relative counting.  Relative counting maintains that a person cannot 
determine how many things there are until she has been given a sortal (a concept or kind) under 
which to count by.  Generally, there cannot be a unique numerical answer (‘1’ or ‘4’ or ‘52’) to 
the unrelativized question How many are there?   Unique numerical answers are legitimately 
given to questions that include a legitimate sortal (How many cards are there?).  Relative 
counting is useful, but may be “insufficiently general” because consideration must be given to 
other paradoxical cases as well.  Bohn explains:  
It makes little sense to say that forming a set is a relation that only holds of 
concepts.  In the case of impure sets, it is usually the things that fall under a 
concept that are members of and form a set, not the concept.  So, it is better to say 
that in all “problematic” cases of the same kind as the three above, i.e. in all cases 
of predication whose truth depends on a unique kind of “division” or 
“decomposition” of the value of the subject term, the properties and relations hold 
relative to concepts, not of concepts.  This way the road to the above paradoxes is 
immediately blocked: having a property F, or standing in a relation R, relative to 
C1, but not having it or standing in it relative to C2 is no paradox.  A formula of 
the form F(x1,…,xn,c1)&∼F(x1,…,xn,c2) is no contradiction…Does invoking 
concepts as relational units entail some form of mind-dependence or lack of 
objectivity with respect to the relational properties?  Only to the extent concepts 
are mind-dependent or lack objectivity, which I take it, in good Fregean spirit, 
they aren’t and don’t.44 
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Arguments of the NUMBER sort equivocate when charging differing cardinality to parts 
and wholes by not accounting for the different modes of presentation/conceptualization and are 
thus invalid.  
Next consider TEMPORAL: If CAI is true, then the Lego bricks are (strictly) identical to 
the Lego wall. But if this is so, then by LLII, any property the Lego bricks have the Lego wall 
must have as well.  But the Lego bricks existed at time t1, while the Lego wall did not.  So, the 
Lego bricks are not identical to the Lego wall. So, CAI is false.  
One way to mitigate this argument is to claim that ordinary objects are composed of more 
than merely spatial parts.  Following Lewis (1986), Heller (1984), Sider (1997, 2001), one could 
claim that ordinary objects are composed of temporal parts as well as spatial parts.  It may be the 
case that ordinary objects are four-dimensional sums of spatial and temporal parts.  What 
grounds certain temporal facts about a person—that she used to be 3 feet tall, that she is going to 
change her hair color to pink, etc.—is that a temporal part of a four-dimensional sum is in fact 3 
feet tall, does in fact have pink hair, etc.  ‘Change’ is qualitative difference between temporal 
parts.  The hair changes from blonde to pink by having a temporal part that is blonde and another 
temporal part that is pink.  This avoids violating LLII since the temporal part that is blonde is 
non-identical to the temporal part that is pink.  Both temporal parts, however (along with many 
other parts), compose the person.   
Assume ordinary objects like Lego bricks and Lego walls actually are four-dimensional 
sums of spatial and temporal parts.  This assumption allows the CAI theorist to maintain that the 
four-dimensional Lego-brick-sum is distinct from the four-dimensional Lego-wall-sum since the 
Lego wall is not composed of all and only the Lego bricks, given this assumption.  The four-





wall-sum and since the Lego wall does not exist until t2, any relevant Lego parts at t1 compose 
the Lego bricks, not the Lego wall.  
If only spatial parts are under consideration, then the Lego bricks are (collectively) 
identical to the Lego wall according to CAI.  Once temporal facts are introduced, however, the 
CAI theorist can legitimately assume that it is no longer merely spatial parts under consideration 
and can then reevaluate the identity claim.  If a four-dimensional object such as a Lego-brick-
sum that has all of its spatial and temporal parts in common with a Lego-wall-sum, as some 
interpretations of four-dimensionalism contend,45 then the CAI theorist will accept the identity 
claim that the Lego bricks are (collectively) identical with the Lego wall.  But this would remove 
any teeth that TEMPORAL might have since there is no temporal feature that the parts (the Lego 
bricks) have that the whole (the Lego wall) does not, and so the appeal to LLII would be wasted.  
Importantly, these potential moves are consistent with CAI, since there may be two 
distinct wholes (the Lego-brick-sum and the Lego-wall-sum) each of which is identical to its 
parts, or there may be one whole (the collection of Legos variously construed as a pile, as a wall, 
etc.) which is identical to its parts (the Lego bricks).   
Finally, consider MODAL: If CAI is true, then the Lego bricks are (strictly) identical to 
the Lego wall.  But if this is so, then by LLII, any property the Lego bricks have the Lego wall 
must have as well.  But the Lego bricks could have survived being scattered, while the Lego wall 
could not.  So, the Lego bricks are not identical to the Lego wall. So, CAI is false.   
Arguments of this sort contend that even if four-dimensionalism is granted, it is still the 
case that there is a property of the Lego bricks that is not a property of the Lego wall, namely 
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that Lego bricks could survive being scattered, but the Lego wall could not.  The Lego wall 
never needs to actually be scattered for these properties to hold, just the possibility of scattering 
is enough to make the properties hold. 
A response to this argument could contend that when it comes to de re modal predication, 
such predication is flexible and dependent on a certain way of conceptualizing the object in 
question.  So, it may be true that the Lego wall is identical to Lego bricks, but to say that the 
Lego wall could not survive being scattered is just to say that the Lego wall has Lego wall 
counterparts that do not survive being scattered, which is also consistent with the Lego wall 
having Lego bricks counterparts that do survive being scattered.  And all of this is consistent 
with the fact that the Lego wall is identical to Lego bricks.   
Wallace contends that if the CAI theorist accepts flexible de re predication, then she can 
explain how it is that modal properties that seemingly distinguish parts from wholes are really 
just two different ways of conceptualizing what is in fact identical.  The only difference is that 
instead of the identity claim in question being a one-one relation it is many-one (Lego bricks 
[collectively] = Lego wall).  The CAI theorist can block MODAL by denying that modal 
predicates such as could have survived being scattered apply to the Lego bricks but do not apply 
to the Lego wall based on counterpart theory and a different manner of conceptualizing the same 
portion of reality.   
So it seems that all the challenges presented against CAI can be met.  CAI makes 
important use of numerically hybrid identity statements, which are grammatical in colloquial 
English, Norwegian, Hungarian, and in formal logical languages.  CAI can provide coherent 
truth-conditions for numerically hybrid identity statements, namely when the value, v, of xx is 





the truth-condition for ‘xxCy’ is satisfied iff v(xx) is identical with v(y).  CAI can also stand 
against charges alleging inconsistency with Leibniz’s Law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals, 
since the arguments making such allegations are either invalid based on equivocation or they 
contain a false premise based on a misunderstanding of conceptualization.   
 
Section III—Composition as Identity—a Philosophical Move Implemented Demonstrating  
 
the Coherence of ONE and THREE 
 
Can CAI really help the address the logical challenges raised against the Trinity?  It 
certainly seems so.  The main logical objections raised against the doctrine pit the following 
creedal summary statements against each other. 
ONE: There is one God. 
THREE: The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are distinct divine persons. 
 
On a simple CAI reading, there is no paradox here at all.  The one God is the three 
persons (collectively).  The three persons (collectively) are the one God.  The one God is 
composed of the three persons (collectively).  The three persons (collectively) compose the one 
God.  The three persons are distinct divine persons, but it is not the case that each person 
individually/distributively is identical with God.  Yet proponents of logical critiques of the 
Trinity regularly try to elicit contradiction by charging that the doctrine claims that the Father 
individually is identical to God, that the Son individually is identical to God, and that the Holy 
Spirit individually is identical to God.  If it is the case that the doctrine states that the persons 
(distributively) are each identical to God, then there must be three46 Gods, contradicting ONE.   
Shieva Kleinschmidt alleges that the doctrine of the Trinity makes just this critical error. 
                                                          





The doctrine of the Trinity is, put simply, a conjunction of these three claims: (i) 
There are three distinct Divine Persons: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, 
(ii) each Divine Person is God, and (iii) there is exactly one God.  However, if 
there are three distinct Persons that are each God, we should get the result there 
are three Gods.  It seems Trinitarian Christians are having trouble counting:  they 
need 3 to equal 1.47  
 
The trinitarian may be quite capable of counting if there is an errant claim in 
Kleinschmidt’s summary.  The errant claim rests in (ii).  Kleinschmidt interprets the creeds to 
say that each divine person individually, or distributively, is identical with God.  She therefore 
writes (ii) as a statement of numerical identity.  But nothing in the statements summarizing 
creedal orthodoxy requires that the persons distributively are each identical to God.  In fact, the 
creeds seem to explicitly reject this faulty notion.  Claiming that the creeds do, in fact, declare 
that the persons distributively are each identical to God is an unfortunate misunderstanding of the 
creeds.  Consider the following Athanasian Creedal affirmations:48  
(a) The Father is uncreated; the Son is uncreated; and the Holy Spirit is uncreated.   
      And yet there are not three uncreated, but one uncreated. 
(b) The Father is unlimited; the Son is unlimited; and the Holy Spirit is unlimited.  
      And yet there are not three infinites, but one infinite.   
(c) The Father is eternal; the Son is eternal; and the Holy Spirit is eternal.   
      And yet they are not three eternals, but one eternal.   
(d) Father is Almighty; the Son is Almighty; and the Holy Spirit is Almighty.   
      And yet they are not three Almighties, but one Almighty.   
(e) The Father is God; the Son is God; and the Holy Spirit is God.   
     And yet they are not three Gods, but one God.   
(f) So likewise the Father is Lord; the Son is Lord; and the Holy Spirit is Lord.   
      And yet they are not three Lords, but one Lord.   
(g) We acknowledge every Person by himself to be God and Lord;  
      We are forbidden to say, there are three Gods, or three Lords.   
 
(a)-(g) all follow the same pattern: The Father is X, the Son is X, the Holy Spirit is X, and 
yet there are not three Xs, but one X.  The only way to make sense of this pattern which ascribes 
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X to each of the persons, but does not yield three Xs is to read the statements not as employing 
the “is of identity,” but as utilizing the “is of predication” when ascribing X to the persons and 
then to read the creedal statements as using the (collective) “is/are of identity” when denying that 
there are three Xs.49 The denial that there are three Xs seems to be based on a collective 
understanding of the divine persons who together compose the one God.  The creedal 
affirmations seem to make use of distinct understandings of ‘is/are.’50  A non-creedal example 
may help see the distinction played out. 
Suppose a wall is composed of only three bricks.  Under CAI, the bricks (collectively) 
compose the wall (xxCy, where xx=the bricks and y=the wall).  Since there is a numerically 
hybrid identity statement which understands the bricks (collectively) to compose the wall, 
following the form xx=y, the wall is identical to the bricks collectively, not individually.  Now 
ascribe a property to each of the bricks, say redness.  So it is the case that b1 is red, b2 is red, and 
b3 is red.  How many red things are there?  It seems like ‘three’ could be the answer as there are 
                                                          
49 The ‘is’ of identity, among other features, is symmetrical; whereas predication is 
not.  ‘Eternal’ is predicable of the Father, but the Father is not predicable of ‘eternal.’). 
50 In addition to making use if the “is of identity” and the “is of ascription,” philosophy also 
makes use of the “is of composition.”  The “is of composition” is employed when a group 
collectively composes a whole.  It is the claim of this project that the three divine persons (the 
Trinity) compose God.  The “is of composition” does not have to make an identity claim.  Saying 
that Socrates’ body is (composed of) skin and bone is not to say that Socrates’ body is identical 
to skin and bone.  After all, there is skin and bone that do not compose Socrates.  The “is of 
composition” serves as a subcategory of the “is of ascription.”  Saying that Socrates’ body is 
(composed of) skin and bone is to say that Socrates’ body fits into the category skin and bone.  
That is, Socrates’ body predicatively has the property “is composed of skin and bone,” ascribed 
to it.  Other bodies might also be so composed.  The “is of composition,” as subcategory of the 
“is of ascription” is only employed when the linguistic context demands it.  Linguistically, the 
“is of composition” serves as a subcategory of the “is of ascription,” noting that some whole is 
fully inside of a given linguistic category, not that the whole in question fully exhausts that 
linguistic category.  Mereologically, the composition relation is the identity relation.  It seems 
that the creeds simply use “is/are” and the interpreter must decide if the use of “is/are” intends an 







three red bricks.  But if the three bricks collectively compose the wall, it seems like ‘one’ could 
be the answer as there is only the one red wall.51  ‘Four’ should not be the answer because the 
three bricks (collectively) are identical to the one wall since they compose it, so claiming ‘four’ 
would be an instance of double counting.   
Consider the following affirmation:  
(h) b1 is red, b2 is red, and b3 is red. 
      And yet there are not three reds, but one red. 
 
Again, how many red things are there?  While it is tempting to say ‘three’ based on the 
first line of the affirmation, the second line explicitly states that the answer is ‘one,’ indicating 
that the sortal assumed in the question How many red things are there? is ‘walls’/wholes.  Some 
may claim that affirmation (h) is incoherent because the first line claims that there are three reds 
and the second line claims that there are not three reds, which is a contradiction.  Contradiction, 
however, only abounds under a particular reading of (h).  If the first line employs the ‘is of 
identity,’ then, yes, contradiction emerges.  But no contradiction exists if (1) the first line 
employs the ‘is of predication,’ (2) the second line employs the ‘is/are of identity’ when denying 
that there are three reds, and (3) the second line assumes CAI when referring to the numerically 
singular whole.   
It may seem as though this is an unnecessarily complex understanding of (h), but it is also 
a necessary understanding of (h) if one is to avoid contradiction.  Imagine not being asked to 
interpret (h) as reader, but to write an affirmation of the following: there are three bricks; each 
brick is numerically distinct; each brick has the property of redness; the bricks collectively 
compose a single wall; the wall has the property of redness; the bricks never fail to compose the 
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wall; CAI is true; and to write it in such a way that does not make mention of one’s 
philosophical and logical assumptions, but that instead maintains poetic brevity and rhetorical 
cadence.  One could do worse than to whip up (h).  If that content served as the basis of what one 
wanted to affirm, and under the stricture of maintaining poetic brevity and rhetorical cadence, it 
may be possible to present a more precise and equally brief and poetic rendering of that content, 
but (h) is certainly an acceptable affirmation of that content under such stricture.   
Might it be the case that the ancient Creeds of Christendom were devised in a 
philosophically rich milieu but under the compulsion to compact the logically coherent beliefs of 
the Christian faith into a brief, poetically robust set of affirmations which would be easy to 
memorize and recite aloud?  This seems, in fact, to be exactly what the creeds are and how they 
function.   
Consider (a)-(d).  How many uncreated, infinites, eternals, and Almighties are there?  
Consider (a)-(d)’s first lines in isolation from the other lines of the creed.  In each case, the 
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit each have a property ascribed to them.  Under an ‘is of identity’ 
reading of the affirmations’ first lines, each person is identical to the property listed.  Under such 
a reading, the answer to the question How many uncreated, infinites, eternals, and Almighties are 
there? is clearly ‘three.’  Then using basic logical laws of identity, each person must be identical 
to the others, but this violates the creed’s forbidding the ‘confounding’ of the persons.   
Under an ‘is of predication’ reading of the affirmations’ first lines, each person has the 
same properties predicated of them, but the persons are not identical to those properties.  This 
means that while fully uncreated, unlimited, eternal, and Almighty, none of the persons exhaust 
those categories, since the other persons also completely fit into those property categories.  





Almighties are there? is undetermined without knowing (1) the creedal literary context of these 
lines, and/or (2) the philosophical/logical commitments of the creed’s authors.  Fortunately, the 
literary context of the creed is clear, and the authors of the creed were not haphazard logicians.52 
According to the first lines, each person has a given property predicatively.  Since the 
nature of the second lines of (a)-(d) explicitly denies the answer ‘three,’ shouldn’t the ‘is of 
identity’ reading of the first lines be rejected on pain of contradiction?  Why should the ‘is of 
identity’ reading be endorsed given the literary context of the creed and the author’s commitment 
to logic and reasoning?53   
Consider (a)-(d)’s second line.  In each case, it is affirmed that the answer to the question 
How many uncreated, infinites, eternals, and Almighties are there? is not three, but ‘one.’  These 
second lines have two components: a denial of distributive independent predications made of the 
persons and an affirmation of the predication of the collectively unified persons—i.e. the ‘Trinity 
in Unity.’  The initial component seems to employ the ‘is/are of identity’ for the explicit purpose 
of denying that there are three uncreated, infinities, eternals, and Almighties.  The explicit 
emphasis is clear: there is no distributive identity obtaining.  It is simply not the case that there 
are three independent eternals because, unlike bricks that could still exist as red and not be a part 
of the wall, the three eternal persons necessarily coexist as parts of the one being that is God.54  
The latter component seems to assume a CAI understanding.  The reason that there is only ‘one’ 
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uncreated, infinite, eternal, and Almighty is that the three persons (Trinity) compose the one God 
(Unity).   
Now consider (e)-(g). 
  (e) The Father is God; the Son is God; and the Holy Spirit is God.   
     And yet they are not three Gods; but one God.   
(f) So likewise the Father is Lord; the Son is Lord; and the Holy Spirit is Lord.   
      And yet they are not three Lords; but one Lord.   
(g) We acknowledge every Person by himself to be God and Lord;  
      We are forbidden to say, there are three Gods, or three Lords.   
 
Consider (e) The Father is God; the Son is God; and the Holy Spirit is God.   
                    And yet they are not three Gods; but one God.   
 
Even though (e) and (f) follow the exact pattern of predicating properties to the persons 
and then denying distributive identity before affirming collective identity, just as above in (a)-
(d), Kleinschmidt insists that the Athanasian Creed in (e) affirms that the Father, the Son, and the 
Holy Spirit are distributively each God and claims that utilizing a CAI approach “just looks like 
the denial of the original claim in the Athanasian creed; to interpret the original statement in a 
way that makes it compatible with what appears to be its denial seems problematic.”55 
The reason that Kleinschmidt contends that the pattern breaks with (e) is most likely the 
use of the term ‘God.’  ‘God’ often functions like a proper name for the one God, but must it 
always so function?  Certainly not.  There is a predicative property usage of the term as well.56  It 
is not always immediately clear which usage is intended when the term is employed.  Consider 
the following uses: 
(h) Jesus is God. 
(i) The Trinity is God. 
(j) And yet they (the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit) are not three Gods; but one God.   
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Proper names are linked to identity,57 but none of these examples require the term ‘God’ 
to function as a proper name.  The key to determining the usage of the term ‘God’ does not lie in 
its deployment, but with the verb of the sentence in which it is deployed.  Each of (h)-(j) include 
either an ‘is’ or an ‘are’ (the same verb but conjugated for singular and for plural subjects).   
Consider (h): Jesus is God.   
Jesus (the Son) is a divine person according to the Christian faith and as laid out in the 
creeds.  ‘Jesus’ is the subject and ‘God’ is the object and ‘is’ is the verb.  How does the verb 
function?  As noted above, ‘is’ can be read in an identity way or in a predicative way.  Under the 
‘is of identity’ reading, Jesus is identical to God.  Every property that Jesus has God has and 
every property that God has Jesus has.  If Jesus or God has a property that the other does not 
have, then Jesus is not identical to God.  Assuming trinitarianism and CAI, Jesus has (among 
others) the properties of being a part of the Trinity and not being the whole Trinity, but God has 
the properties of being the whole Trinity and not being a part of the Trinity.  Given trinitarianism 
and CAI, then, Jesus is not identical to God.  So what is to be made of (h)?  Is it a false statement 
or is there another possible reading of it? 
‘Is’ does more work than merely indicate identity.  Under an ‘is of predication’ reading of 
(h), Jesus is not identical with God since he is not everything that God is (Jesus is not the 
Trinity), but Jesus is located fully within the category ‘God,’ yet Jesus does not exhaust the 
category.  It is not a contradiction to say that someone else is also under the same category.  This 
is, in fact, exactly what the Athanasian Creed affirms.  It is like saying ‘Kamie is beautiful.’  
Kamie is not identical to beauty since she is not everything that beauty is, but Kamie is located 
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fully within the category ‘beautiful,’ yet Kamie does not exhaust the category.  ‘Kamie is 
beautiful’ is not inconsistent with ‘Kim is beautiful’ and ‘Kamie is not Kim.’  The reason those 
three statements are consistent is that the ‘is’ does not denote identity in the first two statements, 
but ascribes a property to both Kamie and to Kim.  The final statement’s use of ‘is’ does denote 
identity, explicitly denying that Kamie and Kim are identical.  
The property that (h) ascribes to Jesus is something like is a divine person, which is 
exactly what the creed affirms.  Since the creed explicitly denies the logical outcome of having 
three Gods, the ‘is’ in (e), as it is in (h), must be serving as the ‘is of predication.’  The only 
difficulty that remains is that (e) does not say ‘Jesus (the Son) is a divine person,’ it says Jesus 
(the Son) is God.  But since ‘is a divine person’ is a legitimate reading of ‘is God,’ under 
predicative property assignment, the fact that ‘God’ often plays the part of a proper name, should 
not drive one’s interpretation to the ‘is of identity.’   
Consider (i): The Trinity is God.   
Here the ‘is’ must indicate identity.  Even under trinitarian theories that do not make use 
of CAI, God is identical to the Trinity.  No ‘is of predication’ reading makes sense for (i) since 
‘The Trinity’ functions as a proper name functions, not as a property predicated of something.  
The property predicated of something indicating that it is the Trinity is triune.  The term ‘God’ 
can serve as a predication, but since the Trinity is everything that God is, given trinitarianism, 
and since the Trinity fully exhausts the category ‘God,’ an ‘is of predication’ reading collapses 
into an employment of the ‘is of identity.’ 
Consider (j): And yet they (the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit) are not three Gods;  
         but one God.   
 
Here the ‘to be’ verb is conjugated for a plural subject—they (the Father, the Son, and the 





assumed usage of the verb.  The only legitimate reading of the are not verb in (j) is an ‘are of 
identity’ reading because the object (three Gods) cannot function as a predicative category since 
the category would be repeated in triplicate if the verb were not negated.  Categories have no 
need of reduplication because things that are not identical to each other can coexist in a given 
category so long as none (distributively) exhaust that category.  If something fully exhausts a 
given category, than anything in that category is identical to that something.  Since (j) 
specifically notes that they are not three Gods, but one God, this is not a case of three non-
identical things coexisting within the category ‘God.’  All this prevents an ‘are of predication’ 
reading.  This is a case of ‘they’ collectively being one thing, and since the one thing they are 
fully exhausts the category (according to the creed), even if the authors had ‘God’ in mind as a 
property category able to be predicated of something, that category understanding becomes an 
identity relationship in virtue of the complete conceptual overlap of ‘they (the Father, the Son, 
and the Holy Spirit)’ and ‘God.’   
Consider (f): So likewise the Father is Lord; the Son is Lord; and the Holy Spirit is Lord.   
                              And yet they are not three Lords; but one Lord. 
 
The same problem presents itself as in (e).  Instead of ‘God,’ the term in play is ‘Lord.’  
The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are all said to be Lord, but (f) insists that they are not 
three Lords, but one Lord.  An ‘is/are of predication’ is the preferable reading for the first line if 
one is to allow the creed to prohibit a modalistic confounding of the persons.  The second line, as 
in (e), cannot be read as the ‘are of predication,’ however, because of the issue of total 
conceptual overlap and must therefore be read as an ‘are of identity.’ If the second line did not 
employ a negative formulation of the ‘are of predication,’ there would be not three, but only one 
predication of the category ‘Lord,’ but since the three are non-identical to each other they could 





predication of the category ‘Lord’ becomes an identity relationship: the one Lord is the Father, 
the Son, and the Holy Spirit collectively.  The best way to make sense of this is Composition as 
Identity.   
Consider lastly: (g) We acknowledge every Person by himself to be God and Lord;  
                                We are forbidden to say, there are three Gods, or three Lords.   
 
At first glance, (g) seems to present a logical problem.  If each person by himself is God 
and Lord, then how can it be forbidden to say there are three Gods or three Lords?  Again, 
everything turns on the proper reading of ‘is.’  If one is to be charitable at all to the authors of the 
creeds, then one should look for a way to preserve the coherence of what they affirm.  To do 
otherwise is to beg the question against the logic of creedal affirmations.  If the first line of (g), 
which assumes the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit to be the persons under consideration, 
employs the ‘to be of identity’ for each person distributively/individually, then it would be 
undeniable that there are three Gods and three Lords.  Reading the verb ‘to be’ as a statement of 
identity is not the only acceptable reading, however.  The first line of (g) can be read to say that 
the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit each by himself falls under the categories ‘God’ and 
‘Lord.’  If a person fully falls under a given category, then the property content understanding of 
that category is predicated upon that person, such that the Father is divine (what it means to be 
fully inside the category ‘God’) and is lordly—fully possessed of all the rights and privileges of 
being Lord (what it means to be fully inside the category ‘Lord’).  Likewise for the Son and the 
Holy Spirt.  They are fully inside the categories ‘God’ and ‘Lord.’  Such a ‘to be of predication’ 
reading absolves the first line of (g) from contradicting second line of (g). 
The context of (g) (the Athanasian Creed) also says “the Godhead of the Father, of the 
Son, and of the Holy Spirit, is all one.”  Given this context, it seems that the use of the verb to be 





second line.  The property all one belongs to the Godhead of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit 
collectively.  It is together that the persons form the Godhead which is ‘one.’  The reason we are 
forbidden to say there are three Gods or three Lords is that while each divine person falls within 
the categories ‘God’ and ‘Lord,’ only together do the persons fully exhaust those categories and 
fully exhausting a category (complete conceptual overlap) is another way of describing the 
identity relation.  If each fully exhausted the categories, then each would be identical to each 
other, but if each does not fully exhaust the category, then all three can coexist within those 
categories, and there would be three Gods and three Lords, insofar as three persons are each 
predicated the property ‘God’ and ‘Lord.’  Since we are forbidden to say (presumably because is 
it false to say) that there are three Gods and three Lords, it must be the case that the second line 
of (g) is making an identity claim and what is forbidden is saying that there are three persons 
who are each distributively identical to God or Lord.   The second line of (g) must be an instance 
of the ‘is/are of identity’ since the ‘one’ which referred to the Godhead of the Father, the Son, 
and the Holy Spirit earlier in the creed, is used again here.  The one God and Lord is numerically 
identical to the Godhead of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit (the Trinity). 
Drawing distinctions in the employment of the verb ‘to be’ (and its various conjugations: 
is, are, to be) is an acceptable reading of the particular syntax involved in creedal affirmations.  
Composition as Identity seems to be an essential element in deriving this coherent understanding 
of the creeds.  When referring to the persons (distributively), the creeds affirm that each person 
predicatively falls under particular property categories.  When referring to persons 





CAI proves of great use to the Trinitarian, opposing Kleinschmidt’s assertion that CAI “is not 
useful in helping reconcile the claims in the Doctrine of the Trinity.”58   
Kleinschmidt has the same logic in mind when she makes her claim, preventing her 
dissent from being a case of meaning something by CAI other than what is discussed here, but 
takes a starting point that “…each Divine Person is a God,” and continues in a footnote:  
The language of the Athanasian Creed can be read in various ways.  In this paper, 
I will take ‘God’ to be a name, and ‘god’ to be a count noun.  When I talk of there 
being “one God” I mean “for any x1,…xn, and y1…yn, if x1 stands in the identity 
relation to God, and y1…yn, stands in the identity relation to God, the x1…xn 
stands in the identity relation to y1,…yn.  (Where a plurality’s standing in the 
identity relation to an entity does not entail that every member of the plurality 
stands in the identity relation to that entity.  And of course, there might be only 
one member of x1,…xn and y1,…yn.)
59  
 
Given her commitment to each divine person (distributively) being a God, Kleinschmidt 
asks of the doctrine, “But do we really want to claim that the Persons compose God?  This will 
require that each of the Persons is a part of God.”60  The divine persons being parts of God is 
unseemly to Kleinschmidt since this tends to promote Social Trinitarian views, of which she 
disapproves: 
Suppose we claim that the Persons stand in a many-one composition relation to 
God; that is, they are each a proper part of God, and together compose Him.  Now 
it seems we are simply left with a form of Social Trinitarianism…Using parthood, 
the Social Trinitarian will claim there is one god, God, who is a composite being 
whose parts are the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.  This is exactly what we have 
when we require that composition is many-one in our application of [CAI].  So 
taking the many-one option requires that the [CAI] theorist endorse a response to 
the puzzle of the Trinity which can stand on its own.61 
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Why must CAI promote a trinitarianism that can stand independent of Social 
Trinitarianism (ST) or Latin Trinitarianism (LT)?  It seems a peculiar requirement of a 
mereological notion that it explain a theological doctrine on its own, outside the theological and 
philosophical milieu in which the doctrine is often described.  Of course, CAI makes no 
commitment to ST inherently.  CAI is a mereological notion that seeks to make sense of the 
identity relation in a particular version of Christian Theism.   
Understanding God to be identical to the divine persons (collectively) is itself not a ST 
move as it does not start with the persons and then seek to explain the Unity.  Nor is such an 
understanding an LT move as it does not start with the Unity and then seek to explain the 
persons.  Rather, such an understanding claims that cardinality is not an inherent property of 
anything until relativized to some category of understanding the thing in question.  God is Unity 
when counting ‘gods.’  God is Trinity when counting ‘persons.’  CAI helps to solidify an 
understanding that God just is the Trinity.  It is, in fact, quite the upshot of CAI as a 
logical/philosophical starting point for trinitarian theorizing that neither ST not LT is privileged 
prior to assessing potential models of trinitarian explication.  CAI seems to be useful tool to the 
trinitarian seeking to demonstrate the logical coherence of the doctrine against the puzzles 
presented.    
Still, Kleinschmidt posits all CAI theorists as Social Trinitarians and declares:  
Social Trinitarians say that there is only one thing that is identical to God, namely 
the community or fusion (or something relevantly similar) of the Persons.  But we 
still want to preserve as much as possible the claim that each Person is a god.  
Monotheists cannot endorse both claims without appealing to one of the other 
responses to the problem of the Trinity (like relative identity, Modalism, etc.).  
The only way in which the monotheist Social Trinitarian can claim the Persons 
are gods is via appeal to something like derivative Divinity.  However, if we cared 
enough about the godhood of the Persons, we would combine our [ST] with 
polytheism.  We would still have only one God in the sense of having a single 





Persons to be identical to (so: there would be a total of four gods, one of whom is 
identical to God).  Of course, Social Trinitarians needn’t be polytheistic.62 
 
Kleinschmidt continues directly in a footnote, “For instance, one could deny the claim 
that the Persons are God in any sense stronger than being proper parts of or members of God.  
My claim that applying [CAI] to the Trinity produces a form of [ST], however, still stands.”63 
The insistence that “we still want to preserve as much as possible the claim that each 
Person is a god” is a relic of the ‘is’ is always the ‘is of identity’ interpretation of the creeds, 
disputed above.  It is not a creedal commitment that each person be a god, where ‘god’ serves as 
a count noun.  The creedal commitment to each person being God can be understood in terms of 
property category predication.  It is a creedal commitment, however, that “there are not three 
Gods, but one God” where ‘God’ serves as a count noun (just like ‘god’).  The move 
Kleinschmidt suggests from ST to polytheism is haphazard.  There need not be a count noun 
‘god’ for each person to be identical to if each person has the property ‘God’ predicated of him. 
Even with polytheism out of the picture, Kleinschmidt contends that creeds demand that 
each person be identical to a ‘god’ count noun.  The results of such a demand would be 
problematic for the trinitarian.  According to Kleinschmidt, trinitarians employing CAI want to 
avoid double-counting when considering the whole after already considering the parts that 
compose it: 
Fregean counting won’t actually help us avoid double-counting in cases where the 
composite falls under the same relevant sortal as the parts.  So it will not help us 
avoid double-counting with respect to gods, since each Person is a god, while the 
plurality is also identical to a god.  To see why, imagine taking a bunch of dog 
statues, and making larger dog statue out of them.  When we want to know how 
many statues are there, we must count the composite statue, and each of the 
statues that make it up.  We seem to count the same portion of reality twice, in 
spite of sortal-relitivization, and so end up with a number that’s higher that it 
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should be.  One might claim that the dog statue case in not analogous to the case 
of the Trinity—after all, we have different sortal with the Trinity, which I’ve used 
throughout this paper: Gods and Persons.  However, if we take the Trinitarian to 
be asserting that each Person is a god, and we claim that God is a god composed 
of the Persons, we have the result that a god is composed of gods.  So when 
counting by gods, we must count the one god that Trinitarians posit, and the three 
gods that the fusion has as its parts.  (After all, all of the gods I’ve mentioned are 
numerically distinct; while the fusion may be identical to the plurality of gods, it 
is not identical with each god).64 
 
This unwanted logical outcome dissolves under the interpretation that each divine person 
is not a ‘god’ count noun, but has the property ‘God,’ predicated of them, meaning that each 
person falls under the category ‘God’ and is thus divine, but also that no person individually 
exhausts that category.  Kleinschmidt’s contention that double-counting is inevitable does not 
hold in the case of the Trinity owing to a different interpretation of the creeds.  Neither does it 
hold in common examples.  Consider a much more plausible example than dog statues.  The 
Protestant Bible is a book composed of 66 books.  The question How many books are there? 
when referring to the Protestant Bible is either ’66,’ if one assumes a theological flavor to the 
question or ‘1’ if the question is assumed to have a books-on-the-desk flavor.  The answer given, 
even though the Protestant Bible (a book) is made up of 66 books will not be ’67’ since it seems 
that people innately understand that double-counting is wrong, even if they cannot 
philosophically articulate why it is wrong.  Even when a composite falls under the same relevant 
sortal as the parts, double-counting is not a major worry if the composition relation is so tightly 
bound to the identity relation, as in the case of the Protestant Bible, to imply a distinction in the 
question.  The best answer to the question How many books are there? when referring to the 
Protestant Bible is something like this: There are 66 books that compose the Protestant Bible.  
Yes, the Protestant Bible is a single book and yes there are 66 books that compose it, but the one 
                                                          





book (the Bible) just is the 66 books and the 66 books just are one Bible.  This is an answer that 
makes sense and that refuses to present cardinality independent of implied sortal relativization.  
The sortal ‘book’ applies to both the composite and the parts, but an implied sortal distinction 
exists between ‘book as physical object with cover’ and ‘book of the Bible.’  Anyone who 
dissented from the answer given claiming that the best answer is something like: No, that’s not it.  
The answer is 67 on account of the composite and the parts sharing a sortal, would be seen as 
someone trying to promote mereological fisticuffs.   
CAI is a tool available to the trinitarian theorist that helps provide conceptual clarity, 
helps to answer paradoxes of cardinality generally, and helps to answer the paradox of the 
Trinity being one and three.  CAI can be defended and endorsed despite not garnering 
widespread acceptance among the philosophical community.  While CAI helps to demonstrate 
how the creedal affirmations ONE and THREE are coherent, it does not aid in demonstrating the 
logical coherence of the creedal affirmations FATHERSOUCE and EQUALITY.  The discussion 
surrounding the latter two affirmations falls outside the purview of Composition as Identity.65 
 
Section IV—Demonstrating the Coherence of FATHERSOUCE and EQUALITY 
 
The logical problem of the Trinity is to explain how the creedal summary statements are 
logically consistent.  The most often alleged cases of logical inconsistency within the Trinity 
involve creedal summary statements ONE and THREE.  Having addressed the consistency of 
ONE and THREE above, the challenge of assessing the logical consistency of 
FATHERSOURCE and EQUALITY must be met. 
(FATHERSOURCE): The Father is the source of the Son and the Holy Spirit (perhaps  
                                                          






                                    with the Son, perhaps not). 
(EQUALITY): The three persons in the Trinity are ontologically equal; none is greater  
                         than any of the others.   
 
How can the three persons of the Trinity be ontologically equal if it is the case that the 
Father is the source of the Son and the Holy Spirit?  The very nature of the Father being the 
source of the Son and Holy Spirit seems to imply the superiority of the Father.  To address this 
concern, the nature of both the Father somehow being the source of the other persons, and the 
nature of ontological equality must be explored.   
Consider FATHERSOURCE.  The Nicene Creed provides creedal orthodoxy concerning 
this issue by affirming (among other things) the following about the Son and the Holy Spirit: 
(a) The Son is eternally begotten of the Father. 
The creed provides the following affirmations by way of explication of (a).  The Son is: 
 (a.i) God from God 
 (a.ii) Light from Light 
 (a.iii) True God from True God 
 (a.iv) Begotten, not made 
 (a.v) One in being with the Father 
(b) The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father [and the Son]. 
 
The Athanasian Creed affirms: 
 
(c) The Father is neither made, nor created, nor begotten.   
(d) The Son is neither made, nor created; but begotten of the Father alone.  
(e) The Holy Spirit is neither made, nor created, nor begotten; but proceeds from the Father [and 
the Son].  
 
How is the Father the source of the Son?  The Father begets the Son (a), (d).  The Son is 
begotten of the Father alone (d) and is begotten eternally (a).  Being begotten is not the same as 
being made (a.iv), (d), and it is not the same thing as being created (d), and it is not the same 
thing and proceeding (e).  Whatever begetting is, the creeds explicitly state what it is not.  What 
is begetting in this creedal context, then?  C.S. Lewis explains: 
We don’t use the words begetting or begotten much in modern English, but 





create is to make. And the difference is this. When you beget, you beget 
something of the same kind as yourself. A man begets human babies, a beaver 
begets little beavers and a bird begets eggs which turn into little birds. But when 
you make, you make something of a different kind from yourself. A bird makes a 
nest, a beaver builds a dam, a man makes a wireless set—or he may make 
something more like himself than a wireless set: say, a statue. If he is a clever 
enough carver he may make a statue which is very like a man indeed. But, of 
course, it is not a real man; it only looks like one. It cannot breathe or think. It is 
not alive. 
           Now that is the first thing to get clear. What God begets is God; just as 
what man begets is man. What God creates is not God; just as what man makes is 
not man. That is why men are not Sons of God in the sense that Christ is. They 
may be like God in certain ways, but they are not things of the same kind. They 
are more like statues or pictures of God.66 
 
The Father eternally begets the Son and thus the Son is eternally of the same kind as the 
Father, or one in being with the Father (a.v).  One in being means that there is no “dividing the 
Essence,” (a stricture of the Athanasian Creed).  But does begetting indicate that the Son once 
was not existent or existed in a state unlike the Father’s?  No.  Since the begetting is eternal, 
there was never a time the Son was not and as eternally begotten, the Son is eternally of the same 
kind as the Father. 
A great deal of mystery abounds, but this is somewhat expected.  There is no analogue to 
eternal divine begetting.  According to Origen, the Father eternally begetting the Son is an 
“exceptional process, worthy of God.”67  He continues: 
We can find no comparison whatever, not merely in things, but even in thought 
and imagination, such that by its aid human thought could apprehend how the 
unbegotten God becomes Father of the only-begotten Son.  It is an eternal and 
everlasting begetting, as brightness is begotten from light.  For he does not 
become Son in an exceptional way through the adoption of the Spirit, but is Son 
by nature.”68 
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The Son is Son by nature, not by adoption.  Adoption is a choice.  One’s nature is not a 
choice.  Importantly, the Father does not choose to beget the Son, but rather the Son’s being 
begotten is independent of the Father’s will. If the Father’s choice and will were operative in the 
begetting of the Son, that would have seemed to the creedal authors tantamount to saying that 
Father was prior to the Son. St. Athanasius himself held that the expression “by the Father’s 
will” was inappropriate.  Since the Son was naturally the Son of the Father from all eternity, the 
Son’s generation transcends any act of will.69  
Mystery is one thing, but is there any way to positively describe what is going on when it 
is affirmed that the Father is the source of the Son and the Holy Spirit?  Senor provides just that:   
We can start to address the distinction question if we think of the single particular 
[divine] nature as being multileveled (obviously this is all metaphor).  The 
fundamental level is the Father, the second level is the Son, and the third is the 
Holy Spirit; that is, the Father is the ontological ground of both the Son and the 
Holy Spirit.  This does not imply that the Father creates either the Son or Holy 
Spirit, however, because the means by which the Son and the Holy Spirit are 
produced is will-independent.  In any possible situation in which the Father exists, 
the Son and the Holy Spirit exist, and they are eternally brought about as a 
necessary extension of the Father’s very existence.  Yet there is an important 
asymmetry at work here: the Son and Holy Spirit are ontologically dependent on 
the Father, while the Father is ontologically independent of them.  What does this 
mean?  Let’s say that B is ontologically dependent on A if were it not for A’s 
productive powers, B would not exist.  So even though each member of the 
Trinity exists necessarily and eternally, the Son and the Holy Spirit are 
ontologically dependent on the Father although the Father is not ontologically 
dependent on either of them.70 
 
This provides a model of the Trinity that addresses how it is that the Father can be the 
source of the Son and the Holy Spirit (the Son is begotten of the Father and the Holy Spirit is 
proceeded by the Father [and the Son]) and the three persons be equal (there is no superiority 
since the Father’s generation of the Son and the Holy Spirit is will-independent and thus all three 
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are coeternal and possess the same necessity, which is to say that if the Father exists, so must the 
Son and the Holy Spirit).   
How is the Father the source of the Holy Spirit?  The Holy Spirit proceeds from the 
Father [and Son] (b), (e).  Proceeding is not same thing as being made (e), and it is not the same 
thing and being created (e), and it is not the same thing as being begotten (e).  Whatever 
proceeding is, the creeds explicitly state what it is not.   
The eternal procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father is, likewise, will-independent.  
In any possible situation that the Father exists, the Holy Spirit exists and is eternally brought 
about as a necessary extension of the Father’s very existence.  The Holy Spirit is like the third 
level of the single particular divine nature, of which the Father is the fundamental level.   
Is this third level dependent upon the second level (the Son) or just on the first level (the 
Father)?  Does the Holy Spirit proceed from the Father alone or from the Father and the Son?  
The creeds never state that the Father alone is the source of the Holy Spirit, but they explicitly 
state that the Father alone is the source of the Son (d).  Both (b) and (e) affirm that the source of 
the Holy Spirit is the Father [and the Son].  The reason that the phrase and the Son is in brackets 
owes to the fact that not all Trinitarians agree that the Son is the co-source of the Holy Spirit 
along with the Father.    
The Latin term for “and the Son” is filioque.  The controversial nature of this phrase 
contributed to the split between the Eastern and Western churches in A.D. 1054. The phrase was 
not included in the Nicene Creed in either the first version of A.D. 325 or the second version of 
A.D. 381. Those versions simply said that the Holy Spirit “proceeds from the Father.” But in 
A.D. 589, at a regional church council in Toledo, the phrase “and the Son” was added, so that the 





The Eastern, or Orthodox Church, rejected the filioque and maintained that the Holy 
Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, whereas the Western, or Roman Catholic Church, 
continues to accepts it.  Most Protestant churches (which reformed out of Catholicism) also 
accept the filioque.71 
Opposition to the filioque clause seems to exist because if the Holy Spirit proceeds from 
both the Father and the Son, then the Holy Spirit would be subordinate on account of this double 
procession and the fact that the Holy Spirit would be the only person of the Trinity not to be the 
source of another.  Double procession does not indicate subordination any more than single 
procession, however, and if only the Father is the source of the Son and the Holy Spirit, worry 
about subordination would still exist if one defined subordination/lack of equality in terms of 
being the source of another divine person.  The creeds, however, define equality in other terms.   
Consider EQUALITY.  The Athanasian Creed affirms: 
(f) No person of the Trinity is before or after another. 
 (f.i) The Father is eternal, the Son is eternal, the Holy Spirit is eternal. 
(f.ii) And yet there are not three eternals, but one eternal. 
(g) No person of the Trinity is greater or less than another. 
 (g.i) The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit share equal glory. 
 (g.ii) The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit share equal majesty. 
                                                          
71 According the New Testament, there is no doubt that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father.  
John 15:26 says, “When the Helper comes, whom I will send to you from the Father, that is the 
Spirit of truth who proceeds from the Father, He will testify about Me.”  The Greek word for 
“proceeds” is ἐκπορεύομαι. It means to come out of, to proceed from, depart out of, to leave 
from.  It is used in many places in the New Testament.  No specific New Testament verse says 
that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, but John 16:7 says “But I tell you the truth, it is to 
your advantage that I go away; for if I do not go away, the Helper (Holy Spirit) will not come to 
you; but if I go, I will send Him to you.”  Philippians 1:19 says, “for I know that this will turn 
out for my deliverance through your prayers and the provision of the Spirit of Jesus Christ.” 
      Because of these verses, many Trinitarians have concluded that there is a procession of the 
Spirit from the Son because of how the Holy Spirit is said to be of the Father (Matthew 10:20), 
of God (Romans 8:9), of the Son (Galatians 4:6), and of Jesus Christ (Philippians 1:19). So, if the 
Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and he is the Spirit of the Father (Matthew 10:20), and 
since the Holy Spirit is also the Spirit of the Son (Philippians 1:19), it seems that it must follow 





 (g.iii) The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit share the one divine essence. 
(h) All three persons of the Trinity are coequal. 
 (h.i) Such as the Father is; such is the Son; and such is the Holy Spirit.  
 
The creedal affirmation of equality amongst the divine persons can be understood in two 
primary ways: eternality and greatness.  While the Father is the source of the Son and the Holy 
Spirit, none of the persons are made or created (d-e).  All three are eternal (f.i).  Begetting and 
proceeding have nothing to do with time, but are accomplished timelessly.  Neither have they to 
do with choice.  The Father’s begetting the Son and proceeding the Holy Spirit is will-
independent.  This means that the source of the Son and the Holy Spirit necessarily and eternally 
generates them and such generation is not a choice the Father made.  None of the persons is 
before or after another in terms of temporality or causality.  The creed explicitly predicates the 
property ‘uncreated’ of all three divine persons.  This seems to indicate that the predications 
‘begotten’ and ‘proceeds from’ serve as relational distinguishers.  The distinctness of the divine 
persons cannot be relational only, however.   
While the Holy Spirit uniquely relates to the Son and Father by virtue of not being 
begotten of the Father, but proceeding from him (and from the Son), and the Son uniquely relates 
to the Father as his only begotten, and the Father uniquely relates to the Son and Spirit by virtue 
of being the source for both of them, something else distinguishes the divine persons as well.  
Each possesses a unique will.  Much more on this will follow, but to qualify as a person, one 
must possess a unique set of mental faculties.  This requirement seems necessary for the 
distinctness of the persons. 
Distinctness of each is in terms of unique sets of mental faculties and relational 
generation, but the creed also affirms “one God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity; neither 





greatness.  The Father is not greater than the Son and the Holy Spirit because he begets and 
proceeds them, respectively.  Rather all three share in glory (g.i) and majesty (g.ii).  All three are 
affirmed as “Almighty.  And yet there are not three Almighties, but one Almighty.”  The 
greatness of the divine persons lies not in their dependence (the Son and Holy Spirit) or 
independence (the Father), but in their shared metaphysical and ontological necessity.  
Metaphysical necessity is such that if God exists, God exists in Trinity (and Trinity in Unity).  
The Father is the (will-independent) source of the Son and the Holy Spirit because they could not 
be/exist without the Father, but the Father is not the metaphysical source of the Son and Holy 
Spirit because in any possibility in which the Father exists, the Son and Holy Spirit must also 
exist.  Ontological necessity is such that God must exist—there is no possibility in which God 
does not, could not, or might not exist,72 and Trinitarianism notes that God must exist in Trinity. 
Equality among the divine persons is ultimately a matter of the persons jointly sharing in 
the one divine essence/nature.  Each divine person (predicatively) is God because each is 
instantiated in the one, particular divine nature, but none fully exhaust that nature.  Since the one 
essence is shared by all three persons and all three persons are distinct, not merely in terms of 
their relational begetting/proceeding, but also in terms of their unique set of faculties, each 
person is fully and equally divine. 
                                                          
72 Divine ontological necessity of God is typically described in terms of Anselmian Perfect Being 
Theology and makes use of various forms of the Ontological Argument for the necessary 
existence of God.  For Anselm, God is than which none greater can be conceived.  The modal 
versions of this argument which highlight Anselm’s use of necessary existence as a predicate are 
much stronger than the often caricatured reductio versions that attempt to derive God’s necessary 
existence making use of existence as predicate.  The caricatured versions often mistake Anselm’s 
initial reductio as employing existence as a predicate as his only formulation.  Anselm’s second 
formulation appropriately upgrades existence to necessary existence as a crucial predicate in his 





This explanation seems to demonstrate the coherence of FATHERSOURCE and 
EQUALITY. Equality is grounded in the tripartite sharing of the one divine essence and the 
Father is the will-independent source of the Son and the Holy Spirit.  There is nothing incoherent 
about affirming both of those statements simultaneously so long as they are understood in terms 
of the multi-leveled model described above.   
Both of the most critical coherence issues—finding a way to wed ONE and THREE and 
to wed FATHERSOURCE and EQUALITY—that apply exclusively to the orthodox delineation 
of the doctrine of the Trinity have been demonstrated above.  While this demonstration makes 
use of logical distinctions and important philosophical notions, such logical and philosophical 
understandings are not necessary for a person to embrace the doctrine of the Trinity.  Such 
understandings become necessary when the doctrine is challenged on grounds of incoherence as 
they are defeaters for such challenges.  Logical challenges appeal to obvious tension that exists 
between ONE and THREE and between FATHERSOUCE and EQUALITY.  Tension is 
appropriate as it forces one to continually reevaluate one’s notions and helps one not to favor any 
particular creedal statement over another.  Tension does not give way to incoherence so long as 
one explains the creedal content in a way that is consistent with the rules of logic/identity and 
with a philosophically nuanced understanding of the creedal statements in their context.  The 
above understandings attempt to do just that.   
 
Part II—A Priori Trinitarianism 
 
Section I—A Priori Trinitarianism Conceived 
 
Is the motivation for Trinitarianism merely a desire to uphold traditional creedal 





certainly emerged as a result of the early Christian community’s commitment to the divinity of 
Jesus and the Holy Spirit, and while creedal orthodoxy stands atop biblical passages expressing 
the essential content of the doctrine of the Trinity, Trinitarianism is not the exclusive purview of 
exegetically a posteriori theology.  There is, in fact, a strong case to be made for Trinitarianism 
on a priori grounds.  Such a priori reasoning does not start with the creeds or with Scripture, but 
with the very concept of God.  If one rightly conceives of God, one will come to see that God 
must be triune.  One’s reasoning might not begin with the creeds or with Scripture, but one’s 
reasoning must be consistent with them in order to stand within traditional Christian Theism 
which endorses creedal orthodoxy as the essential explication of the content of the doctrine of 
the Trinity.   
 Is it even possible to arrive at an accurate concept of God without being informed by the 
creeds and by Scripture?  Scripture itself indicates that the answer is Yes.  Psalm 14:1 reads, 
“The fool says in heart, There is no God.”  St. Anselm famously understands this Scripture to be 
the starting point for his offering of praise to God in which is found his Ontological Argument.  
Anselm contends that even an atheist with no knowledge of creeds or of Scripture can arrive at 
the same conception of God as the believer.  The fool’s use of the term ‘God’ is certainly meant 
to contain the same content as the theist’s use of the term, or else the fool could not be so labeled 
as he would only be guilty of denying something-other-than-what-is-rightly-intended-by-the- 
term-‘God,’ and it is no deficiency to deny that.   
 This led Anselm to profess that God is the being “than which no greater can be 
conceived.”73  An entire field of theology known as Perfect Being Theology has emerged from 
Anselm’s enigmatic phrase and attendant arguments.  According to Perfect Being Theology, God 
                                                          





is, by definition, the Greatest Conceivable Being (GCB).  God’s nature is constituted by a 
combination of great-making properties.  Since the concept of God is underdetermined by the 
biblical and creedal data, and since what constitutes a ‘great-making’ property is to some degree 
debatable, philosophers working within and assessing the Christian worldview enjoy 
considerable latitude in formulating a philosophically coherent and biblically faithful doctrine of 
God.  Indeed, the aim of this project is to demonstrate that being triune is itself a great-making 
property and a property which is necessary for any conception of a greatest conceivable being.   
Perfect Being Theology is not without its critics.74  One common objection raised against 
Perfect Being theology is that it is inherently subjective since what is a great-making property to 
one person might not be considered great to another person.  This objection seems to 
confuse God’s being the greatest conceivable being with consensus concerning what properties 
the greatest conceivable being must possess.  Whatever those properties may be, God must 
possess them to count as the GCB.  There are some straightforward properties that obviously 
must belong to the GCB, but there are also less obvious properties to consider. 
It is difficult to know in some cases which property is great-making.  For example, is it 
greater to be timeless or omnitemporal?  The answer is not immediately clear.  But uncertainty as 
to what properties the greatest conceivable being must have does nothing to invalidate the 
definition of God as the greatest conceivable being.  There cannot, by definition, be anything 
greater than God/GCB.  A good way to develop one’s conception of the GCB is to ponder certain 
properties and determine if those properties enhance a being who might have them or diminish 
such a being.   
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 Begin this simple binary thought experiment with some of the obvious great-making 
properties.  Consider power (construed as the disposition and ability to act in certain ways).  Is a 
being greater for having more power than another being identical in all ways except for power?  
Certainly.  Since power, then, is a great-making property, the GCB must possess power to a 
maximal degree, for otherwise one could conceive of a being with more power than the being 
under consideration.  Since no being can be more powerful than all-powerful, the GCB must, by 
definition, be all-powerful/omnipotent.  Of course, the very notion of power may be restrained 
by other aspects of God’s nature.  There are certain things that God cannot or will not do—for 
instance, God cannot torture babies for fun.  One might object to an understanding of 
omnipotence that is in some way restrained by arguing that God cannot count as omnipotent if 
there is another being able to do something that the supposedly omnipotent being (God) cannot 
do.  Beings that are nowhere close to omnipotent can still torture babies for fun, after all.  This 
objection does not make the second being greater in power than God, but seeks to demonstrate 
that God is not, in fact, all-powerful. 
 Two lines of response emerge.  First, the Perfect Being Theologian could respond by 
saying that omnipotence is not the ability (or disposition) to do anything at all, but the ability to 
do (or be disposed to do) anything that can be done in a broadly logical sense.  It is not possible 
to violate one’s own nature, and so if God’s nature also includes moral perfection, then God 
cannot do certain (evil) acts.  Such inability would not count against his omnipotence so defined.  
A second response would be to say that there is no possible combination of attributes that 
includes both omnipotence and necessary moral perfection.  But it does not at all follow from 
this that God does not exist, or that God is not the greatest conceivable being, possessing the best 





great-making properties does not include both omnipotence (defined as the ability or disposition 
to do absolutely anything that can be done) and necessary moral perfection.  This second 
response acquiesces on the definition of omnipotence as the ability to do anything that can be 
done, but holds that the GCB would not possess such a property because such a property is not 
great-making, all things considered.  The other consideration is overall greatness.  The property 
able to torture babies for fun (or perform any other morally deficient act) diminishes a 
conceivable being rather than enhancing such a being.  So whether the Perfect Being Theologian 
opts for the first or the second response, she still contends that the GCB must possess the 
maximal degree of power possible given other great-making properties.   
The same is true for the property of knowledge.  A being who knows more than another 
being is certainly greater than that less-knowing being.  No being can know more than 
everything that can be known, so the GCB must be all-knowing/omniscient, or else one could 
conceive a being who, in fact, knows more than the being under consideration, preventing that 
candidate from being the GCB.  There is some question as to what type of knowledge is 
available to the GCB.  Certainly, the GCB would know all propositional truth75, but such a being 
would not have to know everything, but only everything that can be known according to his 
nature.  This means that the GCB would not know what a square triangle looks like since such an 
object is a logically contradictory concept, nor would he know what it is like to torture babies for 
fun since God’s moral perfection prevents him from doing such an act and thus from knowing 
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what it is like to do such an act.  Of course, the GCB would know that square triangles are 
logically impossible, and that torturing babies for fun is wrong, and even what those who in fact 
do torture babies for fun experience, though the GCB does not actually experience having 
tortured babies for fun.  So knowledge, like power, has a peak intrinsic maxima.  Whatever that 
maxima is, the GCB possesses knowledge to that degree.   
In addition to possessing power and knowledge to the maximal levels, a being is 
enhanced by possessing eternality, necessary existence, and moral perfection which is often 
equated with the notion love.  Is a being who loves greater than a being who does not?  Certainly, 
since love is a moral perfection.  Since possessing love, then, is a great-making property, the 
GCB must be all-loving/omnibenevolent.  This strikes theists and atheists as obvious.  God, 
whether worshipped or thought not to exist, is considered to be good, or loving.  He is praised by 
believers for his goodness, and he is chastised as fictional by atheists who do not see evidence of 
his goodness or who see evil as incompatible with his goodness.  The argument for such 
incompatibility advanced by the atheist might looks like this:  God cannot be all-loving and all-
powerful simultaneously since evil exists.  Either God is loving enough to stop evil but is not 
powerful enough to stop it, or God is powerful enough to stop evil but is not loving enough to 
stop it.  Theists believe God is both all-loving and all-powerful.  The existence of evil shows 
there is no all-loving and all-powerful being.  There is no God.   
 The literature on the problem of evil is vast, the variations of argument that flow from it 
are voluminous, and yet the responses to those arguments seem to adequately refute them.76 The 
following set of propositions is not inconsistent: 
 (a) God exists and created the world. 
 (b) God is all-loving and all-powerful. 
                                                          





 (c) Evil exists.   
 
 Logical arguments from the problem of evil contend that this set is inconsistent with what 
is argued to be a natural implication of (a) and (b): 
 (d) There should be no evil. 
 But (d) is not inconsistent with (a)-(c).  The existence of evil is consistent with the fact 
that there should be no evil.  There may be a good reason God allows evil to exist.  Even if the 
reason is unclear, so long as there is a possible reason, then (a)-(d) is consistent.  Add to (a)-(d) 
the following proposition: 
 (e) There is good reason God allows evil. 
 The literature spends considerable time discussing what that reason might be, but free 
will seems to be the strongest candidate.77  So the existence of evil is no bar to the GCB 
possessing the great-making property of love.  The natural inclinations of atheists and theists 
alike understand that the GCB must possess love to whatever maximal degree is possible.78   
With the concept of God as GCB in mind, one can now turn toward a possible case for 
Trinitarianism on a priori grounds.  Love is the great-making property most central to an a priori 
Trinitarianism.    
 
Section II—A Priori Trinitarianism in Ancient and Contemporary Sources 
While not the majority position within the Christian tradition, a priori reason concerning 
the Trinity has been advanced as supporting evidence for the truthfulness of the doctrine.  This 
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section will analyze the most influential ancient source advocating an a priori trinitarianism and 
two contemporary sources that do likewise.  
Richard of St. Victor 
Richard of St. Victor, a prominent member of the Abbey of St. Victor in France, wrote 
On the Trinity in the third quarter of the twelfth century.  His a priori understanding of the divine 
nature stands as a shining example of medieval Christian devotion and reasoning.  He explains 
the procedure by which humans acquire knowledge of various matters: 
If we desire to ascend toward the knowledge (scientiam) of lofty truths through 
insights of the mind, it is first worthwhile to know that we usually acquire 
knowledge (notitiam) of things in certain ways.  Unless I am mistaken, then, we 
acquire knowledge of things in three ways: we demonstrate some things by 
experience; we conclude other things by reasoning; and we are certain of other 
things by believing.  We acquire knowledge of temporal things though experience 
itself, but we rise to knowledge of eternal things sometimes by reasoning and 
sometimes by believing.79   
 
Richards’s intention is to arrive at truths about eternal things like God’s nature by 
introducing:  
Not only probable but also necessary reasons (necessarias rationes) for what we 
believe and to season the teachings of our faith with an exposition and 
explanation of truth.  I believe without a doubt that, with regard to the explanation 
of any being that necessarily exists, not only are probable arguments not lacking, 
but neither are necessary arguments. 
 For everything which begins to exist in time according the good pleasure 
of the Creator, it is possible to exist and possible not to exist.  The source and 
cause of their being is demonstrated by experience rather than concluded by 
reasoning.  But those beings that are eternal absolutely cannot not exist; just as 
they have never not existed, so certainly they will never not exist, or rather they 
are always what they are; they cannot be different or otherwise.80  
 
                                                          
79 Richard of St. Victor. “On the Trinity” 1.1 in Trinity and Creation. Coolman, Boyd & Coulter, 
Dale, eds. New City Press, 2011. 





According to Richard, it is thus not merely the case that God happens to be triune if God 
is indeed triune, but it is necessarily the case that God is triune, for the eternal nature cannot be 
otherwise than it actually is.  The authoritative statements concerning the Trinity for Richard are 
the creeds (primarily the Athanasian Creed).  About the content of the creeds, Richard notes that: 
I frequently hear or read all these assertions, but do not recall having read how all 
these assertions are proven.  Authorities abound in all these issues, but 
argumentations are not equally abundant; proofs (experimenta) are lacking in all 
these assertions and argumentations are rare.  Therefore, as I have already said 
above, I think that I have accomplished something if I am able to assist even to 
modest degree studious minds in a study of this kind, even if it is not granted that 
I can satisfy them.81   
 
Richard is keen to lay out exhaustive disjunctive categories.  His procedure is meticulous, 
emphasizing God’s eternality, omnipotence, and love.  He notes that every being is generally 
differentiated in three modes of being: “Everything that is or can be either has its being from 
eternity or begins to exist in time.  Likewise, everything that is or can be either has its beginning 
from itself or from some source other than itself,” and concludes therefore, that the being of 
“anything existing will either be from eternity and from itself, or, conversely, neither from 
eternity nor from itself, or, mediately between these two, from eternity but not from itself.  
Nature itself in no way allows there to be a fourth mode of being.”82   
Following St. Anselm, Richard views God as “that-than-which-nothing-is-greater and 
that-than-which-nothing-is-better.  Now, without a doubt rational nature is better than irrational 
nature.  Thus, it is necessary for some rational substance to be the highest of all beings.”83  For 
Richard, the highest rational substance is the triune God.  Concerning that substance, Richard 
explains: 
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That substance which is nothing other than the divinity itself will certainly also be 
common to multiple persons.  According to this, there will certainly be multiple 
persons, but only one substance, in one divinity.  Whether, therefore, it is said that 
the is only one person or multiple persons in the one divinity, God will still be 
only one substance.84   
 
By distinguishing between substance and person, Richard’s Perfect Being Theology 
importantly demands monotheism (only one substance) and sets the stage nicely for a priori 
arguments that posit the multi-personal nature of that one divine substance.  The argument 
presented in the following section follows this understanding.  
Omnipotence plays a crucial role in Richard’s account.  He holds that it is impossible for 
several omnipotent beings to exist.  “Indeed he who truly is omnipotent can easily be able to 
render any other power powerless; otherwise he certainly will not be omnipotent…And so, just 
as there can only be one who is omnipotent, so there can only be one God.”85  For Richard, the 
truly omnipotent cannot lack anything that can be desired.  “No fullness and no perfection can be 
lacking where there is omnipotence; otherwise, if God’s supreme power were lacking even a 
little perfection that he could have, then he absolutely would not be omnipotent.”86   Importantly, 
it is Richard’s understanding, also, that “the supreme being of all cannot be made good or 
blessed by a being inferior to it.”87 
 An omnipotent being would rightly be possessed of goodness and love/charity.  Richard 
really sets his philosophical machinery to work in book three of On the Trinity by detailing his 
view of love.  Perfect love must be more than private and more than potential. 
The fullness and perfection of all goodness lies in the supreme and universally 
perfect good.  Moreover, where the fullness of all goodness is, true and supreme 
charity cannot be lacking.  Indeed, nothing is better than charity, and nothing is 
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more perfect than charity.  However, no one properly is said to have love on 
account of private and exclusive love of oneself.  And so, it is necessary that love 
be directed toward another, so that it can be charity.  Therefore, charity 
absolutely cannot exist where a plurality of persons is lacking. 
 Surely God would not be able to have supreme charity toward a created 
person.  After all, his charity would be disordered, if he were loving supremely 
someone who should not be loved supremely.  However, it is impossible that 
charity be disordered in the supremely wise goodness.  And so, a divine person 
could not have supreme charity toward a person who would not be worthy of 
supreme love.   
 As long as someone loves no one else as much as himself, that private 
love, which he has toward himself, proves that he has not yet apprehended the 
highest degree of love.  But a divine person would surely not have someone 
whom he could love as worthily as himself, if he absolutely were not having a 
person of equal dignity.  However, a person who was not God would not be of 
equal dignity to a divine person.  There, so that the fullness of charity can occur in 
true divinity, it is necessary for a divine person not to lack the fellowship with a 
person of equal dignity and, for that reason, a divine person.   
 The fullness of divinity cannot be without the fullness of goodness; the 
fullness of goodness cannot be without the fullness of charity; and the fullness of 
charity cannot be without the plurality of divine persons.88 
 
On Richard’s account, since God is the perfect being, God must exercise all the aspects 
of love/charity.  Self-love is not the highest degree of love according to Richard.  The distinction 
between degrees, or aspects of love feature prominently in the argument to be presented below.  
“A rational life experiences nothing sweeter than the pleasures of charity, and it never enjoys 
anything more delightful than the delight of charity.  A divine person will lack these pleasures in 
eternity, if he lacks a fellowship and remains isolated on the throne of majesty.”89  There is no 
worry about multiple substances occupying the throne of majesty for Richard, since “Each 
[divine] person has one and the same substance, or, if this sounds better, both together are one 
and same substance.”90 
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 Private love of oneself does not exhaust the full array of the aspects of love.  God must be 
multi-personal to experience mutual love, but Richard notes another aspect of love—mutual love 
jointly directed to third party.  “Each of the two persons, who is supremely loved and ought to be 
loved supremely, must seek with equal desire a third person mutually loved (condilectum) and 
must possess him freely with equal concord.”91  Richard provides further detail: 
Certainly if there were only one person in the divinity, then he would not have 
someone to whom he could communicate the riches of this magnitude; but, 
conversely, the abundance of pleasures and sweetness, which could have grown in 
him on account of the acquisition of an intimate love, would be lacking in 
eternity.  But the fullness of goodness does not allow the supremely good one to 
hoard greedily the riches of his magnitude, nor does the fullness of blessedness 
allow the supremely blessed one not to obtain the abundance of pleasures and 
sweetnesses.  And, with regard to the magnificence of this honor, he takes as 
much delight in the bounty of his riches and he glories in the enjoyment of his 
abundance.  You notice from these arguments how impossible it is that any one 
person in the divinity lacks the fellowship of a fraternity (consortio societatis).  
But if he were possessing only one companion, then certainly he would not lack 
someone, with whom he could communicate the riches of magnitude, but he 
absolutely could not have someone with whom he could share the pleasures of 
charity.  Nothing is found to be more pleasant than the sweetness of love; there is 
nothing in which the mind is more delighted.  He alone possesses the pleasure of 
such sweetness, who does [not] have a companion and lover who is loved 
mutually (condilectum) in the love that was presented to him.  And so there 
absolutely cannot be a communion of love in less than three persons.  But, as we 
have said, there is nothing more glorious and more magnificent than to share in 
common whatever you have that is useful and pleasant.  But this cannot be hidden 
from supreme wisdom, nor can this be unsatisfying to the supremely powerful or 
the power of the one supremely happy cannot be lacking in his pleasure, so a third 
person must be united to two persons in the divinity.92 
 
Richard’s idea is that the supreme degree of love would not have a place in divinity if a 
third person “were lacking in the plurality of persons; and in only two persons there certainly 
would not be anyone with whom either of the two persons could communicate the excellent 
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pleasures of his joy.”  For this reason, “the consummation of true and supreme goodness cannot 
subsist without completion of the Trinity.”93 
 But is the joint love of a third really a different aspect of love and even if it is, couldn’t 
God satisfy the desire for it after creation?  Richard explains: 
When a third person is loved harmoniously and communally by two people, and 
when the affection of two is melted together into a single affection for the third by 
the flames of love.  From this description then it is clear that the mutual love for a 
third person (condilectio) would not have a place in divinity itself, if there were 
only two people, and there were lacking a third.  Indeed we are not discussing 
here any kind of mutual love whatsoever but the supreme mutual love.  A creature 
never merits such a love from the Creator, nor is it ever found worthy of it.94 
 
But why must the number of divine persons sharing the one divine substance be limited 
to three?  Richard’s answer is not based on love, as is his explanation for the need of three divine 
persons, but is based on the nature of generation.  Concerning the three divine persons, one 
person (the Father) has his being only from himself, one person (the Son) receives his being from 
someone other than himself and gives being to another divine person, and one divine person (the 
Holy Spirit) receives his being from other persons but gives being to no other divine person.  
Since one divine person just gives, another just receives, and the middle both gives and receives,  
“a quaternary [of divine persons] is totally excluded.  It is clear then that a fourth person 
absolutely cannot exist in the divine nature.”95  The reason is that all modes of being are 
exhausted by the three divine persons.  A fourth divine person cannot have his being from 
himself (as only one divine person can be the start of the chain, otherwise that divine person 
from himself would be a different being/substance).  So a fourth divine person would either have 
his being from someone else and give being to someone else, or give being to no one else, but 
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there would already be divine persons who fill both of those functions and thus nothing 
categorically is added by a fourth divine person.96  
 Richard of St. Victor lays out a compelling case for God’s nature necessarily being three 
divine persons in one being based on God being eternal, omnipotent, and loving.  Much of 
Richard of St. Victor’s work finds a modern advocate in Richard Swinburne.   
Swinburne 
Swinburne joins Richard of St. Victor in believing that the triune nature of God can be 
derived not merely from a posteriori considerations found in Scripture but from the a priori 
exercise of reason.  In his works Was Jesus God? and The Christian God, Swinburne sets out to 
give reasons why, “given that one divine person exists, we should expect there to be a Trinity.”97  
Swinburne explains 
Suppose the Father existed alone. For a person to exist alone, when he could 
cause others to exist and interact with him, would be bad.  A divine person is a 
perfectly good person, and that involves being a loving person. A loving person 
needs someone to love, and perfect love is love of an equal, totally mutual love, 
which is what is involved in a perfect marriage. While, of course, the love of a 
parent for a child is of immense value, it is not the love of equals; and what makes 
it as valuable as it is, is that the parent is seeking to make the child (as she grows 
up) into an equal. A perfectly good solitary person would seek to bring about 
another such person, with whom to share all that she has.98 
 
No created person can ever become an equal with a divine person, so love of an equal 
requires more than one divine (eternal/non-created) person.  Swinburne follows the traditional 
trinitarian identification of divine persons, calling the first divine person who has his being from 
himself the Father and calling the second divine person the Son.   
But if the Father only began to cause the existence of the Son at some moment of 
time, say a trillion trillion years ago, that would be too late: for all eternity before 
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that time he would not have manifested his perfect goodness. At each moment of 
everlasting time the Father must always cause the Son to exist, and so always 
keep the Son in being. Augustine wrote (On Diverse Questions 83 q.50) that if the 
Father ‘wished to “beget” the Son [that is, cause the Son to exist], and was unable 
to do it, he would have been weak; if he was able to do it but did not wish to, he 
would have failed to do it because of “envy”’ (that is, because he wished to be the 
only divine person). A solitary God would have been an ungenerous god and so 
no God.99 
 
Swinburne puts a unique spin on the causal relationship.  While Richard of St. Victor 
noted that a divine person either has his being from himself or from someone else, Swinburne 
understands the causal relationship as reciprocal. 
Although the Father is the (eternal) cause of the Son’s existence, and the Son is 
not the cause of the Father’s existence, they will in a certain sense be mutually 
dependent on each other. For the Father always to cause the Son to exist would be 
a unique best act of the Father, and so, since being perfectly good is an essential 
property of a divine person, the Father will inevitably always cause the Son to 
exist. Hence the Father would not exist at all unless he caused the Son to exist; 
and that is why he requires the Son to exist for his own existence. And the perfect 
goodness of Father and Son means that they love each other without limit.100 
 
Swinburne explains how a third divine person is necessary. 
 
A twosome can be selfish. A marriage in which husband and wife are interested 
only in each other and do not seek to spread the love they have for each other is a 
deficient marriage. (And of course the obvious way, but not the only way, in 
which they can spread their love is by having children.) The love of the Father 
for the Son must include a wish to cooperate with the Son in further total 
sharing with an equal; and hence the need for a third member of the Trinity, 
whom, following tradition, we may call the Holy Spirit, whom they will love and 
by whom they will be loved. A universe in which there was only sharing and not 
cooperation in further sharing would have been a deficient universe; it would have 
lacked a certain kind of goodness. The Father and the Son would have been less 
than perfectly good unless they sought to spread their mutual love of cooperating 
in further sharing with an equal.101 
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So there must be three divine persons on Swinburne’s account based on cooperative 
sharing with an equal.  Only a divine person can be an equal, and Swinburne defines divine 
persons precisely as “necessarily perfectly free, omniscient, omnipotent, and existing of 
metaphysical necessity.”102  Swinburne anticipates worry surrounding omnipotence and how that 
impacts freedom and asks, “Would not the omnipotence of one such individual be subject to 
frustration by the other individual and so not be omnipotence?”103  Swinburne calls a divine 
person omnipotent with regard to compatibilist power if that person has “the power to do 
anything logically possible, if he so chooses” and omnipotent with regard to absolute power if 
that person has “the power to choose and do, and that is limited not merely by logical 
possibilities but by perfect goodness.”104  Since a divine person is perfectly good, no conflict 
between divine persons could emerge on the basis of disagreements concerning actions that are 
either morally required or morally impermissible since all divine persons will necessarily agree 
about such actions.  Swinburne worries about potential conflicts that could possibly emerge 
concerning actions that are not morally required, but are still morally good. 
Even though they are each perfectly good, will not one try to do one equal best act 
while another tries to do an incompatible equal best act?  Maybe the Father will 
try to make Uranus rotate in the same direction as the other planets while the Son 
tries to make Uranus rotate in a different direction (which looks like an equally 
good action).  They cannot both succeed.  The only way in which conflict can be 
avoided is if each of the three persons sees themselves as having at any one time 
different spheres of activity.  Then each could be omnipotent, but there would be 
no conflict because in virtue of their perfect goodness no divine person would try 
to do an act of a kind which would be incompatible with an act which another 
divine person was trying to do.  Each would be omnipotent in that, for example, if 
he chooses to make Uranus rotate in a clockwise direction, he would succeed; but 
only one would choose to do so.  The Father brings about, sustains, and eliminates 
things in one sphere of activity, the Son does this in another sphere, and the Spirit 
does this in a third sphere.  
                                                          







But what could determine which divine person had which sphere of 
activity?  Persons caused to exist by another person have obligations to the person 
whom caused them.  So the Father, being perfectly good, will seek to avoid any 
conflict by laying down for each divine person his sphere of activity; and the 
others, being perfectly good will recognize an obligation to conform to this rule.  
So there will be no possibility of conflict.105 
 
Swinburne sees the various spheres of activity laid out by the Father as the means by 
which “each would recognize a duty not to prevent or frustrate the acts of the other…Only if one 
lays down what the rules are, and his decision is accepted because he has the authority to law 
down the rules, will the collision necessarily be avoided.”106  Does this mean that the other 
divine persons are less necessary than the first?  Not at all, according to Swinburne: 
Since the perfect goodness of the Father requires the other two persons to exist 
just as inevitably as the Father exists, they are what I call ‘metaphysically 
necessary’.  I define a being as ‘metaphysically necessary’ if either it is 
ontologically necessary or it is inevitably caused to exist by an ontologically 
necessary being.  Their equal inevitable existence makes the members of the 
Trinity equally worthy of worship. All three members of the Trinity are 
metaphysically necessary persons, but the Father alone is ontologically 
necessary. And the whole Trinity is ontologically necessary because nothing else 
caused it to exist.107 
 
Swinburne lays out a very detailed account of the cooperative activity of the divine 
persons based on metaphysical and ontological necessity which seems consistent with Richard’s 
account of the chain of causation.  As applied to Richard’s account, the Father who has his being 
from himself is ontologically necessary, and both the Son who receives his being from someone 
else and gives being to someone else, and the Spirit, who receives his being from two sources, 
are both metaphysically necessary.  Necessity on both Richard’s and Swinburne’s accounts 
similarly describe why the number of necessary persons stops at three.   Swinburne explains: 
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I believe that there is overriding reason for a first divine individual to bring about 
a second divine individual and with him to bring about a third divine individual, 
but no reason to go further.  If the Christian religion has helped us, Christians and 
non-Christians, to see anything about what is worthwhile, it has helped us to see 
that love is a supreme good.  Love involves sharing, giving to the other what of 
one’s own good is good for him and receiving from the other what of his is good 
for one; and love involves co-operating with another to benefit third parties.  This 
latter is crucial for worthwhile love…Love must share and love must co-operate 
in sharing.  The best love would share all that it had.  A divine individual would 
see that for him too a best kind of action would be to share and to co-operate in 
sharing…So the love of a first divine individual G1 would be manifested first in 
bringing about another divine individual G2 with whom to share his life, and the 
love of G1 or G2 would be manifested in bringing about another divine individual 
G3 with whom G1 and G2 co-operatively could share their lives.
108  
 
Swinburne goes on to explain in more detail: 
So why only three divine persons?  Do not these arguments suggest that there 
should be more than three divine persons, perhaps an infinite number? I claimed 
in Chapter 1 that when there is a unique best action, God must do that; and when 
there is a best kind of action, God must do an action of that kind. Now, bringing 
about the sharing of divinity is a best kind of action and so is bringing about 
cooperation in sharing of divinity. But there is no comparable best kind of action 
which would be achieved by bringing about a fourth person. Bringing about 
cooperating in sharing with a fourth person is not a qualitatively different kind of 
good action from bringing about cooperating in sharing with a third person. Or, to 
use Richard of St Victor’s further point, bringing about the Spirit as well as the 
Son would provide for each divine person someone other than themselves for 
every other divine person to love and be loved by; but adding a fourth would not 
provide a new kind of good state. 
You might think, nevertheless, that, for the above reasons the more divine 
persons the better. In that case, since however many divine persons the Father (in 
conjunction with others) brought about, it would be still better if he brought about 
more. But, we saw in Chapter 1, when a person has the choice of doing one of a 
series of incompatible actions, each better than the previous one and no best act, 
he would be perfectly good if he did any one of these acts. (To bring about only 
three divine persons would be incompatible with an alternative action of bring 
about only four divine persons, and so generally.) So the perfect goodness of the 
Father would be satisfied by his bringing about only two further divine persons. 
He does not have to bring about a fourth divine person in order to fulfill his divine 
nature. But then any fourth divine person would not exist necessarily, even in 
the sense of metaphysical necessity. His existence would not be a necessary 
consequence of the existence of an ontological necessary being; and hence he 
                                                          






would not be divine. So there cannot be a fourth divine person. There must be and 
can only be three divine persons.109 
 
Swinburne affirms three divine persons and no more, since a fourth person could not be 
divine according to his view of ontological and metaphysical necessity.  He clearly argues for 
exactly three persons, but what is unclear on Swinburne’s account is how many gods there are?  
Do the three persons constitute three beings/substances?  Swinburne wants to follow the creeds 
and presents the following analysis of a central creedal claim.   
If [the creedal affirmation that] ‘there is only one God’ meant ‘there is only one 
divine individual’, then the doctrine of the Trinity would be manifestly self-
contradictory…[But] no person and no Council affirming something which they 
intend to be taken with utter seriousness can be read as affirming an evident 
contradiction.110   
 
Swinburne contends that when denying tritheism, “I suggest that they were denying that 
there were three independent divine beings, any of which could exist without the other; or which 
could act independently of each other.”111  Swinburne’s claim that creeds deny three independent 
divine beings seems to indicate that he endorses three divine beings who are dependent on each 
other.  While the matter of independence/dependence is significant, if there are three beings, 
there are three substances, which opens Swinburne to the charge of tritheism.  Swinburne sums 
up and defends his position in Social Trinitarian terms. 
On the account which I have given, the three divine individuals taken together 
would form a collective source of the being of all other things; the members 
would be totally mutually independent and necessarily jointly behind each other’s 
acts.  This collective would be indivisible in its being for logical reasons—that is, 
the kind of being that it would be is such that each of its members is necessarily 
everlasting, and would not have existed unless it had brought about or been 
brought about by the others…It is they, however, rather than it, who, to speak 
strictly, would have the divine properties of omnipotence, omniscience, etc.; 
though clearly there is a ready and natural sense in which the collective can be 
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said to have them as well.  If all members of a group know something, the group 
itself, by very natural extension of use, can be said to know that thing, and so on.  
Similarly this very string unity of the collective would make it, as well as its 
individual members, an appropriate object of worship.  The claim that “there is 
only one God” is be read as the claim that the source of being of all other things 
has to it this kind of indivisible unity.  The claim that each individual is “God” 
should be understood as the claim that “each is divine—omnipotent, perfectly 
good, etc.  Each such being would be an all-perfect source of all things—what 
more could councils intelligibly mean by the claim that an individual is God?”112 
 
Swinburne seems to describe the unity of the persons as the threefold instantiation of an 
abstract, universal essence—divinity.  For each divine person, there is a distinct trope of the 
divine nature held by a specific being.  Since there are three divine persons, Swinburne seems to 
indicate that there are three divine beings.  If he means that there are three beings, the charge of 
tritheism may find its mark.  This seems to be just what Swinburne means by claiming of the 
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, that “each is divine—omnipotent, perfectly good, etc.  Each such 
being would be an all-perfect source of all things.”113  Perhaps Swinburne is errantly less than 
precise here, and he really means to say, “each such person,” which would help alleviate the 
charge of tritheism.  It seems that if the divine nature includes the property being triune, it is best 
to speak only of one being who is tri-personal and not to speak of three beings.  Even if speaking 
of three persons, however, if the divine nature is instantiated by each of the Father, the Son, and 
the Holy Spirit, the specter of tritheism lingers.  After all, if there are three instantiations of the 
divine nature, the property of being triune cannot be essential to that nature for none of the 
persons is triune.  It seems better to understand the unity of God in terms of God’s being one 
soul/substance composed of the persons of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, each of 
whom possess the property of being a divine person—is omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good, 
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eternal, and necessary.  This posits a distinction between the full and complete divine nature, 
which includes being triune, and being a divine person.  The trinitarian model defended in Part 
III will seek to explain how this distinction is cashed out.  
Davis 
 
Stephen Davis is another contemporary scholar who believes that a priori considerations 
can demonstrate multiple divine persons are inherent to God’s nature.  His aim is to defend the 
Social Trinitarian view of the Trinity and to show that the one divine substance could support 
multiple divine persons.  His argument does not seek to demonstrate that God is three persons, 
only that God may be multi-personal.  His argument is as follows: 
(1) Necessarily, God is perfect, and perfect in love (I John 4:8). 
(2) Necessarily, if God does not experience love of another, God is imperfect. 
(3) Therefore, necessarily, God experiences love of another. ((1), (2)) 
(4) Necessarily, it is possible that only God exists (i.e., that God does not  
            create). 
(5) Necessarily, if ST is false, there is no “other” in the Godhead. 
(6) Necessarily, if God alone exists, and if ST is false, then God does not  
            experience love of another, and thus is not perfect. ((2), (4), (5)) 
(7) Therefore, necessarily, ST is true. ((4), (6))114  
 
The argument is valid, but is it sound?  The first premise is on solid ground.  Not only 
does Davis include Christian scriptural attestation, but the content of the premise is central to 
Perfect Being Theology and can only be attacked if being perfect in love is not an essential 
component of being perfect.  Premise Two seems to be the place where most criticism would 
focus.  Davis defends this premise by noting that 
Now love of oneself is surely a good…Still, it seems obvious (at least to me) that 
love of another person is also a very great good.  It seems that a God who does 
not and cannot love another has missed out on something high and wonderful.  
There would be a deficiency in God.  God would be less than perfect.  (The same 
would be true of any great good that can be logically experienced by an 
                                                          
114 Davis, Stephen. Perichoretic Monotheism: A Defense of a Social Theory of the Trinity in the 






omnipotent and perfectly good being: if God were not to experience beauty or 
justice, that would be a deficiency in God.)  And so premise (2) is true.115 
 
Davis is not out to accomplish the same thing as Richard or Swinburne.  Davis is not 
presenting a fully articulated defense of a priori trinitarian theorizing.  Rather, he is collecting 
reasons to support the Social Trinitarian view.  He should not be criticized for having a different 
aim, nor should he be held to the same standard of precision expected from those advancing a 
more robust a priori trinitarian approach.   
 Davis is less than precise in his explanation and defense of Premise Two.  Not all great 
goods must be experienced by an omnipotent and perfectly good being for that being to still 
count as perfect inherently.  There are many goods which can only be experienced after creating.  
If beauty and justice and love of another person are logically possibly experienced even having 
never created, then a being who lacked them could not be perfect.  Missing out on things high 
and wonderful only strike against a being’s perfection if those high and wonderful things are 
logically possible apart from creating.  Davis seems to contend that they are possible apart from 
creation by invoking Premise Four.  God is still God even if God does not create.   
 Davis’ argument seems sound as well.  Since the scope of his argument does not serve to 
specify or limit the number of divine persons, the argument’s utility is not as great, however, as 
the others under consideration.   
Richard of St. Victor was the first to articulate a philosophically robust a priori trinitarian 
approach making use of divine love and omnipotence while attempting to prove that God’s 
nature must be triune.  Richard Swinburne advances many of the same methods, but provides a 
unique view on the causal reciprocity of the divine persons.  Neither Richard, nor Swinburne 
                                                          





present their views as tight analytical arguments, as does Davis.  Is there a formally structured 
argument that capitalizes on omnipotence which proves that God’s nature includes exactly and 
exclusively three divine persons and that avoids the causal reciprocity of Swinburne’s approach?  
Consider the argument in the following section.  
 
Section III—Kirschner’s Formulation of an A Priori Argument for the Trinity 
Kirschner’s Formulation of an A Priori Love Argument: 
1. God is the Greatest Conceivable Being (GCB). 
2. Any great-making property God/GCB possesses must be possessed to a maximal degree  
    essentially. 
3. Love/benevolence is a great-making property God/GCB possesses. 
4. Maximal love/benevolence includes self-love, love-given, love-received, and love-shared  
    (cooperative love of a third). 
5. A singularly personal being cannot possess love-given, love-received, or love-shared  
    essentially.   
6. A dually personal being cannot possess love-shared essentially. 
7. Therefore, God/GCB must be at least a tri-personal being. 
8. Simplicity is a great-making property. 
9. Being tri-personal is the simplest way to possess maximal love/benevolence.   
10. No other great-making property requires the GCB be multi-personal. 
11. Therefore, God/GCB is a tri-personal being.   
 
 This argument seeks to demonstrate the Trinity on a priori grounds.  It assumes Perfect 
Being Theology and defines God as the greatest conceivable being.  If God is other than the 
GCB, this argument is a non-starter, but with such an assumption in place, this argument seems 
sound.  The only great-making properties under consideration are love/benevolence and 
simplicity.  Importantly, love is construed in a very precise way.  This construal is not an ad hoc 
means by which one might cram triunity into the concept of God, but is a result of conceptually 
mapping the notion of love.  The main thrust of the argument is that any being possessing 
maximal love must possess (be capable of actualizing) the variously unique categorical aspects 





all the aspects of love.  Such beings would need to first create something else to love, but this 
would mean that such beings would only be potentially maximally loving essentially.  A being 
who only potentially possesses the great-making property of maximal love is not the GCB since 
possessing maximal love is a great-making property and a being who can possess maximal love 
can be conceived.  The great-making property of simplicity is invoked as a natural response to 
idea that perhaps the concept of God is enhanced by exponentially multiplying the persons 
within God.  An infinitely personal being, however, is no greater than a tri-personal being as no 
great-making property requires the GCB be more than tri-personal which means that the great-
making properties of simplicity and maximal love are only secured by a tri-personal conception 
of God.  This demonstrates that only a tri-personal concept of God can count as the GCB 
essentially.   
The argument is valid, but is it sound?  The argument must be assessed.  Consider: 
1. God is the Greatest Conceivable Being (GCB). 
This is a stipulated definition claiming that whatever constitutes the greatest conceivable 
being, “God” is the appropriate appellation of that being.  Just as a vixen and female fox identify 
the same concept, so God and Greatest Conceivable Being identify the same concept.  One may 
have reason to doubt that a particular conception of God is the GCB, but this argument does not 
start with a particular conception of God, but rather seeks to understand the very concept of what 
the GCB must be and then says that one’s understanding of God should line up with that concept.  
It may be argued that no intelligible concept of a perfect being is conceivable, but objections to 
that effect are challenges to any argument assuming Perfect Being Theology, not a specific 





a priori line of thought to commend Trinitarianism within the theological context of Perfect 
Being Theology. 
Consider: 2. Any great-making property God/GCB possesses must be possessed to a  
 
maximal degree essentially.   
 
This premise builds on the definition in 1.  It is not enough that the GCB possess certain 
great-making properties.  The GCB must possess those great-making properties to a maximal 
degree.  If strength is an aspect located in the great-making property power, then the GCB must 
be maximally strong.  The reason for this is obvious.  If Andrew can lift 100 pounds and Brian 
can lift 50 pounds, then Andrew is stronger than Brian and is greater than Brian in terms of 
strength.  But Andrew is not the strongest conceivable being.  The Hulk can lift 100 million tons.  
This means that the Hulk is greater than Andrew in terms of strength.  Superman, however, can 
lift 600 quintillion tons, so Superman is greater than the Hulk in terms of strength.  But it is 
conceivable to imagine a being lifting more than even Superman can lift.  Such a being would be 
greater than Superman in terms of strength.  The GCB is all-powerful and thus can lift any and 
every amount, making the GCB maximally strong.  No being can be stronger than maximally 
strong, so any being under consideration as the GCB must be maximally strong or else someone 
could conceive of a stronger being, making that being the GCB, provided maximal strength is 
compossible with the other great-making properties.  
 It will not do to say that the GCB possesses great-making properties but to less than a 
maximal degree.  Such a concept is illogical given the concept of the GCB.  Whatever great-
making property, P, is predicated of the GCB, that property must be maximized.  Such 





the GCB possessing the most P that is compossible with other great-making properties.  Either 
form of predication is an acceptable rendering of ‘possessed to a maximal degree.’116 
The great-making properties the GCB possesses must be possessed to a maximal degree 
essentially.  This means that the GCB cannot merely possess a great-making property potentially 
such that some set of circumstances must obtain prior to the GCB possessing that great-making 
property to a maximal degree.  The idea is that the GCB is the GCB in its essence.  If God has to 
create something prior to possessing a property that is necessary to his status as GCB, then God 
possesses that property only potentially, not essentially and is therefore not the GCB if another 
being can be conceived which possesses maximally all necessary great-making properties 
required of the GCB and possesses them essentially.  The difference is one of modality.  A being 
who possesses a great-making property essentially possesses that property in every possible 
world, but a being who possesses a great-making property potentially/contingently, possesses 
that property only in certain worlds—worlds in which that being first brings about the 
circumstances needed to actualize that property. 
Not all great-making properties must be possessed essentially by God to be the GCB.  
The lack of certain great-making properties does not diminish God as the GCB so long as those 
great-making properties are not necessary for the GCB to be the perfect being essentially.  For 
instance, many within the Christian worldview understand God to be the redeemer of those 
humans who accept God’s grace.  Being the redeemer is certainly a great-making property, but it 
is not one required to be the GCB.  God does not have to redeem anybody to be the GCB.  To 
some theists, this may sound blasphemous in isolation, but it is perfectly reasonable in context.  
God cannot redeem anybody unless there is somebody in need of redemption.  The persons of 
                                                          





the Trinity who comprise God are perfect and require no redemption.  This means that God is not 
the redeemer (does not possess the great-making property of being the redeemer) in his essence.  
God would only potentially be the redeemer in his essence.  God would first need to create and 
then at least one of his creation would need to become in need of redemption for God to actualize 
the potentially held great-making property of being the redeemer.  God is free not to create, and 
if God so chose, that choice would not diminish his status as GCB.  It would only mean that 
those great-making properties not essentially held are potentially held and would remain 
potentially held if God continued not to create.  Once God chooses to create, and his creation is 
in need of redemption, then God would have to exercise the great-making property of being the 
redeemer to retain his status as GCB.   
Being the redeemer is a great-making property, but not one that a being must possess to 
be the GCB in his essence.  Any great-making property that a being must possess in his essence 
to be the GCB must be held to maximal degree for the being truly to be considered the GCB. 
Consider: 3. Love/benevolence is a great-making property God/GCB possesses. 
 A being’s greatness is enhanced when the property love is predicated of that being, but is 
diminished when the property love is not predicated of that being.  Love is a moral good 
universally endorsed.  A being without love cannot be morally perfect or good.  Is moral 
goodness a boon to a being’s greatness?  Moral goodness certainly does not diminish a being in 
terms of greatness, even if moral goodness is often seen (by bad guys, for instance) as a 
diminution of strength.  This is because moral goodness serves as a governor for actions.  Take 
for example, Superman battling the misguided and morally deficient General Zod and his army 





people.  Zod says that Superman’s care for common people is a “weakness.”117 and Faora agrees 
commenting, “You’re weak, son of El. The fact that you possess a sense of morality and we do 
not gives us an evolutionary advantage…For every human you save, we will kill a million 
more.”118  Superman is not as ruthless as Zod and Faora, but is just as strong physically and is 
superior morally, making him a greater being.   
So it is for all beings who are good compared to those without a sense of morality.  Good 
is logically prior to evil in that evil is defined by its distance from good.  Good can exist without 
evil, but evil cannot exist without good, and so a being who is all-good is greater than one who is 
all-evil or just not all-good.  A being without love/benevolence is not as great as a being who 
possesses love/benevolence, securing love/benevolence as a great-making property necessary of 
the GCB. 
Consider: 4. Maximal love/benevolence includes self-love, love-given, love-received, and  
 
love-shared (cooperative love of a third). 
 
To assess the notion of maximal love, one must understand the nature of love.  Consider 
what it is to love.  A person can be said (1) to love baseball, (2) to love justice, (3) or to love 
one’s spouse, and yet something very different is meant by (1), (2), and (3).  (1) may be 
understood to mean that a person very much enjoys baseball.  In this same sense, one can love 
donuts, reading comic books, swimming, etc.  (2) may be understood to mean that a person 
values the concept and results of justice.  In this same sense, one can love freedom, security, 
loyalty, etc.  (3) is importantly different from merely liking or enjoying something or some 
                                                          
117 See the motion picture Superman II for General Zod, portrayed by Terrance Stamp, making 
this claim to Superman just before the beginning of the climactic battle. 
118 See the motion picture Man of Steel for Faora, portrayed by Antje Traue, making this claim 





activity and from valuing concepts either as ends or for the ends they produce.  (3) involves 
caring about another person as that person is, for her own sake.  In this sense, a person can love 
his spouse, his children, his friend, his coworker, etc.  This sort of personal love will be the focus 
moving forward.   
The language of personal love, restricted though it is, still equivocates when deploying 
the term “love.”  Distinctions are needed to adequately make sense of the various modes of 
personal love.  Certainly the love a mother has for her child is different (or at least differently 
expressed) from the love she has for her spouse.  While both may involve caring about the other 
person as that person is for that person’s sake, and while both may involve physical elements, 
those expressions will be wildly different.  This is because the nature of care is itself a vast 
landscape.   
Concerning humans, eros/sexual desire, often expressed as passionate longing for another 
person, and philia/affectionate regard or friendly feelings toward another person, both seem to 
consist of appropriate responses to the positive qualities in one’s beloved.  Agape/choosing to see 
or bestow value in another human person, not on the basis of the positive qualities of the person, 
but on the basis of an awareness of the ontological similitude of other persons, also results in 
appropriate responses to other persons.  While these might be three various ways to express love, 
it seems that something common unites them all under the banner of love.   
Love seems to involve care, concern, valuing, and affection. 119   
                                                          
119 The primary ways in which love is described and discussed philosophically seem to center 
around the following three areas: love as union, love a care/concern, and love as valuing.  Love 
as union involves the creation of an affectionate “we” community.  Aristotle, Hegel, Solomon, 
Scruton, Nozick, Fisher, and Delaney all present views of love that include the formation of a 
community.  The love as concern view takes as central caring about the beloved for her sake.  
Taylor, Newton-Smith, Soble, LaFollette, Frankfurt, and White each advance this notion.  Love 
as valuing takes two tacks.  Velleman is representative of the appraisal view of love, which 






  The examples used to describe this care, concern, valuing, and affection so far have all 
involved human persons loving other human persons.  But love is not restricted exclusively to 
human persons.  Theistic worldviews posit that God loves.  If personal love is open to God, then 
the nature of love goes beyond what can be described using exclusively human examples.   
Divine love and human love share many aspects according to theistic worldviews.  
Human love, however, is a more diverse landscape than divine love since it involves so many 
aspects that are physical in nature, whereas God is incorporeal.  To effectively map love 
conceptually, one must zoom-out from one’s own human perspective which so often 
concentrates on the human-centric facets of love.  As one zooms-out, away from the very precise 
aspects of applied parental love, or the vast complexities of sexually erotic love, one sees a map 
that does not show specific streets or elevations markers, but sees counties which comprise a 
state, then states which comprise regions, then regions which comprise continents, and finally 
continents which comprise the terrestrial map.  What are the largest and broadest categories of 
the concept love?  What individuates the continents of the fully zoomed-out map of the concept 
of love?  Just as the continents of a global map are land masses, and each continent is a uniquely 
shaped land mass, the uniquely distinct aspects of love are comprised of something.  Love seems 
to be care, concern, valuing, and affection for something.  All the continents on the conceptual 
map of love are comprised of care, concern, valuing, and affection, and yet each continent is 
unique. 
Every aspect of personal love is comprised of these four elements and can be 
conceptually grouped into unique continents that allow for the vast array of variously expressed 
                                                          
way to the value of the beloved.  Singer is representative of the bestowal view which understands 





examples of love to be discovered.  Concerning the nature of personal love, it seems there are 
only four qualitatively unique ways in which to express care, concern, valuing, and affection.  
Every example of personal love, however construed, is an expression of one of the following 
four aspects: self-love, love-given, love-received, and love-shared.   
Personal agents can care for themselves, can be concerned with one’s own well-being, 
value one’s self, and like one’s self.  Personal agents can also care for other persons, be 
concerned for other persons, value other persons, and shower affection on other persons.  
Personal agents can, likewise, receive care, concern, value, and affection from other persons.  
Reciprocal love, when directed at a different person forms a qualitatively unique form of love—
love-shared.  The love two persons have for each other is not merely intensified, but transformed, 
as they share the love of another, for the two unite jointly to love another that is not either of the 
two.   
Imagine, then, the conceptual map of personal love.  The nature of love is to care for, 
show concern for, value, and show affection to a person.  There are four continents on this map, 
each of which is similarly comprised, but uniquely shaped.  The continent of Self-Love has a 
divine region where God loves himself.  This region will be thoroughly explored later, but God 
can value himself both essentially and in terms of recognizing a uniqueness distinct from 
anything he creates.  There is also a human region where human persons love themselves.  The 
ways in which human persons love themselves are variously expressed.  Going back to school, 
taking aspirin, exercising, masturbating, going on a diet, indulging in just one more donut, etc. 
can all be examples of self-love, yet the nature of self-love will always be the same.  Each 
example of self-love will either involve care, concern, valuing, or affection for one’s self.  The 





The continent of Love-Given also has a divine region, where God, at least according to 
the Christian worldview, creates human persons in God’s own image, values human persons in 
virtue of being so created, loves human persons so much that whichever human persons believe 
in God will be saved, indwells human persons who believe the Gospel, and inspired the Bible to 
inform and guide human persons.  The continent also has a human region in which is located the 
state of loving other humans in the various ways (romance, admiration, good will, marriage, sex, 
friendship, parenting, etc.).  This region also includes the state of loving God in the various ways 
available to humans.  The continent of Love-Received, likewise, has a divine region and human 
region.  Rather than giving love, on this continent, God receives love and human persons receive 
love.  While different continents, Love-Given and Love-Received have coastlines that look like 
puzzle pieces that would fit together, much like Africa and South America look like they fit 
together.   
Lastly, is the continent of Love-Shared.  The divine region of this continent will be 
explored thoroughly in the assessment of premises 5 and 6.  The human region is expressed in 
various ways.  For example, when two parents (who reciprocate love for each other) both share 
in loving their child, something unique happens.  The third person is loved harmoniously and 
jointly by two others who also love each other and the care, concern, valuing, and affection of 
the two is fused into a community of care, concern, valuing, and affection by their love for a 
third and for each other.  This community emerges as a result of shared love for a third.  This is 
in opposition to two persons who each love a third, but do not love each other.  This union of two 
lovers sharing in love for a third creates a “we” community unique from that which exists on the 
Love-Given continent when two persons both independently love a third.  If those independent 





The myriad expressions of personal love all seem to land on one or more of these continents.  
Every sort of personal love seems to be an example of either self-love, love-given, love-received, 
or love-shared.   
 Maximal love involves the possession of each unique sort of love.  A being could still 
possess the great-making property of love/benevolence essentially even if that being did not 
possess love/benevolence maximally.  Such a being, however, would not be as great as one who 
did possess love/benevolence maximally and thus would not be a viable candidate for GCB 
status.  Such a being would not as great as one who possesses love/benevolence maximally as 
long as maximal love/benevolence is possible to be possessed essentially.  If it is possible for a 
conceivable being to possess maximal love/benevolence essentially and a being under 
consideration fails to do so, then there is another conceivable being who is greater in terms of 
love/benevolence.  The being under consideration could not be the GCB in light of this 
deficiency.   
Consider: 5. A singularly personal being cannot possess love-given, love-received, or  
 
love-shared essentially.    
 
 Love-given and love-received require at least two persons to obtain.  A property is not 
maximally possessed essentially if it does not obtain.  Any property that a being possibly 
possesses but does not obtain is merely a potential property, not an essential one.  Such 
properties are contingent upon some other set of circumstances obtaining.  This means that while 
God is maximally powerful/omnipotent, the possession of omnipotence is not the ability to do 
absolutely anything at all that can be done because many things that God could do require that 
other things be done first.  This renders those things God could do, but that require other things 





certain aspects of omnipotence contingent and not able to be actualized essentially.   What about 
dispositional properties or dispositional aspects of properties?  A dispositional property is the 
ability to affect or be affected by something else.  A dispositional property can be held 
essentially but is still possessed contingently in terms of modality.  A person may be disposed to 
love other persons, but if no other persons exist to love, the first person does not possess love-
given essentially, but potentially/contingently/dispositionally.   Essential properties cannot be 
shut off or withheld.  It is never the case that the GCB can throttle back a great-making property 
from being possessed maximally to being possessed in a lesser way since another conceivable 
being—one exactly similar but who possesses the same great-making property maximally is 
conceivable and such a being would be greater in terms of that property.  By definition, it is 
never the case the GCB possess a great-making property essentially in less than a maximal way 
if that great-making property is possibly possessed maximally and essentially.   
 The only aspect of love/benevolence that a singularly personal being can possess 
essentially is self-love since this is the only qualitatively unique aspect of love that requires only 
one person.  For such a being to possess love-given and love-received, that being would first 
need to create another person to love.  Such a need prevents possession of maximal 
love/benevolence essentially because such possession is dependent upon the being exercising a 
certain other potential great-making property—creating.  This relegates possession of 
love/benevolence to potential status for the singularly personal being.  Such a being could still be 
disposed to love others, but that disposition does not constitute maximal possession of 
love/benevolence if it is possible for a different being to actualize all aspects of love essentially.  
A tri-personal being can actualize all the aspects of love essentially and is conceivable.  Even if a 





love another person and/or receive love from another person (which an omniscient singularly 
personal being certainly could do) such imaginings constitute only potential possession of those 
aspects, not maximal possession of them essentially.   
Consider: 6. A dually personal being cannot possess love-shared essentially. 
Love-shared requires at least three persons to obtain.  A dually personal being can 
possess self-love, love-given, and love-received essentially, but cannot possess love-shared until 
that being creates another person.  Such a dually personal being possessed of the first three 
aspects of love is certainly disposed to love as evidenced by the two persons loving themselves 
and each other, but possessing the disposition for love-shared is not possessing shared-love 
essentially.  Such a dually personal being would possess love-shared potentially.  Such a being 
would be great, no doubt, but not as great as a being able to possess self-love, love-given, love-
received, and love-shared essentially.  The possession of maximal love/benevolence requires the 
actualizing of all the aspects of love essentially, but a dually personal being does not possess 
love-shared necessarily/essentially, only contingently.   
Consider: 7. Therefore, God/GCB must be at least a tri-personal being. 
7 is guaranteed to be true if 1-6 are true.  Maximal possession of love/benevolence 
requires possession of all four aspects of love essentially.  A being may possess 
love/benevolence in a contingent way, but that being is not the GCB.  A singularly personal 
being can be disposed to possess/actualize love-given, love-received, and love-shared, but does 
not actually possess them essentially.  Such a being would possess them 
contingently/dispositionally.  Such a being is great, but not as great as a being who maximally 
possesses all aspects of love essentially.  A dually personal being may possess love/benevolence 





possess/actualize love-shared, but does not actually possess love-shared essentially.  Such a 
being would have to choose to bring about a third person and thus would possess love-shared 
contingently/dispostionally, which is not as great as a being who maximally possesses all aspects 
of love essentially.   
Consider: 8. Simplicity is a great-making property. 
Simplicity here is not the traditional doctrine of divine simplicity as understood in post 
creedal Christianity and still endorsed by some Christian theists today. 120  The doctrine of divine 
simplicity, so understood, says that God is without parts—physical parts, metaphysical parts, 
predicatable parts, etc. essentially.  God cannot have physical parts, obviously, as God is 
incorporeal essentially.  But the very strong form of simplicity also seeks to preclude God from 
possessing unique attributes.  The doctrine equates God’s existence with God’s essence.  The 
doctrine holds that God does not possess properties, but is those properties.  Accordingly, God is 
said not to have power, but to be power; not to have love, but to be love, etc.  Furthermore, the 
strong form of the doctrine of divine simplicity claims that the qualities of God are 
indistinguishable and indivisible, such that God’s power is identical to God’s love, which is 
identical to God’s eternality, etc.   
What is meant by simplicity in this argument is not what is claimed by the traditionally 
understood strong doctrine of divine simplicity.  That doctrine presents problems of incoherence.  
Eternality is a part of God’s nature, but eternality is not the same property as omnipotence.  The 
Athanasian Creed predicates eternality of God and separately predicates omnipotence of God.  
                                                          
120 The doctrine of divine simplicity, while endorsed by thinkers like Augustine, Aquinas, and 
contemporarily by Dolezal, etc., in its strong form is rejected in favor of a more philosophically 
coherent understanding of simplicity by thinkers like William Lane Craig, Alvin Plantinga, J.I. 





While eternality and omnipotence are compossible and are possessed by the GCB essentially, 
some conceivable being may be omnipotent but lack eternality.  It seems that to stretch 
simplicity so far as to make all of God’s properties identical is too far a stretch.  While God 
possesses those properties necessarily, and while those properties do not seem predicated of any 
other actual being, these should not be reasons to preclude distinctions between properties since 
they can be distinguished via thought experiments. 
The doctrine also seems to demand that God have no properties distinct from his nature.  
Such a claim posits that the essential properties of God are necessary and are never latent.  That 
seems right, but such a claim also seems to demand that God have no potential properties, which 
seems wrong.  On this view God is the pure act of being.  God is eternal, necessary, omnipotent, 
etc. in a will-independent way.  God never chooses to exercise or withhold these properties.  Yet, 
many properties God displays seem willed by God.  For instance, God is not the redeemer 
essentially.  God becomes the redeemer when he, in fact, redeems something.  It seems that 
redeeming is a choice that God makes (as is creating anything at all) but it also seems that God 
could refrain from ever creating anything in the first place and in so doing also refrain from 
redeeming anyone.  Such potential properties seem to demonstrate that God’s properties can be 
distinguished from his nature. 
Simplicity is a great-making property but is not the same as the Doctrine of Divine 
Simplicity, which claims that God has no parts, physical or metaphysical, that all of God’s 
properties are identical to each other, and that God’s existence is identical to his existence.  
Rather, Simplicity here is understood as efficiency in aseity.  Aseity is the property of 
independent self-existence and sufficiency.  Such a being exists in and of itself, with no reliance 





of subsistence.   This means that if a being required certain aspects necessary for possession of a 
particular great-making property required for GCB status, that being would have those aspects 
internally and in the most efficient manner possible. 
 Remember that simplicity here makes no stipulation about parts and does not identify 
God’s properties with each other but does require that they be will-independent.  A being who 
chooses to exemplify a great-making property could choose to do otherwise.  In those worlds 
where a being chose not to exemplify such properties, that being would not be as great as an 
exactly similar being who did choose to exemplify them.  If a being is a necessary being, then 
that being’s existence and essence cannot be pulled apart.  If God necessarily exists, then God 
exists in all possible worlds, and in each of those worlds, God’s essence is the same.  As a 
necessary being, what distinguishes those worlds from each other is not the presence of God, or 
the nature of God essentially, but God’s chosen exemplification of God’s potential properties 
(like creation, and the attendant actualities that follow creating beings with free will).  God’s 
essential properties are necessary to God and since necessary existence is a property of God, 
God’s existence and God’s essence are co-extensional, but God is free to choose not to create 
anything at all.  God’s essence is the same across all possible worlds regardless if God creates or 
not, which demonstrates the distinctness of divine attributes.  
 The GCB requires nothing external from itself to exist or to possess the best combination 
of great-making properties.  If a being needed something external to itself to possess a great-
making property, then that being does not possess the property in question essentially, but only 
potentially.  Such a being is not as great a being who possesses that great-making property 
essentially, so simplicity first requires aseity.  Simplicity also requires efficiency in that aseity.  





any composition.  If neither a singularly personal being, nor a dually personal being can possess 
maximal love/benevolence, and love is a great-making property, then the GCB must be at least 
tri-personal.  But why stop there?  Perhaps the GCB is quad-personal, or even infinitely-
personal?  This is impossible if simplicity is a great-making property.   
The need for possession of maximal love requires three persons.  What is the requirement 
for a fourth?  Even if it were to benefit the GCB to experience love-given, love-received, and 
love-shared with additional persons, that benefit would only be quantitative, not qualitative.  This 
means that a fourth person is unnecessarily redundant.  A quad-personal being would be 
comprised of four persons, but one of those person would serve no unique function.  This 
reduplication adds nothing to the greatness of the being, even if it benefits the persons 
comprising the being in a quantitative way.  It may be quantitatively enjoyable to possess love-
given, love-received, and love-shared with additional persons, but it is not greater to do so.  The 
possession of maximal love is secured by a being comprised of three persons.  In fact, if 
unnecessary personal reduplication were somehow to add to the greatness of a being, the GCB 
would have to be infinitely-personal essentially, which may be absurd given the seemingly 
absurd implications of an actually infinite set. 
 If a being has to create in order to possess a needed great-making property maximally, 
that being cannot be the GCB.  A being needs to be tri-personal to possess love maximally.  If a 
being is quad-(or more)-personal, that being is not greater in terms of possession of love, and is 
less efficient and so the tri-personal being is greater in terms of possession of simplicity.  But is 
simplicity really a great-making property?  It certainly seems so.  It diminishes a being to be 
comprised, in part, of unnecessary persons.  That greatness includes simple efficiency is 





still require an appeal to aseity, but then also require making the bizarre case for unnecessary 
personal reduplication as something other than a diminution of greatness.  If the personal 
reduplication were necessary for some other great-making property to be possessed maximally, 
then simplicity would be secured if the being in question was comprised of the number of 
persons needed to secure that other property.  No great-making property other than maximal love 
seems to require multiple persons.  Simplicity would only be abandoned if that being were 
comprised of some number of unnecessary persons in addition to the number required of that 
other property.  And then the question reemerges, what is the point of those persons?  They are 
not needed.  A being of maximal stream-lined efficient aseity is greater than a being of 
unnecessary redundancies.  In fact, unnecessary redundancy is not even compatible with 
necessary existence since the non-necessary persons cannot, by definition, be a part of the 
being’s essence.  The being in question would be at least tri-personal in every possible world, but 
be quad-(or more)-personal in some other worlds, but not all other worlds, essentially which is a 
contradictory.  So it will not do to say that the GCB could be quad-(or more)-personal.  
Efficiency is a great-making property, and seems even to be a necessary one.   
Consider: 9. Being tri-personal is the simplest way to possess maximal love/benevolence.   
 Possession of maximal love/benevolence requires being at least tri-personal.  Being quad-
(or more)-personal is unnecessary and redundant.  Therefore, being tri-personal is the simplest 
way to possess maximal love/benevolence.  Since simplicity is a great-making property, it must 
be possessed in a maximal way.  When considering love, maximal simplicity is secured by a tri-
personal being. 





 Of all the great-making properties, only omnibenevolence requires multiple persons.  
Omniscience, omnipotence, moral perfection, eternality, necessity, and any other conceivable 
great-making property can be secured by single divine person.  Only omnibenevolence requires 
more than one person to be actualized. 
Consider: 10. Therefore, God/GCB is a tri-personal being.   
 1-10 entail 11.  1-10 have been assessed on a general level, and seem true.  Specific 
arguments against premises of this argument will be assessed below. 
 
Section IV—Contra Tuggy: The Impossibility of a Singularly Personal Perfect Being 
Dale Tuggy is no fan of the Trinity, regularly critiquing Trinitarian thought in his 
scholarly writings, during his conference lectures, and on his witty trinities online blog.121  
Tuggy provides nearly a direct critique of this argument.  Aside from some terminological 
differences, his objections to the category of a priori arguments for the Trinity are applicable to 
this argument and require consideration.  Tuggy argues that a singularly personal being can be 
perfect/the GCB and therefore a priori Trinitarian arguments fail.  Tuggy notes:  
Most trinitarians believe that God is a Trinity based on the Bible and/or the 
testimony of the mainstream Christian theological tradition—[as expressed in the 
creeds]. But a few philosophers have argued that another sort of evidence is 
available, offering arguments from reason alone. There is a twofold motivation 
here. First, most Christians would like it to be the case that there’s support for 
                                                          
121 For articles representing his views, see Tuggy’s “Divine Deception, Identity, and Social 
Trinitarianism,” Religious Studies 40, 2004, 269-87; “Constitution Trinitarianism: An 
Appraisal,” Philosophy and Theology 25:1, 2013, 129-62; “On Counting Gods,” TheoLogica, 
2016; “Metaphysics and Logic of the Trinity,” Oxford Handbooks Online, 2016.  For lectures 
given see “On Counting Gods,” Boston College, Boston, MA, December 2016. “How to be a 
Monotheistic Trinitarian,” at the L.A. Theology Conference, Fuller Theological Seminary, 
Pasadena, CA, January 2014; “The Failure of Fashionable Antiunitarian Arguments: 
Would a God who is a single Person fail to be perfect?” at EPS meeting on March 2, 2018, 
Huston, TX.  See Tuggy’s website http://trinities.org/blog/ to really appreciate his often 






what their tradition says about God from another, independent quarter, from 
philosophy. Secondly, mainstream Christians would like to show how their 
doctrine of God is superior to that of other religious theists, such as Jews, 
Muslims, and unitarian Christians. These sorts of argument were never thought of 
in biblical or patristic times; they are the offspring of Anselmian perfect being 
speculation. I shall argue that we know of no such cogent argument.122 
 
It is important to understand these motivations.  Consider the first motivation Tuggy 
notes: most Christians would like it to be the case that there is support from what their tradition 
says about God from the independent quarter of philosophy.  This is certainly so, but the 
motivation is more than merely the desire to marshal supporting evidence for one’s tradition.  
The motivation seems to be much stronger than that.  If it is the case that God is tri-personal, as 
the tradition claims, then it stands to reason that God is necessarily tri-personal.  If God is 
necessarily some way that could not be known prior to scriptural and creedal revelation, then this 
information presents a case of a necessary a posteriori truth.   
 Regarding metaphysically necessary truths, Saul Kripke123 contends that some 
metaphysically necessary truths can be known a priori, such as “All bachelors are unmarried,” or 
“Everything blue is colored,” but that other metaphysically necessary truths can only be known a 
posteriori, such as “Water is H20,” or “Hesperus is Phosphorus.”  The a posteriori truths cannot 
be known prior to experience.  The a priori truths can be known by reason alone, prior to 
experience.  
 If it is the case that it is reasonable to hold that being tri-personal is essential to God, but 
this fact is known only through divine revelation and the interpretation of it, then it is the case 
that “The number of persons in the Godhead is three” is an example of a metaphysically 
                                                          
122 Dale Tuggy. “On the Possibility of a Single Perfect Person,” in Christian Philosophy of  
Religion, C. Ruloff (ed.), Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 2013. P. 130. 





necessary a posteriori truth.  Many Trinitarians would be pleased to have philosophical support 
of the contention that God must be tri-personal and therefore advance a priori arguments for the 
triunity of God based on, and not independent of, what the scriptural and creedal experience 
affords them.   
On the other hand, rather than seeking to demonstrate the necessity of what can only be 
known through revelation and the creeds, some seek to provide a philosophical notion of God 
generally.  A philosophically a priori concept of God emerges from the consideration of great-
making properties and the nature of a greatest conceivable being.  Then it can be determined if 
any religious tradition lines up with that independently derived concept of God.   
Most Trinitarians opt for the former approach, seeing a priori arguments for the Trinity 
as merely supportive of the metaphysically necessary truth declared in the tradition.124  Yet some 
thinkers are Trinitarians because of a priori considerations.125  Even if few endorse 
Trinitarianism because of such arguments, the motivation for a priori Trinitarian arguments is 
not exclusively the purview of the former approach. 
                                                          
124 William Lane Craig is representative of the view.  He says, “I’ve not seen any argument that 
would give us a priori knowledge that the number of persons in the Godhead is three. But given 
divine revelation, we know that there are three persons in the Godhead, and it seems reasonable 
to think that this is essential to God. It seems bizarre to think that in some possible worlds one of 
the persons of the Trinity goes missing! In this case it is a metaphysically necessary a 
posteriori truth that ‘The number of persons in the Godhead is three.’  So God has necessarily 
the property of being tri-personal, though this fact is known to us only via divine revelation.” 
(Reasonable Faith website https://www.reasonablefaith.org/question-answer/P200/does-god-
have-both-necessary-and-contingent-properties/ #554 Does God Have both Necessary and 
Contingent Properties? November 25, 2017.) 
125 This is a rare occurrence since most people do not ponder the nature of God independent of 
the religious tradition they adopt. If one refrains from adopting any particular religious tradition, 
however, opting instead to consider the merits of various traditions, one might be compelled to 
consider the nature of God independent of the traditional construals of God.  Pondering about 
God’s nature apart from religious tradition is, in fact, what led me to test out Christian Theism as 
it was the only tradition that lined up with God being triune, which seemed to me necessary 





 Consider the second motivation listed by Tuggy: the desire to show that the tri-personal 
concept of God is superior to a singularly personal concept of God.  When this motivation is 
channeled through a priori arguments for the Trinity, thinkers can evaluate if the concept of God 
presented by each of these traditions aligns with the notion of the GCB.  It is a simple process: 
Only traditional Christianity claims that God is tri-personal.  If it is shown that a tri-personal 
concept of God is required of the GCB, then the traditional Christian position is philosophically 
superior.  If it is shown that a multiply-personal concept of God (but not necessarily a tri-
personal one) is required of the GCB, then the traditional Christian position is philosophically 
superior to its singularly personal rivals, and the Trinitarian Christian may then downshift to a 
posteriori arguments to compete against other traditions that conceive of God as being multiply-
personal.  If it is not able to be shown that a multiply-personal concept of God is required of the 
GCB, then philosophy takes a neutral stand on the singularly/multiply-personal nature of God, 
and the various religious traditions will have to shift from a priori argumentation to a posteriori 
argumentation when comparing views.  If it is shown that, in fact, a singularly personal concept 
of God is required of the GCB, then philosophy stands against multiply-personal concepts of 
God, including the traditional Christian tri-personal concept.   
Tuggy correctly notes that the motivation is not merely to show how the traditional 
Christian concept of God is superior to singularly personal conceptions of God, but to do so in a 
specifically a priori fashion.  The fact that more Trinitarians have not made this move is 
surprising, given the possible advantages and the very low risk to the endeavor.  Either a priori 
Trinitarian arguments will demonstrate (1) that God must be tri-personal, (2) that God must be 





concerning the singularly/multiply-personal nature of God, or (4) that philosophy stands against 
multiply-personal concepts of God.   
Tuggy seems to think only outcomes (2) and (3) are on the table and he endorses (3).126  
The a priori argument presented here specifically attempts to demonstrate how the multiplicity 
of the persons, in fact, does stop at three (1).  Tuggy takes as a given, it seems, that philosophy 
does not stand against multiply-personal concepts of God (4), only that a perfect singularly 
personal being is possible. 
Tuggy notes: 
The core idea of these philosophical trinitarians is that it is impossible for there to 
be a solitary divine person. Hence, if there is at least one divine person, there must 
be at least two. Thus, we’re two thirds of the way to a Trinity of divine persons. It 
is not clear how one can as it were stop the process of multiplication, so as to 
show that there are at most three. I lay this issue aside, as I shall argue that the 
project never gets off the ground. No one has shown that there can’t be a solitary 
divine person, and whoever thinks theism to be possible, should also think it is 
possible for there to be only one divine person.  
The method of Anselmian theology is to assume that a divine being is an 
absolutely perfect being. We then reason about how an absolutely perfect being 
must or could not be. But what exactly about absolute perfection rules out there 
being a single divine person?127 
 
Tuggy joins Perfect Being Theology in assuming that perfection can be conceived and 
analyzed.  With this assumption in place, the perfect being is the same as the greatest 
conceivable being (GCB).  Perfection is the peak maxima of greatness.  A perfect being cannot 
be greater than it is.  If a being is up for consideration as perfect, the test is conceivability.  Does 
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especially Tuggy, Dale, "Trinity", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
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that being possess the best combination of great-making properties essentially?  The a priori 
argument under consideration contends that the conceivable great-making property a single 
divine person cannot maximize is love.  A single divine person cannot be perfect exactly because 
it is possible to conceive of a being greater than a single divine person, because it is greater to 
possess maximal love essentially than merely to potentially possess maximal love.  A being who 
possesses maximal love essentially requires nothing external of itself to possess the great-making 
property of love/benevolence maximally, but a being who only potentially possesses maximal 
love requires something external of itself to posses this great-making property maximally.   
It is a diminution of greatness to need external circumstances to obtain (even if the being 
who needs those circumstances can bring them about) in order to maximally possess a great-
making property.  The being who possesses that same great-making property, but does so 
maximally and essentially, is greater in terms of that property.  If that property is required for 
GCB status, then the possession of a limited form of that property precludes that being from 
consideration as perfect/the GCB if another conceivable being possesses that property maximally 
and essentially.  According to the argument being considered, a singularly personal being does 
not possess maximal love essentially, but must first create something else in order to possess the 
great-making property love/benevolence maximally.  Recall that the argument under 
consideration: 
1. God is the Greatest Conceivable Being (GCB). 
2. Any great-making property God/GCB possesses must be possessed to a  
    maximal degree essentially. 
3. Love/benevolence is a great-making property God/GCB possesses. 
4. Maximal love/benevolence includes self-love, love-given, love-received, and  
    love-shared (cooperative love of a third). 
5. A singularly personal being cannot possess love-given, love-received, or love- 
    shared essentially.   
6. A dually personal being cannot possess love-shared essentially. 





8. Simplicity is a great-making property. 
9. Being tri-personal is the simplest way to possess maximal love/benevolence.   
10. No other great-making property requires the GCB be multi-personal. 
11. Therefore, God/GCB is a tri-personal being. 
 
Rather than addressing the structure of every particular a priori argument for the Trinity, 
Tuggy lumps all such a priori arguments together and presents a very specific demand of them 
all.  At the heart of Tuggy’s crititque is that a priori Trinitarian arguments need to demonstrate 
the logical impossibility of a scenario he presents by “showing how it is contradictory to suppose 
it true.”128  Only then, he contends, is the multiply-personal nature of God secured by a priori 
considerations.  Consider Tuggy’s LONE GOD SCENARIO: 
A perfect, divine person exists but doesn’t create (or otherwise generate or give 
existence to) anything else.  He’s just there, timelessly beholding and loving 
himself, but not anyone else.  He’s a perfectly loving being—just as much as he 
would be were he to whip up some creatures, so as to have an object of love 
beyond himself.  He’s all-knowing, and so can perfectly imagine what it’s like to 
love another.  But he doesn’t experience any such relationship, as only he exists.  
This god is perfect, yet perfectly alone.129 
 
Tuggy’s scenario can be broken down in the following claims:  
LG1: A solitary divine person doesn’t create (or give existence to) anything else.   
LG2: This divine person timelessly loves himself (but not anyone else). 
LG3: This divine person is perfectly loving. 
LG4: Having an object of love beyond himself does not enhance his ‘perfectly loving’ status. 
LG5: This divine person is all-knowing, which includes having perfect imagination. 
LG6: This divine person can perfectly imagine what it’s like to experience ‘other-love’. 
LG7: This divine person doesn’t experience other-love relationships, as only he exists. 
LG8: This divine person is perfect. 
 
Tuggy’s scenario seems possible on a prima facie level, but faces modal and conceptual 
difficulties after proper consideration is given to the nature of perfection and love.  Much will 
turn on what ‘perfectly loving’ means and if it is different from ‘possessing maximal love.’  The 
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idea that perfectly imagining ‘what it’s like’ to be in other-love relationships is just as great as 
actually being in such relationships seems suspect.  Is one really not greater than the other?  A 
being that actually experiences other-love relationships in his essence and not as a result of 
external circumstances seems better than one who merely imagines such relationships.  These 
claims will be evaluated, but not until Tuggy explains more of his case.  Tuggy wonders: 
What reason have we been given to think the above scenario is impossible? The 
way one shows a claim to be logically impossible—that is, necessarily false—is 
by showing how it is contradictory to suppose it true. Well then, where is the 
contradiction? I don’t see one. Furthermore, the above scenario positively seems 
possible. This doesn’t prove it to be possible (the only way to do that, would be 
for us be sure that it is actual, and of course, it is not actual, since there are 
created selves), but it does give us reason to think that it is possible. In light of 
this, social trinitarians cannot just assert that perfect goodness requires being in a 
peer-love relationship. 
We’re told that a completely perfect being must be “perfectly loving”. I 
agree. But what is it to be “perfectly loving”? Perfection is a matter of a thing’s 
intrinsic condition, and so the perfection of being perfectly loving is a certain state 
of character, being disposed to think, feel, and act in loving ways. In principle, it 
seems that one can be perfectly loving without actually loving perfectly, or 
without ever actually loving anyone else in any way… surely, one can have the 
character trait of being fully loving without actually loving anyone beyond 
oneself. From the fact that a being is loving, it doesn’t logically follow that she 
actually loves, and it doesn’t matter if we change this to completely or perfectly 
loving.  
There are plausible claims nearby. If a perfect being were not in any 
interpersonal relationship, he would be motivated to get into (at least) one, for the 
simple reason that other-love is more valuable than, or at least valuable in a 
different way than self-love. And so, a perfect being must have a motive to 
actually love another, and even to engage in love which goes beyond 
condescending loves, a love between what are in some sense peers. But no one 
has given us a reason to think that this motive must be acted upon by a perfect 
being. Swinburne simply asserts that this reason is “overriding” (such that one 
would be irrational and/or immoral to not act on it), and Davis asserts that a being 
who acted on it would be imperfect. But their strong modal claim needs more than 
a bare assertion to back it up; one proves a necessary truth by showing that it is 
contradictory to suppose the claim in question to be false. The burden remains on 
them, for the Lone God Scenario positively seems possible.130 
 
                                                          





Tuggy asks, “What reason have we been given to think the above scenario is 
impossible?”  The reason is that the claims in the LONE GOD SCENARIO form an inconsistent 
set.   The impossibility involves Tuggy’s final claim (LG8: This divine person is perfect).  The 
conditions that Tuggy lays out in LG1-LG7 are insufficient to render this divine person perfect 
because they are incompatible with perfection.  Tuggy voluntarily wades into the waters of 
Anselmian Perfect Being Theology which defines the perfect being as the greatest conceivable 
being.  For those in this tradition, the perfect being is than which no greater can be conceived, 
but the divine person in Tuggy’s scenario is not the greatest conceivable being.  Recall that 
Tuggy himself notes that “other-love is more valuable than, or at least valuable in a different way 
than self-love”131 and that a divine person “would be motivated to get into”132 other-love 
relationships.  Tuggy even gives this strong modal claim: “A perfect being must have a motive to 
actually love another,” and then also claims “but no one has given us a reason to think that this 
motive must be acted upon by a perfect being.”133   
 The type of other-love that Tuggy has in mind is a peer-love as opposed to 
‘condescending loves’.  If a divine person has motivation to engage in peer-love because it is 
‘more valuable’ than self-love (LG2), but does not create or give existence to anything else 
(LG1) and does not experience such love (LG7), then this person is not the perfect being because 
a greater being is conceivable.  A divine person who eternally and will-independently begets a 
second person is able to engage in peer-love essentially and not merely (even if perfectly) 
imagine what it would be like to experience other-love (LG6).  The divine person in Tuggy’s 
scenario is not in other/peer-love relationships essentially, but must decide to act upon the 
                                                          







motivation to engage in such relationships.  A possible being who will-independently exists as 
multiply personal is conceivable and would experience other/peer-love essentially.  Of course, 
this multiply personal being would still be motivated to create other beings with whom to engage 
in other-love relationships, but this multiply personal being does not have to act upon that 
motivation to be the perfect being since the persons comprising that being already experience 
such relationships essentially.   
A solitary person cannot be perfect if a greater being is conceivable and possible.  In this 
case, a singularly personal being who loves himself (LG2), is all-knowing (LG5), can perfectly 
imagine what it’s like to experience other/peer-love (LG6), is motivated to engage in other/peer-
love, but doesn’t experience other/peer love as only he exists (LG7) because he doesn’t create or 
give existence to anything else (LG1) is not as great as a multiply personal being whose persons 
each love themselves, are all-knowing, are motivated to engage in other/peer-love, and actually 
engage in other/peer-love essentially.  
The difference between these beings is the number of persons inherent to each being and 
the exemplification of the aspects of love.  The first is will-independently singularly personal and 
remains so by choice, whereas the second is multiply personal by will-independent generation of 
(at least) a second person.  The first is motivated to engage in other/peer-love, but does not 
engage in this valuable good, whereas the second has engaged in the valuable good of other/peer-
love eternally and essentially (in virtue of the will-independent generation of (at least) a second 
person).  The second being is greater because that being exemplifies a greater degree of the 
great-making property/good love and does so essentially.  The first being is not as great as he 





 Tuggy’s scenario is impossible because of LG8.  The solitary divine person in his 
scenario cannot be perfect if a perfect being is the greatest conceivable being and if a being 
greater than the one in his scenario is conceivable.  The entire project of Anselmian Perfect 
Being Theology is predicated upon the definition of the perfect being as the GCB.  Maximal 
possession essentially of the great-making property/good love is greater than potential possession 
of it (even if the potential possession of it is perfectly imagined).  A being who maximally 
possesses love essentially is conceivable.  Under this understanding, Tuggy’s scenario is 
logically impossible—that is, necessarily false as it is contradictory to suppose it true. 
 Tuggy asks, “Well then, where is the contradiction? I don’t see one.”134  The 
contradiction is in calling the solitary divine person in his scenario perfect.  It is not 
contradictory to suppose that such a solitary divine person exist and exist all alone, loving 
himself and no one else, yet perfectly imagining what it would be like to love others, be loved by 
others, or to share love with others.  What is contradictory is to suppose that this solitary divine 
person is perfect.  He is less than perfect since a greater being is conceivable—a being who 
eternally and will-independently exists as multiply personal and can maximally possess love 
essentially.  But couldn’t the solitary person still be perfect?  No, not if a greater being is 
conceivable.   
Perhaps a being is not made greater by maximally possessing (actually engaging 
in/exemplifying) love essentially?  Tuggy pursues this line.  LG3 claims that the solitary divine 
person in Tuggy’s scenario is ‘perfectly loving’ and LG4 claims that having an object of love 
beyond one’s self does not enhance one’s ‘perfectly loving’ status.  Recall that Tuggy 
understands being perfectly loving as a “certain state of character, as being disposed to think, 
                                                          






feel, and act in loving ways.”135  Tying being perfectly loving to one’s dispositional character 
allows Tuggy to hold that “it seems that one can be perfectly loving without actually loving 
perfectly, or without ever actually loving anyone else in any way.”136 
 Tuggy’s approach is a skillfully crafted one.  His terminology shifts the onus from the 
exemplification of certain attributes to the disposition of the person’s character.  Tuggy does not 
employ the oft used term of Perfect Being Theology ‘great-making properties,’ but rather refers 
to ‘goods.’  Tuggy claims that “not all goods, not even all great goods, are such that their 
absence would render one imperfect.  Some goods one doesn’t need in order to be perfect.”137 
This seems right.  The GCB does not need all goods.138  Love, however, is a great-making 
property/good that the GCB must have, for its absence is a diminution of essential greatness and 
thus any being lacking it cannot be the GCB if its possession is conceivable.   
 But what is necessary for having the great-making property/good love?  Is the disposition 
to think, feel, and act in loving ways enough?  No.  Tuggy’s scenario indicates that a person must 
actually love (at least) himself and be disposed to think, feel, and act in loving ways in order to 
be considered perfectly loving.  This seems right, for God’s essential attribution is not 
exclusively occurrent or exclusively dispositional.  Rather, God’s essential attributes are both 
occurrent and dispositional.  Consider power.  God is all-powerful/omnipotent, which is 
understood as either possessing all-P simpliciter, or as possessing as much P is compossible with 
God’s other essential attributes.  This means that God actually does certain things without need 
of external circumstances obtaining and that God is disposed to act in certain additional ways not 
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yet available to him essentially as no external circumstances obtain, ushering in the need or 
opportunity to so act.   
 Consider knowledge.  God is all-knowing/omniscient, which is understood in various 
ways.  God certainly actually knows himself and all other necessary truths (natural knowledge) 
essentially.  God knows truths that are dependent on God’s acts and choices (free knowledge).  It 
may be that God knows truths of counterfactuals, or what would happen, including the free 
choices of creatures, given certain circumstances obtaining (middle knowledge).  Some, like 
Tuggy, deny middle knowledge and hold that God cannot know future truths based on the free 
choices of creatures and endorses open knowledge.  Whether God actually knows the free 
choices of creatures essentially, God knows some things essentially and is disposed to know 
additional things (perhaps) not yet available to him essentially as no external circumstances 
obtain, ushering in the need or opportunity to so know.   
 In the cases of both power and knowledge, the perfect being must be able to do and know 
certain things essentially and must also be disposed to do and know other additional things 
beyond the scope of that being’s essential existence.  Yet, it is not good enough to be able to do 
and know certain, but not all, things available to be done and known essentially.  If a being is 
able to do and know most things essentially, but not all things that can be done and known 
essentially, then that being is not as great as a different being who can do and know all things 
that can be done and known essentially.   
 So it is with love.  God is all-loving/omnibenevolent, understood as possessing all the 
aspects of love available essentially along with the disposition to think, feel, and act in loving 
ways.  Is the self-love of a solitary divine person combined with the disposition to think, feel, 





obtain, ushering in the need or opportunity to so think, feel, and act enough to secure 
omnibenevolence?  That all depends on what aspects of love are available essentially.  Self-love 
is certainly available essentially.  But what about other-love (love-given, love-received, and 
love-shared)?  Is it possible and conceivable for a person to actually love another person, be 
loved by another person, and share love for a third with another person essentially?  Yes, as 
demonstrated earlier in this project.  The persons inherent to a multiply personal being can 
conceivably experience other-love essentially—fully apart from anything external of that being 
and so can possess maximal love essentially. 
 This is where terminological differences between Tuggy and those used in the argument 
under consideration come into play.  Possessing love maximally essentially does not happen if a 
being only actually loves in some, but not all, of the ways available essentially, even if that being 
is disposed to love in those other ways should the circumstances needed for them to be exercised 
ever obtain.  However, a being can be perfectly loving if that being actually loves in all of the 
ways available essentially as long as he is also disposed to love in those other ways should the 
circumstances needed for them to be exercised ever obtain.  This difference is crucial.  For 
Tuggy, any occurrent love essentially (self-love), when paired with the disposition to think, feel, 
and act lovingly, is enough for a being to be ‘perfectly loving.’  This is because being perfectly 
loving is a ‘character trait’ that such a being does not need to exercise in order to have.   
 The reason that Tuggy’s scenario is not possible is because it is conceivable for a being to 
exemplify all the qualitatively unique aspects of love essentially.  It is possible and conceivable 
for there to be a will-independently multiply personal being who experiences all four 
qualitatively unique aspects of love essentially and is disposed to think, feel, and act in loving 





qualitatively unique aspects of love essentially is greater than experiencing/exemplifying only 
one aspect of love essentially.  A singularly personal divine being is not as great as a multiply 
personal divine being in terms of love.  Therefore, a singularly personal divine being is not the 
greatest conceivable being.  Therefore, a singularly personal divine being is not perfect.  
Therefore, the LONE GOD SCENARIO is contradictory because it claims that a singularly 
personal divine being is perfect.  Still Tuggy claims:  
If a perfect being were not in any interpersonal relationship, he would be 
motivated to get into (at least) one, for the simple reason that other-love is more 
valuable than, or at least valuable in a different way than self-love. And so, a 
perfect being must have a motive to actually love another, and even to engage in 
love which goes beyond condescending loves, a love between what are in some 
sense peers. But no one has given us a reason to think that this motive must be 
acted upon by a perfect being.139 
 
Tuggy assumes a perfect being can be singularly personal, and also be motivated to 
engage in peer-love, but never actually engage in such a relationship.  A being who is motivated 
to engage in a peer-love relationship and must choose to bring about the circumstances needed to 
engage in such a relationship is not as great as a being who can engage in peer-love essentially, 
apart from external circumstances.  If the singularly personal being never chose to 
generate/create anything, his motivation to engage in peer-love would always go frustrated.  If a 
will-independent multiply personal being never chose to generate/create anything, the motivation 
the persons feel to engage in peer-love could still be satisfied essentially since the divine persons 
that comprise this being can engage in those relationships essentially, apart from creating 
anything at all.  Everything needed for these relationships to obtain is internal to the one being. 
 The reason a perfect being must engage in peer-love is that peer-love is a valuable 
qualitatively unique aspect of love, and love is a great-making property/good that must be 
                                                          





maximized in order to be the greatest conceivable being.  A “perfect” being that cannot engage 
in peer-love essentially does not seem perfect at all since a being who can engage in peer-love 
essentially can be conceived, and it is greater to exemplify love maximally essentially than it is 
to exemplify it in a limited sense essentially.  Yet Tuggy’s “perfect” being does not even need to 
bring about the circumstances to engage in peer-love to count as perfect by his reckoning.  In 
what sense is such a (willfully) deficient being perfect at all? 
 Tuggy contends that his “perfect” being is perfect by virtue of (among other things) 
loving himself (LG2), being disposed to love maximally (LG3), having omniscience (LG5), and 
using that omniscience to perfectly imagine what it is like to engage in other-love relationships 
(LG6). Tuggy seems to be arguing that experiencing/exemplifying all the qualitatively unique 
aspects of love is no greater than exemplifying one of them so long as a being is disposed to 
exemplify them.  Tuggy assumes that only self-love need be available to a perfect being 
essentially and that the other aspects of love are not needed essentially to be perfect.  Such a 
singularly personal being can only experience the other aspects of love after willfully 
generating/creating someone with whom to engage other/peer-love.  This assumption seems 
based on the notion that a perfect being is always a single person who chooses to generate at 
least one other person internal to his being or to create other persons external to his being.  That 
assumption and notion seem incorrect, however, as evidenced by the conceivability and 
possibility of perfect being comprised of multiple persons, one of whom is the will-independent 
ontological source of the other(s). 
 If a perfect being comprised of multiple persons, one of whom is the will-independent 
ontological source of the other(s) is conceivable and possible, then all the qualitatively unique 





being who cannot experience/exemplify all the qualitatively unique aspects of love essentially, 
but instead perfectly imagines peer-love relationships cannot be just as great as a being who can 
and actually does exemplify peer-love essentially.  After all, Tuggy says that a perfect being is 
“motivated to get into (at least) one [other/peer-love relationship], for the simple reason that 
other-love is more valuable than, or at least valuable in a different way than self-love. And so, a 
perfect being must have a motive to actually love another, and even to engage in [such] love.”140  
A possible being comprised of multiple persons, one of whom is the will-independent 
ontological source of the other(s), can exemplify all of the aspects of love essentially, whereas 
the being in Tuggy’s Lone God Scenario cannot.   
This forces Tuggy to argue that other/peer-love is a good that God does not need in order 
to be perfect since being perfectly loving requires only being disposed to love others along with 
omniscience.  The solitary divine person can perfectly imagine what it’s like to experience other 
love, and that is enough to secure his status as perfect.  But this is only so if other/peer-love is 
not available essentially for a divine being—if other/peer-love is only available after the divine 
being decides to act on the motivation to engage in such a relationship and ‘whips up’141 another 
person to love.   
Tuggy pulls possession of maximal X apart from being perfectly X and holds that a being 
who is perfectly X is good enough to be perfect.  The reasoning seems inviting at first blush.  
Perhaps a perfect divine person does not need to possess maximal knowledge to be ‘perfectly 
knowing.’  His perfectly knowing status is secured by knowing what can be known essentially 
and by being disposed to know other things once they become available (after he creates).  
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Perhaps a perfect divine person does not need to possess maximal power to be ‘perfectly 
powerful.’  His perfectly powerful status is secured by his doing what can be done essentially 
and by being disposed to do other things once they become available (after he creates).  In the 
same way, one drawn to this line of reasoning might contend that a perfect divine person does 
not need to possess maximal love to be ‘perfectly loving.’  His perfectly loving status is secured 
by loving himself and by being disposed to love in other ways once they become available (after 
he creates).   
The reasoning pattern, however, concerning knowledge and power is different from the 
reasoning pattern concerning love.  In the former cases, perfectly knowing and perfectly 
powerful status require (1) knowing or doing what can be known or done essentially and (2) the 
disposition to know and do other things once they become available (after the divine person 
creates).  According to Tuggy, in the case of love, however, perfectly loving status does not 
require loving in all ways possible essentially and by the disposition to love other things once 
they become available (after the divine person creates).  Instead, perfectly loving status can be 
secured by loving himself and by the disposition to love in other ways once they become 
available (after the divine person creates).  But, as demonstrated above, self-love is not the only 
way to love available essentially to a perfect being.  Other/peer-love is available for a divine 
being essentially since a possible being comprised of multiple persons, one of whom is the will-
independent ontological source of the other(s), is conceivable.   
Of course, a will-independent multiply personal being, if perfect, would also be 
omniscient and perfectly imagine what it’s like to engage in other-love with creatures, all while 
actually exemplifying/experiencing other love essentially internally.  Tuggy, presumably, holds 





being can be perfectly loving.  Even if that is so, only the multiply personal being can possess 
maximal love essentially and the way in which the multiply personal divine being is perfectly 
loving is greater than the way the singularly personal divine being is.  If it is greater to possess 
maximal love essentially and to be perfectly loving in a greater way, then a solitary divine person 
cannot be the perfect being since a greater being is conceivable.   
 Tuggy asserts that the “burden remains on [a priori Trinitarians], for the Lone God 
Scenario positively seems possible.”  That burden seems to have been met.  The possibility of the 
Lone God Scenario dissolves when perfection is properly defined.  A solitary divine person 
cannot count as perfect if a greater being is conceivable and possibly exists.  Consider the 
TRIUNE GOD SCENARIO 
A perfect, will-independently tri-personal being exists but doesn’t choose to 
create (or otherwise give existence to) anything else.  This tri-personal being is 
just there, the persons of which timelessly behold and love themselves and each 
other.  This being is perfectly loving in virtue of exemplifying all the qualitatively 
unique aspects of love essentially, not needing to whip up some external creatures 
to experience other-love.  This being is all-knowing and so each omniscient 
person comprising the being can perfectly imagine what it’s like to love another 
being even though no other beings exist.  This God is perfect; the persons of 
which are never alone.   
 
 This scenario seems positively possible.  Not only is it possible, but the God in it is 
greater than the solitary divine person in Tuggy’s scenario because it is greater to possess love 
(and other great-making properties) to a maximal degree essentially, and multiple persons are 
necessary for any divine being to possess maximal love essentially.  It seems, given the 
possibility and conceivability of a greater being than that of Tuggy’s scenario, that a singularly 









Part III—A Successful Trinitarian Model 
 
Section I—Trinity Monotheism Considered 
 
The doctrine of the Trinity is committed to four essential affirmations: 
Monotheism (ONE): There is one God. 
Three Persons (THREE): The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are distinct divine persons. 
Father/Son/Holy Spirit Relationship (FATHERSOURCE): The Father is the source of the  
 Son and the Holy Spirit (perhaps with the Son, perhaps not). 
Equality of the Persons: (EQUALITY): The three persons in the Trinity are ontologically  
   equal; none is greater than any of the others. 
 
Each essential element of the doctrine is easily grasped when taken individually, but it 
can be an enigmatic process to apprehend the doctrine as a whole and explain how the doctrine 
works.  Affirming the logical consistency of the above desideratum is not the same thing as 
offering a possible model which provides a way to think about how the essential truths coalesce 
into a coherent whole.  Formulation of a defensible model of the Trinity must make use of 
strategies employed to uphold the logical consistency of the trinitarian data, and must also seek 
to provide a possible explanation of the innerworkings of the doctrine.  Two broad categories of 
trinitarian models dominate the doctrinal landscape: Social Trinitarianism (ST), which places 
greater emphasis on the diversity of the three persons, and Latin Trinitarianism (LT), which 
places greater emphasis on the unity of one being.142  William Lane Craig notes that “The central 
commitment of [ST] is that in God there are three distinct centers of self-consciousness, each 
with its proper intellect and will.”143 The central commitment of LT “is that there is only one 
God, whose unicity of intellect and will is not compromised by the diversity of persons.”144 The 
                                                          
142 The appellation “Latin Trinitarianism” is somewhat misleading since Latin Church Fathers 
Tertullian, Hilary, and Athanasius were all Social Trinitarians, but dubbing one set of models as 
“Anti-Social Trinitarianism” seems to carry something of a negative connotation. 






potential danger of these emphases is polytheism for ST and Unitarianism for LT.  Models 
located in either camp must clearly demonstrate how they avoid such dangers and uphold the 
trinitarian data.   
The model to be advanced and considered here is in the ST camp.  It takes as a base 
Craig’s Trinity Monotheism model strengthens and it in two important ways: (1) by fully 
committing to mereological Composition as Identity and (2) by emphasizing the necessary will-
independent generation of the Son and Spirit. 
Craig describes his model as holding “that while the persons of the Trinity are divine, it is 
the Trinity as a whole which is properly God. If this view is to be orthodox, it must hold that the 
Trinity alone is God and that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, while divine, are not Gods.”145  
Craig begins an explanation of his model by responding to a challenge raised against ST by 
Brian Leftow: 
Either the Trinity is a fourth case of the divine nature, in addition to the Persons, 
or it is not. If it is, we have too many cases of deity for orthodoxy. If it is not, and 
yet is divine, there are two ways to be divine—by being a case of deity, and by 
being a Trinity of such cases. If there is more than one way to be divine, Trinity 
monotheism becomes Plantingian Arianism. But if there is in fact only one way to 
be divine, then there are two alternatives. One is that only the Trinity is God, and 
God is composed of non-divine persons. The other is that the sum of all divine 
persons is somehow not divine. To accept this last claim would be to give up 
Trinity monotheism altogether.146 
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Craig notes the Trinity Monotheist, concerning the first disjunction, “will clearly want to 
say that the Trinity is not a fourth instance of the divine nature, lest there be four divine 
persons.”147  Concerning the next set of options, the Trinity Monotheist must affirm that the 
Trinity is divine 
since that is entailed by Trinity Monotheism. Now if the Trinity is divine but is 
not a fourth instance of the divine nature, this suggests that there is more than one 
way to be divine. This alternative is said to lead to Plantingian Arianism. What is 
that? Leftow defines it as “the positing of more than one way to be divine.” This 
is uninformative, however; what we want to know is why the view is 
objectionable. Leftow responds, “If we take the Trinity’s claim to be God 
seriously, . . . we wind up downgrading the Persons’ deity and/or [being] 
unorthodox.” The alleged problem is that if only the Trinity exemplifies the 
complete divine nature, then the way in which the persons are divine is less than 
fully divine.148 
 
Craig explains the flaw in such a contention. 
This inference would follow, however, only if there were but one way to be divine 
(namely, by exemplifying the divine nature); but [Trinity Monotheism] asserts 
that there is more than one way to be divine. The persons of the Trinity are not 
divine in virtue of exemplifying the divine nature. For presumably being triune is 
a property of the divine nature (God does not just happen to be triune); yet the 
persons of the Trinity do not exemplify that property. It now becomes clear that 
the reason that the Trinity is not a fourth instance of the divine nature is that there 
are no other instances of the divine nature. The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are 
not instances of the divine nature, and that is why there are not three Gods. The 
Trinity is the sole instance of the divine nature, and therefore there is but one 
God. So while the statement “The Trinity is God” is an identity statement, 
statements about the persons like “The Father is God” are not identity statements. 
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Rather they perform other functions, such as ascribing a title or office to a person 
(like “Belshazzar is King,” which is not incompatible with there being co-regents) 
or ascribing a property to a person (a way of saying, “The Father is divine,” as 
one might say, “Belshazzar is regal”).149 
 
If the trinitarian persons are not divine because they are instances of the divine nature, 
then how is it that they are divine?  The persons are divine because they are parts of the Trinity.  
Craig likens this to the ways that something can be feline.  “One way of being feline is to 
exemplify the nature of a cat. But there are other ways to be feline as well. A cat’s DNA or 
skeleton is feline, even if neither is a cat.”150  A cat’s skeleton and DNA are feline because they 
are parts of a cat.  Being a part of a cat is not a “downgraded or attenuated felinity: a cat’s 
skeleton is fully and unambiguously feline. Indeed, a cat just is a feline animal, as a cat’s 
skeleton is a feline skeleton.”151 A cat is feline in virtue of being an instance of the cat nature and 
a cat’s skeleton is feline in virtue of being a part of a cat.  Craig suggests:  
We could think of the persons of the Trinity as divine because they are parts of 
the Trinity, that is, parts of God. Now obviously, the persons are not parts of God 
in the sense in which a skeleton is part of a cat; but given that the Father, for 
example, is not the whole Godhead, it seems undeniable that there is some sort of 
part/whole relation obtaining between the persons of the Trinity and the entire 
Godhead.152 
 
Is it the case, as Leftow suggests, that taking seriously the Trinity’s claim to be God 
somehow downgrades the divinity of the persons?  Craig thinks not. 
Far from downgrading the divinity of the persons, such an account can be very 
illuminating of their contribution to the divine nature. For parts can possess 
properties which the whole does not, and the whole can have a property because 
some part has it. Thus, when we ascribe omniscience and omnipotence to God, we 
are not making the Trinity a fourth person or agent; rather God has these 
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properties because the persons do. Divine attributes like omniscience, 
omnipotence, and goodness are grounded in the persons’ possessing these 
properties, while divine attributes like necessity, aseity, and eternity are not so 
grounded. With respect to the latter, the persons have these properties because 
God as a whole has them. For parts can have some properties in virtue of the 
wholes of which they are parts. The point is that if we think of the divinity of the 
persons in terms of a part/whole relation to the Trinity that God is, then their deity 
seems in no way diminished because they are not instances of the divine nature.153 
 
As noted above, a logically and creedally consistent position is that the Father, or the 
Son, or the Spirit taken individually does not exhaust the category “God” and hence none of the 
three persons taken individually is an instance of the divine nature, but each person is located 
fully within the category “God” and the three persons taken collectively exhaust the category 
“God” since they collectively form the Trinity which is identical to God.  By being fully located 
in the category “God,” each person taken individually is fully divine, but there are not three 
instances of a complete divine nature since being triune is a property of the divine nature and 
none of the persons taken individually possess that property. 
Neither does it seem that understanding the Trinity to be God is an unorthodox position.  
In fact, such a commitment is at the heart of the orthodox creedal confession, “We worship one 
God in Trinity and Trinity in Unity.”154  Taking seriously the claim that the Trinity is God seems 
to be precisely what the Athanasian Creed is concerned to accomplish in laying out the 
parameters of how to think about such a claim.   
Craig is less concerned with squaring his model with the commitments enshrined in the 
creeds than he is with squaring his model with Scripture155 but still notes: 
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It is true that the Church Fathers frequently insisted that the expression “from the 
substance of the Father” should not be understood to imply that the Son is formed 
by division or separation of the Father’s substance. But the concern here was 
pretty clearly to avoid imagining the divine substance as a sort of “stuff” which 
could be parceled out into smaller pieces. Such a stricture is wholly compatible 
with our suggestion that any one person is not identical to the whole Trinity, for 
the part/whole relation at issue here does not involve separable parts. It is simply 
to say that the Father, for example, is not the whole Godhead. The Latin Church 
Father Hilary seems to capture the idea nicely when he asserts, “Each divine 
person is in the Unity, yet no person is the one God” (On the Trinity 7.2; cf. 7.13, 
32). 
On the other hand, it must be admitted that a number of post-Nicene 
creeds, probably under the influence of the doctrine of divine simplicity, do 
include statements which can be construed to identify each person of the Trinity 
with God as a whole. For example, the Eleventh Council of Toledo (675) affirms, 
“Each single person is wholly God in Himself,” the so-called Athanasian Creed 
(eighth century) enjoins Christians “to acknowledge every Person by Himself to 
be God and Lord,”156 and the Fourth Lateran Council, in condemning the idea of a 
divine Quaternity, declares, “each of the Persons is that reality, viz., that divine 
substance, essence, or nature. . . . what the Father is, this very same reality is also 
the Son, this the Holy Spirit.” If these declarations are intended to imply that 
statements like “The Father is God” are identity statements, then they threaten the 
doctrine of the Trinity with logical incoherence. For the logic of identity requires 
that if the Father is identical with God and the Son is identical with God, then the 
Father is identical with the Son, which the same Councils also deny.157 
 
Next Craig attempts to explain “how three persons could be parts of the same being, 
rather than be three separate beings. What is the salient difference between three divine persons 
who are each a being and three divine persons who are together one being?”158  He proceeds by 
means of an analogy.  Craig considers Cerberus, the three-headed guard dog of Hades in Greek 
mythology.  The image is easy enough to grasp: just imagine a giant dog body with three necks 
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and three heads, and thus three brains.  Suppose that Cerberus, in virtue of having three brains, 
has three distinct states of consciousness and not one unified consciousness.  Concerning the 
three heads of Cerberus, Craig playfully notes: 
We could even assign proper names to each of them: Rover, Bowser, and Spike. 
These centers of consciousness are entirely discrete and might well come into 
conflict with one another. Still, in order for Cerberus to be biologically viable, not 
to mention in order to function effectively as a guard dog, there must be a 
considerable degree of cooperation among Rover, Bowser, and Spike. Despite the 
diversity of his mental states, Cerberus is clearly one dog. He is a single 
biological organism exemplifying a canine nature. Rover, Bowser, and Spike may 
be said to be canine, too, though they are not three dogs, but parts of the one dog 
Cerberus. If Hercules were attempting to enter Hades, and Spike snarled at him or 
bit his leg, he might well report, “Cerberus snarled at me” or “Cerberus attacked 
me…We can enhance the Cerberus story by investing him with rationality and 
self-consciousness. In that case Rover, Bowser, and Spike are plausibly personal 
agents and Cerberus a tri-personal being.”159 
 
It seems clear that, given this analogy, what makes the three-headed Cerberus one being 
is that he has a single body.  But suppose that Hercules stabs the beast through the heart, killing 
Cerberus, yet his minds survived the death of his body.  How would they still be one being and 
not three separate beings?  Craig suggests that the three minds might all share the same soul and 
that this suggestion is how he ties such a mythological analogy back to the Trinity.   
Now God is very much like an unembodied soul; indeed, as a mental substance 
God just seems to be a soul. We naturally equate a rational soul with a person, 
since the human souls with which we are acquainted are persons. But the reason 
human souls are individual persons is because each soul is equipped with one set 
of rational faculties sufficient for being a person. Suppose, then, that God is a soul 
which is endowed with three complete sets of rational cognitive faculties, each 
sufficient for personhood. Then God, though one soul, would not be one person 
but three, for God would have three centers of self-consciousness, intentionality, 
and volition, as Social Trinitarians maintain. God would clearly not be three 
discrete souls because the cognitive faculties in question are all faculties 
belonging to just one soul, one immaterial substance. God would therefore be one 
being which supports three persons, just as our individual beings each support one 







person. Such a model of Trinity Monotheism seems to give a clear sense to the 
classical formula “three persons in one substance.”160 
 
Trinity Monotheism seems to be a very strong trinitarian model.  Firmly in the ST camp, 
Trinity Monotheism explains why there are not three Gods, preserves the divinity of the persons, 
and is consistent with the trinitarian data.  While the model may possibly be strengthened, does it 
suffer in ways not considered by Leftow?  Daniel Howard-Snyder certainly believes so.   
The Athanasian Creed affirms: “the Father is God; the Son is God; and the Holy Spirit is 
God.  And yet they are not three Gods; but one God” and also “we are compelled by the 
Christian truth to acknowledge every person by himself to be God...we are forbidden by the 
catholic religion; to say, there are three Gods.”  Howard-Snyder notes that these words imply 
what he calls The Sameness Claim: the Father is the same God as the Son.161 The Athanasian 
Creed also affirms that “there is one Person of the Father, another of the Son, and another of the 
Holy Spirit.” Howard-Snyder notes that these words imply what he calls The Difference Claim: 
the Father is not the same person as the Son.162 
 Howard-Snyder contends that if the relation affirmed within the Sameness Claim is that 
of absolute identity (as opposed to relative identity), then the Sameness Claim is actually 
shorthand for the following conjunctions:  
(Si) the Father has property of being a God 
(Sii) the Son has the property of being a God  
(Siii/The Person Identity Claim) the Father is absolutely identical with the Son.   
 
Howard-Snyder also contends that if the relation denied within the Difference Claim is 
absolute identity, then the Difference Claim is actually shorthand for the conjunctions:  
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(Di) the Father has the property of being a person  
(Dii) the Son has the property of being a person  
(Diii) the Father is not absolutely identical with the Son.   
 
Thus, given the supposition that both claims involve the absolute identity relation, “the 
Sameness Claim and the Difference Claim cannot both be true; their conjunction entails a 
contradiction.”163  Howard-Snyder wonders: 
How might the Trinitarian respond? One option is to deny that the relation of 
sameness that is affirmed in the Sameness Claim and that is denied in the 
Difference Claim is absolute identity. Another option is to insist that, properly 
understood, the conjunction of the Sameness Claim and the Difference Claim 
does not lead to contradiction, even if the relation of sameness expressed in both 
claims is absolute identity. This is the route taken by J. P. Moreland and William 
Lane Craig.164 
 
 Supposing that the Sameness Claim (the Father is the same God as the Son) and 
Difference Claim (the Father is not the same person as the Son) are shorthand for the 
conjunctions Howard-Snyder provides is woefully mistaken.  The mistake is twofold.  First, it is 
mistaken to assume that the creed is employing the ‘is of identity’ when it states that “the Father 
is God; the Son is God; and the Holy Spirit is God,” as though each of the Father, the Son, and 
the Holy Spirit taken individually is identical to God.  It is better to assume that the creed is 
employing the ‘is of ascription,’ such that each person taken individually is inside the category 
“God.”  Second, it is mistaken to assume that the creed does not make careful distinctions 
between persons and God.  Howard-Snyder carries this supposition to his (Si) and (Sii) and it 
compels the wording of his (Siii/The Person Identity Claim): the Father is absolutely identical 
with the Son.  Of course (Siii/The Person Identity Claim) contradicts (Diii), but the Sameness 
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Claim is only that the Father and the Son are the same God, not that they are identical, which is 
made explicitly clear by the Difference Claim.   
It is not a mistake to assume that the creed employs an absolute identity relation in the 
Sameness Claim and in the Difference Claim, but it is a mistake to suppose that the use of 
absolute identity within these claims serves a shorthand for conjunctions that are obviously 
contradictory.  To avoid the worry Howard-Snyder raises, and to avoid forcing relative identity 
into the claims, the Sameness Claim and the Difference Claim must be understood alternatively.  
Yet, Howard-Snyder thinks that Craig’s reading is problematic.  Rather than claiming that the 
Father is identical to a God and that the Son is identical to a God, Craig’s understanding of the 
Sameness claim involves ascribing the property of being divine to the persons, resulting in the 
following conjunctions: 
(CSi): The Father is divine 
(CSii): The Son is divine 
(CSiii/The Property Identity Claim): the property of divinity that the Father instantiates is  
 absolutely identical to the property that the Son instantiates  
 
The Father and the Son (and the Holy Spirit) share in common the same property in 
virtue of which each of them is divine.  If each person exemplifies the same property of divinity, 
this understanding of sameness does not imply that the Father is absolutely identical with the Son 
since each is also a different person according to the Difference Claim.  Howard-Snyder objects 
that a property-sameness understanding of the Sameness Claim as opposed to a person-sameness 
understanding arguably contradicts the trinitarian’s monotheistic claim: 





Against Trinity Monotheism Howard-Snyder presents what he calls the Challenge of 
Polytheism.165  It is summarized as follows: 
(1) the Difference Claim entails that the Father is not absolutely identical with the Son.  
 
(2) the Sameness Claim, understood as implying the Property Identity Claim, entails both  
      that the Father has the property of being divine and that the Son has the property of  
      being divine.  
 
(3) necessarily, for any x and y, if x is not absolutely identical with y but x has the  
      property of being divine and y has the property of being divine, then x is a God and y  
      is a God and x is not the same God as y. It follows that the Father is a God and the  
      Son is a God, and the Father is not the same God as the Son.  
 
(4) necessarily, for any x and y, if x is a God and y is a God and x is not the same God as  
      y, then there are two Gods. Thus, if we read the Sameness Claim as implying the  
      Property Identity Claim, then, given the Difference Claim, it is false that there exists  
      exactly one God—which contradicts Monotheism. 
 
Is Trinity Monotheism actually polytheistic?  No, it seems not.  (3) seems false, and it 
begs the question against Composition as Identity.166  It is not the case that for any x and y, if x is 
not absolutely identical with y but x has the property of being divine and y has the property of 
being divine, that x is a God and y is a God and that x is not the same God as y.  According to 
Trinity Monotheism, the Father and the Son are not absolutely identical because each is a distinct 
person, but the Father has the property of being divine and the Son has the property of being 
divine.  Having the property of being divine does not make the Father (taken individually) a God.  
Having the property of being divine does not make the Son (taken individually) a God.  The 
reason for this is that one way of being divine is to instantiate the divine nature, which is what 
makes something a God, or, secondly, to be a part of the divine nature.  A part of the divine 
nature is not a God, but is a part of God.  According to Trinity Monotheism, a necessary property 
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of being God is being triune, and none of the persons taken individually possess that property.  
Only the Trinity as a whole—the persons taken collectively—has that property.  Having the 
property of being divine makes the Father a part of God/the Trinity.  Having the property of 
being divine makes the Son a part of God/the Trinity.  According to Trinity Monotheism, x is a 
part of God and y is a part of God and x is not the same part of God as y.  For any x and y if x is 
divine and y is divine, neither x nor y is “a God” unless either x or y exemplifies all the necessary 
attributes of God; that is, unless either x or y completely exhausts the category “God.”  
Otherwise, x and y, while divine, are not properly God since neither individually exemplifies all 
the essential properties of being God.  The claim of Trinity Monotheism is that only the Trinity is 
properly God.  The persons are each distinct centers of consciousness (thought, will, volition, 
etc.) that all share the property of being divine.  None of the persons taken individually 
constitutes “a God” since none of them taken individually has the property of being triune, which 
is why there are not multiple Gods. 
Howard-Snyder presses his critique, however, in a number of ways.  He argues that the 
divinity of the persons is diminished if there is more than one way to be divine. 
For if the Persons do not instantiate the divine nature and they are divine in the 
way in which a cat’s skeleton is feline, then they are no more God-like than a 
feline skeleton is cat-like, which is to say they are hardly God-like at all. You 
might put the point this way: if the sense in which the Persons are “divine” 
approximates the sense in which a cat’s skeleton is “feline,” then the sense in 
which the Persons are “divine” approximates the sense in which any one of the 
properties that are constitutive of full divinity is “divine” or the sense in which a 
divine plan is “divine.” But the property of being, say, worthy of worship, 
although doubtless divine in this sense, lacks what Christians have had in mind 
when they affirm the fully divinity of each of the Persons.167 
 
                                                          





Unlike the way any of the properties that are constitutive of full divinity are “divine” or 
the sense in which a divine plan is “divine,” the persons are divine in a robust way precisely 
because each person is a person.  That is, each person is a center of consciousness with a full set 
of rational powers.  The confusion comes when thinking that parts are of lesser importance than 
wholes.  After all, a cat skeleton, while fully feline, is not what people have in mind when 
thinking of felinity.  A cat is fully feline and a cat skeleton is fully feline, but the cat skeleton is 
seemingly of less importance or worth than the full instantiation of a cat nature (a cat).  Each 
person, however, is an eternal and necessary conscious set of rational powers (including 
omniscience, omnipotence, moral perfection) which is precisely what Christians have in mind 
when affirming the full divinity of each person, as enshrined in the creeds and affirmed today.  
So, while the Trinity is divine in virtue of being the sole instantiation of the divine nature, and 
the persons are each divine in virtue of being parts of (composing) the Trinity, there is no 
diminution of divinity for the persons since each person is a conscious set of rational powers that 
include omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection.  The analogical nature of felinity is 
useful because it demonstrates that there is more than one way to be feline.  Likewise, there is 
more than one way to be divine.  Unlike a cat skeleton (which is not what most people have in 
mind when thinking of felinity), however, each person (taken individually) is robustly divine 
(what people have in mind when thinking that something is divine) since each person is fully 
equipped with a set of rational powers.  This makes each person divine—each can rightly be 
ascribed “divine”—even though none of the persons (taken individually) can be God—none of 
the persons taken individually are identical to God.  Only the persons taken collectively are 





Howard-Snyder’s most vociferous critiques involve just this composition aspect of 
Trinity Monotheism.  He wonders “how exactly is it that the three Persons compose the Trinity 
‘as a whole’?”168  This echoes Craig’s question: “What is the salient difference between three 
divine persons who are each a being and three divine persons who are together one being?”169  
Craig answers that, as a mental substance, “God just seems to be a soul…the reason human souls 
are individual persons is because each soul is equipped with one set of rational faculties 
sufficient for being a person.”170 Trinity Monotheism understands God to be a soul which is 
equipped with three complete conscious sets of rational powers each of which is sufficient for 
personhood.  This means that “God, though one soul, would not be one person but three, for God 
would have three centers of self-consciousness, intentionality, and volition, as Social Trinitarians 
maintain.”171 God would not be three separate souls since the conscious sets of rational powers 
all belong to the same immaterial substance.  Given this understanding, God would be one 
being/soul which supports three persons, similarly to how typical individual human beings each 
support one person. 
 Howard-Snyder contends that the persons must be individual substances since they “meet 
the conditions for being individual substances just as God does,”172 and wonders, “if the Persons 
are not individual substances, then to what category do they belong?”173  The motivation for this 
contention and question is to place Trinity Monotheism at odds with the trinitarian formula three 
persons in one substance.174  Howard-Snyder seems to think that if the persons are each 
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individual substances then they must each be individual beings, which would strengthen his 
polytheistic critique lodged earlier.  If the Persons are individual substances and hence individual 
beings, then the Trinity would not be an individual, but a collection.  Very careful distinctions 
are needed to resolve this matter.  It may be the case that the persons are individual substances, 
but those individual substances would still be inseparable parts of the Trinity.  It may be the case 
that the persons are not individual substances but still possess the properties necessary for robust 
divinity. 
 Craig points to Peter Simons’ book Parts175 for an analysis of composites to advance the 
debate.  Simons notes that both individual things and collections can be composed of individuals.  
Simons notes that an individual is anything which can be the subject of a true singular (not 
disguisedly plural) count predication and that collections are objects which are essentially not 
one thing but many things.  For instance, a wall is an individual that is composed of individual 
stones and a pack is a collection composed of individual wolves.176 
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________ can be composed/made of ________ 
Category    Category   Example 
individual    individuals   wall/stones 
individual    mass    sweater/sm wool 
individual   individuals + mass  toffee apple/an apple+sm toffee 
individual    individuals + mass  fruitcake/currants+sm dough 
mass     individuals   gold/gold atoms 
mass     masses   dough/flour+water 
mass     mass(es)+individuals  blood/plasma+blood cells 
collection    individuals   pack/wolves 
collection    mass    snowballs/sm snow 
collection    individuals+mass  toffee apples/apples+sm toffee  
Masses are concrete particulars which are neither one nor many individuals. When Simons uses 
“some” with a mass term, as in “some water” he writes “sm” to differentiate this usage from 






 Trinity Monotheism holds that God is an individual substance composed of inseparable 
individuals.  If this is so, then the persons are individuals which may or may not be substances 
themselves.  Is God an individual or a collection?  At first glance, the answer seems to depend on 
how God is being reckoned.  Remember that orthodox trinitarian theorizing must adhere to both 
ONE (There is one God) and THREE (The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are distinct 
divine persons).  When counting by Gods, the Trinity/God is one.  When counting by persons, 
the Trinity/God is three.  This means that persons do not stand in a one-to-one correspondence 
with Gods or else there would be three Gods, which violates ONE.  This, then, means that the 
persons somehow “fit” into the category God.  Since God is one soul, or substance, the persons 
are not three souls or separable substances but are the three distinctive parts of the Trinity/God, 
and thus God is an individual composed of individuals.  If any one of those individuals were not 
a part of the individual substance, or soul that God is, then God would not be the Trinity—each 
person is an inseparable part of the Trinity. The issue of whether or not the persons are individual 
substances remains.  Are inseparable parts of a substance substances themselves?  Craig notes 
that Simons’ example of the wall composed of stones is not illuminating because:  
the stones were substances before being made into the wall, and the wall can be 
separated into stones which would then be the same substances. What about parts 
which were never separate substances, such as one’s hands? Are they substances? 
What about parts which cannot be separated from the whole without undergoing 
substantial change, such as the trunk of a tree? Are they substances? Such parts 
are individuals, but it is not clear that they are substances. They seem to lack the 
“stand alone” quality that something must have in order to be a substance. If they 
are not substances, they may still have, however, enough integrity to have natures. 
A hand, for example, seems to have certain essential properties, such as having 
digits and having an opposable thumb. The persons of the Trinity could similarly 
share a certain nature, just as my hands do, without being substances in their own 





worthy of worship. In such a case we should have three parts composing one 
substance, as in traditional Trinitarian formulas.177 
 
The persons of the Trinity seem not to be individual substances themselves, but 
inseparable parts of the one substance, or soul, that is the Trinity/God.  They are inseparable 
parts because without any one of them, God would undergo substantial change.  Must the 
individuals be substances in order to be divine in a robust sense?  Can only substances be 
omniscient, omnipotent, etc.?  Remember that persons are, under Trinity Monotheism, conscious 
sets of rational powers that, concerning God, stand in a three-to-one correspondence to 
souls/substances.  It seems that each individual shares in the nature of being a divine person.  A 
divine person is omniscient, omnipotent, morally perfect, eternal, and necessary.  A divine 
person is not and cannot instantiate the full divine nature since the full divine nature includes the 
property of being triune and the property of being omnibenevolent/perfectly loving, both of 
which require three divine persons.  No divine person taken individually can be perfect since no 
singular divine person can instantiate omnibenevolence.  Only a (tri)unity of divine persons can 
be perfect.178  The full divine nature can only be instantiated when three divine persons compose 
one divine being.  Persons are not the sorts of things that can be tri-personal.  Beings are the sorts 
of things that can be tri-personal.   
 What if this metaphysical understanding is mistaken and the individual persons are 
individual substances?  Does this mean that God is not one substance?  No.  The sort of 
substance that the persons would be are not the same sort of substance that the Trinity/God is.  
Craig explains: 
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[S]uppose we say that inseparable parts can count as substances in their own right. 
In that case the persons of the Trinity would doubtless count as individuals who 
are substances. They would again share the nature of a divine person. But never 
mind: as inseparable parts they are still three persons in one substance. They are 
no more instances of the nature of that unique substance than my hands are 
instances of the human nature. So the unity of God is preserved along with the 
divinity of the persons. Hence, nothing of significance hangs on whether we 
regard a substance’s inseparable parts as substances. The crucial fact is that these 
individuals compose one unique, indivisible individual which is a substance.179 
 
Even if the persons are each substances they would not each be beings, as they are 
inseparable parts and as such cannot each be a separate soul.  This means that Trinity 
Monotheism can affirm that God is three persons in one substance regardless of whether or not 
the persons are individual substances.   
 Howard-Snyder notes that Trinity Monotheism’s claim that the Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit taken individually are identical to particular persons, but not identical to individual 
substances mirrors the claim that God is absolutely identical with a particular individual 
substance but not with a particular person. “God has three persons as proper parts, but God, the 
Trinity ‘as a whole,’ is not a person. Strictly speaking, using personal pronouns to refer to God 
presupposes, on [Craig’s] view, the false proposition that God is a person.”180  Such a claim 
strikes Howard-Snyder as “most unusual.”181  It strikes Howard-Snyder as obvious that God is a 
person and that if God is not a person then: 
God is not “equipped with rational faculties of intellect and volition which enable 
it to be a self-reflective agent capable of self-determination.” That is not to say 
that God does not have proper parts that are thus equipped; it is only to say that 
God itself lacks the equipment. There are several implications we might draw out 
here.182 
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Howard-Snyder mentions three.  The first involves creation.  The opening line of the 
Bible is “In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth.” Creation is an intentional act, 
but Howard-Snyder believes that intentional acts can only be performed by a person.  If God is 
not a person, then “God did not create the heavens and the earth; indeed, He could not have done 
so. The first sentence of the Bible expresses a necessary falsehood.”183  Could someone just say 
that God created the heavens and the earth insofar as the Son created them?  Howard-Snyder 
thinks not, noting that borrowing of properties has limits and that unless “God is antecedently the 
sort of thing that can act intentionally—that is, unless God is a person—God cannot borrow the 
property of creating the heavens and the earth from the Son. God cannot create.”184 
The second involves the imago Dei, the doctrine which states that human beings are 
made in the image of God. Genesis 1:27 says, “So God created human kind in his own image, in 
the image of God he created them.”  The tradition has it that a human being is made in the image 
of God insofar as he or she is equipped with the rational powers of intellect and volition which 
allow for self-reflective agency and self-determination. “Unfortunately, this is the description of 
a person, which [Trinity Monotheists] say God is not. In what respects, then, are we made in the 
image of an individual substance that is void of all personal attributes?”185  
 Third involves the divine nature.  According to Trinity Monotheism, the divine persons 
“do not exemplify the divine nature, only the Trinity ‘as a whole’ enjoys that privilege. Thus, on 
[this] view, the Trinity ‘as a whole’ at once exemplifies the divine nature and yet fails to be a 
person. This is not a high view of the divine nature, I take it; indeed, it is abysmally low.186 
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 Craig responds on behalf of Trinity Monotheism by noting that a soul’s cognitive 
equipment is “explanatorily prior to the number of persons there are: the reason there are three 
persons in the Godhead is because God is endowed with three sets of rational faculties sufficient 
for personhood,”187 just as Howard-Snyder is one person because his soul is equipped with a 
single set of rational faculties. “We could perhaps say that personhood supervenes on rational 
faculties and in that sense depends on what sort of soul is involved.”188  If this is so, then a soul 
is antecedently the sort of thing that can borrow properties.  A soul is personal if that soul is 
endowed with conscious rational powers sufficient for personhood.  Typical human souls are 
endowed with one set of rational powers sufficient for personhood.  God is a soul endowed with 
three such sets of rational powers and is thus three persons.  Since souls can be possessed of 
rational equipment (in God’s case three sets of rational equipment), a soul can create even if that 
soul is not a person.  Such a soul, of course, would be personal, even if not a single person.  That 
soul would be tri-personal.  If the Father is the person of the Godhead who created the heavens 
and the earth, then the Godhead created them.  If each person is involved in creating the heavens 
and the earth, then God created the heavens and the earth.  The issue of appropriate linguistics 
and attribution will be addressed fully in the final part of this project.   
 Concerning the Imago Dei, human beings are made in God’s image, similarly, because 
human beings are endowed with rational powers sufficient for personhood, just as God is so 
endowed, but whereas humans have one such set of powers, God has three.  Both human beings 
and God are personal beings. 
                                                          






 Concerning the divine nature, Howard-Snyder assumes that God cannot rightly exemplify 
the divine nature unless God is a person.  Craig observes: 
it seems to me that God can [exemplify the divine nature] if God is a soul 
possessing the rational faculties sufficient for personhood. If God were a soul 
endowed with a single set of rational faculties, then He could do all these things. 
By being a more richly endowed soul, is God thereby somehow incapacitated? 
How can augmenting God’s cognitive faculties make God less knowing, less 
good, less powerful, less worthy of worship? On our view it belongs to the divine 
nature to be a personal being, and a soul so richly endowed with rational faculties 
is, if anything, more majestic and worthy of worship than a more meagerly 
endowed soul.189 
 
Craig’s Trinity Monotheism seems able to preserve the majesty and agency of God 
because God, who is the Trinity, is one soul equipped with three sets of rational powers, each 
sufficient for personhood, and so God is tri-personal.  The persons of the Godhead are each 
divine (omniscient, omnipotent, morally perfect, eternal, and necessary), but none taken 
individually is the instantiation of the divine nature, which is why there is only one God. 
 
Section II—Important Additions That Strengthen Trinity Monotheism: Will- 
 
Independent Mereological Trinity Monotheism 
 
 Craig’s Trinity Monotheism is a ST model that identifies God with the Trinity, that 
describes God as a soul equipped with three sets of rational powers, each sufficient for 
personhood, and that argues that there are two ways for something to be divine—instantiate the 
divine nature (which only the Trinity does) or be an inseparable and distinctive part of the Trinity 
(which only the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit do).  The main lines of critique against 
Trinity Monotheism involve arguing that it is actually polytheistic, that the persons are less 






divine than the Trinity as a whole, that God is not a person, and the composition aspect of Trinity 
Monotheism is illogical.   
 Even against very thoughtfully considered critiques, Trinity Monotheism seems to stand 
as a viable trinitarian model.  Craig is able to successfully ward off the charges of polytheism, 
diminished divinity of the persons, and the alleged problem of God not being a person.  The 
areas that Craig’s defense could be strengthened involve the composition aspects of Trinity 
Monotheism and the dismissal of the eternal generation of Son and Holy Spirit.  Given that these 
two conceptual additions move Trinity Monotheism beyond its original presentation, a new, 
modified model emerges. 
Remember the essential claims of Trinity Monotheism: 
(1) God is the Trinity.   
 
(2) God is one substance/soul equipped with three conscious sets of rational powers. 
  
(3) Something is (robustly) divine if it is the instantiation of the divine nature, or if it is  
      an inseparable and distinctive part of the divine nature. 
 
These conjunctions stand in affirmation of the trinitarian formula that God is one being in 
three persons.  It is Trinity that is properly identified as God.  God does not just happen to be 
triune; rather, being triune is an essential property that God possesses, and therefore only the 
Trinity instantiates the divine nature.  Thus, while divine, the persons taken individually are not 
instantiations of the divine nature but are inseparable and distinctive parts of the divine nature.  
The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, are each a conscious set of rational powers, including 
omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection, and are the divine parts of the Trinity, which is 
the sole instance of the divine nature.   
 Craig’s Trinity Monotheism purposefully steers clear of making mereological 





“given that the Father, for example, is not the whole Godhead, it seems undeniable that there is 
some sort of part/whole relation obtaining between the persons of the Trinity and the entire 
Godhead.”190  Craig’s model seems to assume Composition as Identity (CAI), but does not fully 
embrace or endorse it.  What follows is an attempt to enhance Craig’s model by adding to it a 
full-fledged mereological Composition as Identity theory and a will-independent theory of 
eternal generation concerning the Son and the Holy Spirit.  These additions produce a distinct 
trinitarian model: Will-Independent Mereological Trinity Monotheism.  There are five essential 
claims of Will-Independent Mereological Trinity Monotheism: 
(1) God is the Trinity.   
 
(2) God is one substance/soul equipped with three conscious sets of rational powers. 
  
(3) Something is (robustly) divine if it is the instantiation of the divine nature, or if it is  
      an inseparable and distinctive part of the divine nature. 
 
(4) The three persons of the Trinity compose God. 
 
(5) The generation of the Son by the Father and of the Holy Spirit by the Father and the 
      Son is will-independent. 
 
The Three Persons of the Trinity Compose God 
Traditional Christian theism holds that God is triune and that God does not just happen to 
be triune, but that triunity is an essential attribute of the divine nature.  If it is the case that God is 
necessarily triune, then God just is the Trinity and God cannot have been other than the Trinity.  
In possible worlds vernacular, there is no possible world in which God is not triune.  Although 
contentious within metaphysics, the Composition as Identity (CAI) thesis, which claims that the 
composition relation is the identity relation, seems to be a natural description of the relationship 
between the Trinity and God.  
                                                          





 Composition as Identity is an important thesis to use in understanding the logical 
coherence of the doctrine of the Trinity, as described in Part I, Section II above.  
Recall Bohn’s definition of Composition as Identity as “the thesis that a whole and all its parts 
collectively is the same thing under two different modes of presentation.”191  Given this 
understanding, God and the Trinity are the same portion of reality under two different modes of 
presentation.  Wherever God is, the Trinity is.  Wherever the Trinity is, God is, similarly to how 
wherever Superman is, Clark Kent is.  This is so because Superman is Clark Kent and because 
God is the Trinity. 
 The Superman/Clark Kent identity example is easier to grasp as each predicate refers to a 
numerically consistent referent.  The Trinity/God identity claim of Will-Independent 
Mereological Trinity Monotheism is made more difficult by the fact that the numerical referent is 
one-many as opposed to one-one.  But this difficulty, as noted above, gives way if numerical 
properties are relational properties.  A portion of reality’s numerical property (cardinality) 
depends on how it is conceptualized.  Recall that when conceptualizing some portion of reality as 
two arms, two legs, one head, and a torso, it has the numerical property “six” holding true of it, 
but when conceptualizing the same portion of reality as a body, it has the numerical property 
“one” holding true of it.  It seems that independently of being conceptualized, a certain portion of 
reality has no particular numerical property holding true of it at all.   
 Consider God.  When someone conceptualizes the portion of reality that is God as God 
that portion of reality is conceptualized as one in number.  Yet when someone conceptualizes the 
portion of reality that God is as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit (the Trinity) that portion of reality is 
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conceptualized as three in number, but it is the same portion of reality nonetheless.  As Bohn 
notes: 
Numerical properties aren’t properties holding of it independently of how it is 
being conceptualized. This is of course not saying that one conceptualization 
cannot be better somehow than another, nor that they cannot be equally good. It is 
only saying that, better, worse, or equal, it is a conceptualization of one and the 
same portion of reality either way.192 
  
Thus it is the case that God is one in number relative to one way of conceptualizing that 
portion of reality that God is, and it is the case that God is not one in number relative to another 
way of conceptualizing the portion of reality that God is.  This seems precisely to be what the 
trinitarian requirements ONE and THREE demand.  Such an understanding can be described as 
follows using the logical form:  
One(x,y) & not-One(x,z). 
This is not a contradiction since ‘x’ ranges over portions of reality and ‘y’ and ‘z’ range 
over the concepts ‘God’ and ‘Father, Son, Holy Spirit’, respectively.   
Yet Howard-Snyder critiques Craig’s Trinity Monotheism, which does not explicitly 
endorse CAI, but only hints at it, contending that the claim that an individual substance can be 
three persons is false.  Trinity Monotheism and Will-Independent Mereological Trinity 
Monotheism both claim that God is absolutely identical with the three persons.  Howard-Snyder 
contends, “This claim is false since the relation of absolute identity is a one-one relation, not 
one-many.”193 He later adds, “[Trinity Monotheism claims] God, that single composite item, is 
absolutely identical with the three Persons, which is impossible.”194  Merely begging the 
question against CAI does not do away with the theory, however.  If Howard-Snyder’s insistence 
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of impossibility lies not merely in the one-many mereological relation, but instead contends 
impossibility lurks since one immaterial substance cannot support/be made of three persons 
because the persons are themselves immaterial substances, his insistence still fails to undo the 
compositional aspect of this model.  As noted in the evaluation of Craig’s Trinity  Monotheism, 
the persons are still persons even if they are each individual substances in their own right, but the 
sort of individual immaterial substances they would be are not the same sort of immaterial 
individual substance that is the soul who is God.  They would be persons, not souls.  It seems 
more likely, however, that the persons are not individual immaterial substances in their own 
right, but are sets of rational powers (persons) which are all inseparable and distinct parts of the 
substance/soul that God is.  It seems that Howard-Snyder wants to advance both senses of 
impossibility.   
 CAI, as applied to trinitarian theorizing, holds that God = the Father, the Son, the Holy 
Spirit.  ‘God’ is a singular term, and ‘the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit’ is a plural term that 
each refer to the same portion of reality, just conceptualized differently.  It is important to read 
‘=’ collectively, not distributively. That is to say, God is identical with neither the Father nor the 
Son nor the Holy Spirit, but that God is identical with all of them taken together.  God = the 
Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit collectively.   
 Howard-Snyder, in holding that the identity relation must be one-one, rejects this.  Yet 
recall Bohn’s helpful example:   
Consider three things a, b, and c surrounding one thing x. It is then true that a,b,c 
taken together or collectively surround x, but not true that a surrounds x, and it is 
not true that b surrounds x, and it is not true that c surrounds x. To solve the 
Trinitarian Paradox, we simply treat identity like that; hence, the collective 
reading of proposition.195 
 
                                                          





 It is simply not the case that this model holds to an understanding of identity that requires 
a (or b or c taken individually) to surround x or that requires the Father (or the Son or Holy 
Spirit) to be identical to a particular God.  Such a distributive understanding of composition 
stands in direct opposition to the collective understanding of CAI.  CAI helps make sense of the 
idea that none of the persons taken individually are identical to a God, but that only the persons 
taken collectively (the Trinity) are identical to a God.  The model also affirms that there is only 
one God who is composed by/identical to the Trinity. 
 As noted in Part I, Section III above, the three challenges to CAI—that numerically 
hybrid identity statements are ungrammatical in English, that no coherent truth conditions exist 
for numerically hybrid identity statements, and that CAI must deny Leibniz’s Law of the 
Indiscernibility of Identicals—can each be answered.  CAI makes important use of numerically 
hybrid identity statements, which are grammatical in colloquial English, Norwegian, Hungarian, 
and in formal logical languages.  CAI can provide coherent truth-conditions for numerically 
hybrid identity statements, namely when the value, v, of xx is identical with the value of y.  That 
is, ‘xx=y’ is satisfied iff v(xx) is identical with v(y).  CAI says that the truth-condition for ‘xxCy’ 
is satisfied iff v(xx) is identical with v(y).  CAI can also stand against charges of various sorts 
alleging inconsistency with Leibniz’s Law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals, since the 
arguments making such allegations are either invalid based on equivocation or they contain a 
false premise based on a misunderstanding of conceptualization. 
 Assigning the mereological theory of Composition as Identity to the model allows for a 
more robust understanding of how it is that God just is the Trinity.  The one God is the three 
persons (collectively).  The three persons (collectively) are the one God.  The one God is 





God.  The three persons are distinct divine persons, but it is not the case that each person 
individually/distributively is identical with God.   
 The CAI tenet of Will-Independent Mereological Trinity Monotheism requires consistent 
application of the collectively/individually distinction so that statements like “the Father (or Son 
or Holy Spirit) is God” are to be read not as identity statements, but as statements of ascription.  
“The Father is God” ascribes the property of being divine to the Father, but since the Father 
individually is not the whole Godhead, the Father is not identical to God.  The statement “the 
Trinity is God” is to be read as an identity statement since the Father, the Son, and the Holy 
Spirit collectively are identical to God.   
Yet proponents of logical critiques of the Trinity regularly try to elicit contradiction by 
charging that the doctrine claims that the Father individually is identical to God, that the Son 
individually is identical to God, and that the Holy Spirit individually is identical to God.  This 
insistence comes from a particular reading of the traditional creeds, which was disputed above.  
Since the creeds affirm that there is one God, statements that the Father (or Son or Holy Spirit) 
are God should be read as employing the ‘is of ascription.’ 
Recall that the pattern of the Athanasian Creed is to affirm:  
The Father is X; the Son is X; and the Holy Spirit is X;  
And yet there are not three Xs, but one X. 
 
The creed follows this pattern six times in a row, supplying “uncreated,” “infinite,” 
“eternal,” “Almighty,” “God,” and “Lord” in place of X.  The creed then immediately follows 
this repeated pattern with the following affirmation: 
We acknowledge every Person by himself to be God and Lord;  






The only way to make sense of this pattern which ascribes X to each of the persons, but 
does not yield three Xs, is to read the first line as utilizing the “is of ascription” when predicating 
X of the persons, and not as employing the “is of identity,” and then to read the second line as 
using the (collective) “is/are of identity” when denying that there are three Xs. The denial that 
there are three Xs seems to be based on the understanding that the divine persons are each part of 
the one X.  The only way to yield just one X is to prevent a reading whereby each person is 
identical to an X.  This forces the first line to be an ascription of a particular attribute to each 
person. 
 The hang-up to embracing this seemingly obvious interpretation of the creed is the final 
couplet, the first line of which acknowledges each person himself to be God and Lord.  If the 
creed stopped there and did not include the second line of the final couplet, the trinitarian would 
be forced to embrace either logical contradiction, relative identity, or inexplicable mystery when 
affirming the doctrine of the Trinity.  Fortunately, the second line of the final couplet sheds light 
on the intent of the creed.  Since it is forbidden to affirm that there are three Gods or Lords, the 
affirmation that each person himself is God and Lord must, as each of the previous six couplets 
are, be an affirmation that the property predicate “God” and “Lord” is ascribed of the persons, 
which is to say that each person is fully inside the predicate categories “God” and “Lord.” 
 To better understand the deployment of the terms “God” and “Lord” in the final couplet, 
the earlier affirmations that also use the terms should be considered.  Consider: 
 The Father is God; the Son is God; and the Holy Spirit is God. 
 And yet there are not three Gods, but one God. 
 
It is quite simple to see that the creed intends an ‘is of ascription’ in the first lines when 
the X is “uncreated,” “infinite,” “eternal,” and “Almighty.”  Some interpreters think the pattern 





proper name for the one God.   Must “God” always function as a proper name?  Certainly not.  
The term can serve as sortal, or count noun, and there is a predicative property usage of the term 
as well.  It is not always immediately clear which usage is intended when the term is employed.  
Consider the following uses: 
(1) Jesus is God. 
(2) The Trinity is God. 
(3) And yet they (the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit) are not three Gods; but one God. 
   
Proper names are linked to identity,196 but none of these examples require the term ‘God’ 
to function as a proper name.  The key to determining the usage of the term ‘God’ does not lie in 
its deployment, but with the verb of the sentence in which it is deployed.  Each of (1)-(3) include 
either an ‘is’ or an ‘are,’ which is the same verb conjugated for singular and for plural subjects.   
Consider (1): Jesus is God.   
Jesus (the Son) is a divine person according to the Christian faith as laid out in the creeds.  
‘Jesus’ is the subject, ‘God’ is the object, and ‘is’ is the verb.  How does the verb function?  As 
noted above, ‘is’ can be read in an identity way or in a predicative way.  Even if ‘God’ here 
served as a proper name, under the ‘is of identity’ reading, Jesus would be identical to God.  
Every property true of Jesus would be true of God, and every property that God has Jesus has.  If 
either Jesus or God has a property that the other does not have, then Jesus is not identical to God.  
Jesus has the property of being a part of the Trinity, and thus is not triune, but God has the 
property of being triune, and is thus not a part of the Trinity.  Jesus, then, is not identical to God, 
even if ‘God’ here is intended as a proper name since it is not the case that Jesus is everything 
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that God is.  Does such an understanding render (1) false, or is there another possible reading of 
it?   
Under an ‘is of predication’ reading of (1), Jesus is not identical with God since he is not 
everything that God is (Jesus is not the Trinity), but Jesus is located fully within the category 
‘God,’ and yet Jesus does not exhaust the category since the Father and the Holy Spirit are also 
located fully within the category ‘God.’ Similarly, ‘Superman is super’ does not mean that 
Superman is identical to ‘super’ since he is not everything that is super, though such a statement 
does affirm that Superman is fully inside the category ‘super,’ but Superman does not exhaust 
the category.  ‘Superman is super’ is consistent with the statements ‘Supergirl is super’ and 
‘Superman is not Supergirl.’  The reason these three statements are consistent is that the ‘is’ does 
not denote identity in the first two statements; it ascribes a property to both Superman and to 
Supergirl.  The final statement’s use of ‘is’ does denote identity, explicitly denying that 
Superman and Supergirl are identical.  
The property that (1) ascribes to Jesus is something like is a divine person.  Since the 
creed explicitly denies the logical outcome of having three Gods, the ‘is’ when affirming that 
‘The Father is God; the Son is God; and the Holy Spirit is God,’ as it does in (1), must be serving 
as the ‘is of predication.’  The only difficulty that remains is that the final couplet does not say 
‘the Son (Jesus) is a divine person,’ it says the Son (Jesus) is God.  But since ‘is a divine person’ 
is a legitimate reading of ‘is God,’ under predicative property assignment, the fact that ‘God’ 
often plays the part of a proper name should not drive one’s interpretation to the ‘is of identity.’   
Consider (2): The Trinity is God.   
Here the ‘is’ must indicate identity.  While all forms of Trinity Monotheism view this 





property predicated of something indicating that it is the Trinity is triune.  The term ‘God’ can 
serve as a predication indicating that someone is a divine person, but since the Trinity is 
everything that God is—the Trinity fully exhausts the category ‘God.’  An ‘is of predication’ 
reading collapses into an employment of the ‘is of identity’ even if the predicative reading was 
intended since the Trinity fully exhausts the category ‘God.’ 
Consider (3): And yet they (the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit) are not three Gods;  
                                  but one God.   
 
Here the ‘to be’ verb is conjugated for a plural subject—they (the Father, the Son, and the 
Holy Spirit collectively).  (3) is an example of a negation of a verb (are not three Gods) followed 
by an assumed usage of that verb (but [are] one God).  The only legitimate reading of the are not 
verb in (3) is an ‘are of identity’ reading because the object three Gods cannot function as a 
predicative category since the category would be repeated in triplicate if the verb were not 
negated.  Categories have no need of reduplication because things that are not identical to each 
other can coexist in a given category as long as none (distributively) exhaust that category.  If 
something fully exhausts a given category, then anything in that category is identical to that 
something.  Since (3) specifically notes that they are not three Gods, but one God, this is not a 
case of three non-identical things coexisting within the category ‘God.’  All this prevents an ‘are 
of predication’ reading.  This is a case of ‘they’ collectively being one thing, and since the one 
thing they are fully exhausts the category (according to the creed), even if the authors had ‘God’ 
in mind as a property category able to be predicated of something, that category understanding 
becomes an identity relationship in virtue of the complete conceptual overlap of ‘they (the 
Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit)’ and ‘God.’   
So the pattern of the creed is clear.  In each instance of: 





And yet there are not three Xs, but one X 
 
the first line always utilizes the ‘is of ascription,’ whereby a particular attribute is predicated of 
each of the persons, and the second line always utilizes the ‘is of identity,’ to deny the existence 
of three separable Xs and to affirm the existence of a solitary X.  The implication of this pattern 
is that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit collectively compose/are identical to God.  The 
pattern does not suddenly break when the creed affirms: 
We acknowledge every Person by himself to be God and Lord;  
       We are forbidden to say, there are three Gods, or three Lords.   
 
Again, the first line employs the ‘is of ascription.’  To say every person by himself is 
God, is not to say that each person by himself is identical to God, which is made clear by the 
second line which forbids the existence of three Gods.  It is to say that each person by himself is 
fully inside the category ‘God.’  That is, each person is equipped with all the necessary 
properties to count as a divine person and does not require the other two persons to warrant 
membership inside the category ‘divine person.’   
Will-Independent Mereological Trinity Monotheism understands the above to mean that 
each person by himself is omniscient, omnipotent, morally perfect, eternal, and necessary, but 
that none of the persons exists by himself since each is an inseparable yet distinct part of the one 
immaterial substance/soul that God is.  In other words, God is one substance/soul that is 
composed of three divine persons: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, who collectively are 
the Trinity.  The Trinity is properly God since the Trinity is identical to God.  The persons are 
divine, and thus have the property ‘God’ predicated of them, but none of the persons taken 
individually exhausts the category ‘God.’  Only the Trinity exhausts that category, which is why 










Another important distinctive aspect of Will-Independent Mereological Trinity 
Monotheism is the full-fledged affirmation of the eternal generation of the Son and the Holy 
Spirit.  Craig’s Trinity Monotheism holds that the Trinity is God, and that God is one soul that is 
equipped with three sets of rational faculties each sufficient for personhood.  His model makes 
no commitment concerning the mereological part-whole relationship between the divine persons 
who are distinctive parts of the Trinity, nor does his model seek to align with all four traditional 
trinitarian creedal parameters.  Craig is concerned to align his model with Scripture alone and is 
willing to depart from certain creedal commitments.  One area in which Craig departs from the 
creedal data concerns the generation of the Son and the Holy Spirit.  Craig notes:  
Finally, such a model does not feature (though it does not preclude) the derivation 
of one person from another, enshrined in the confession that the Son is “begotten 
of the Father before all worlds, Light of Light, very God of very God, begotten, 
not made” (Constantinopolitan Creed). God could simply exist eternally with His 
multiple cognitive faculties and capacities. This is, in my opinion, all for the 
better. For although creedally affirmed, the doctrine of the generation of the Son 
(and the procession of the Spirit) is a relic of Logos Christology which finds 
virtually no warrant in the biblical text and introduces a subordinationism into the 
Godhead which anyone who affirms the full deity of Christ ought to find very 
troubling.197 
 
It would be troubling indeed if subordinationism found its way into the Godhead since 
subordinationism is the heretical view that the Father is somehow greater in power or authority 
than the Son and the Holy Spirit.  The creeds, however, are explicit that the three persons of the 
Trinity are equal while at the same time affirming that the Father is the source of the Son and the 
Holy Spirit.  Along with ONE and THREE are the following traditional creedal affirmations: 
(FATHERSOURCE): The Father is the source of the Son and the Holy Spirit (perhaps  
                                                          





                                    with the Son, perhaps not). 
(EQUALITY): The three persons in the Trinity are ontologically equal; none is greater  
                         than any of the others.   
 
Will-Independent Mereological Trinity Monotheism is a model of the Trinity that seeks 
to satisfy all four traditional creedal affirmations.  Craig’s Trinity Monotheism satisfies ONE, 
THREE, and EQUALITY, but is not concerned to address FATHERSOURCE.  Is Craig’s 
reticence to satisfy FATHERSOURCE warranted?  Is the doctrine of the generation of the Son 
“a relic of Logos Christology which finds virtually no warrant in the biblical texts and introduces 
subordinationism into the Godhead”?198  It seems that many biblical texts do affirm the 
generation of the Son.  Craig holds that these texts (mostly found in the Gospels) refer to the 
economic Trinity (the Trinity during the Incarnation) and not the eminent Trinity (eternal 
Trinity).  The doctrine is affirmed in the traditional creedal orthodoxy.  Even if it is not explicitly 
scriptural, it is consistent with Scripture.  But does the generation of the Son and Holy Spirit 
introduce subordinationism into the Trinity?   
Consider FATHERSOURCE as enshrined in Nicene Creed and Athanasian Creeds.  The 
Nicene Creed affirms: 
(a) The Son is eternally begotten of the Father. 
      The Son is: 
 (a.i) God from God 
 (a.ii) Light from Light 
 (a.iii) True God from True God 
 (a.iv) Begotten, not made 
 (a.v) One in being with the Father 
(b) The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father [and the Son]. 
 
The Athanasian Creed affirms: 
(c) The Father is neither made, nor created, nor begotten.   
(d) The Son is neither made, nor created; but begotten of the Father alone.  
(e) The Holy Spirit is neither made, nor created, nor begotten; but proceeds from the Father [and  
      the Son].  







Recall Lewis’ description of begetting. 
To beget is to become the father of: to create is to make. And the difference is 
this. When you beget, you beget something of the same kind as yourself…What 
God begets is God; just as what man begets is man. What God creates is not God; 
just as what man makes is not man.199 
 
Traditional orthodoxy affirms that the Father eternally begets the Son and thus the Son is 
eternally of the same kind as the Father, or one in being with the Father (a.v).  One in being 
means that there is no “dividing the Essence,” (a stricture of the Athanasian Creed).  Since the 
begetting is eternal, there was never a time the Son did not exist, and the Son is of the same kind 
as the Father.  Three issues must be considered regarding the generation of the Son and the Holy 
Spirit: eternality, necessity, and volition. 
It seems that in order for FATHERSOURCE to reconcile with the creedal claim that “the 
Son is eternally begotten of the Father,” the generation of the Son must be eternally atemporal or 
else some duration would pass while the first divine person decided to generate a second person.  
This generation must also be necessary or else there would be a possible world in which the 
Father did not generate the other persons, the implications of which include rendering the Trinity 
unnecessary and allowing God to be less than the Greatest Conceivable Being.  The Father’s 
generation of the other divine persons must also be free of his volition/will.  The alternatives to 
will-independent generation are to claim, as Craig does, that God simply exists eternally with 
multiple rational faculties and capacities, or that the generation of the Son is a volitional choice.  
If a trinitarian model claims that God simply exists eternally with multiple rational faculties, then 
that model abandons FATHERSOURCE since the Father is not the source of the Son or the Holy 
Spirit.  In addition to departing from traditional orthodoxy, such models also face the problem of 
                                                          





explaining how the desires of three omnipotent persons would not be frustrated unless one 
person functioned as the source of the others.   
Swinburne addresses this worry, asking, “Would not the omnipotence of one such 
individual be subject to frustration by the other individual and so not be omnipotence?”200  Since 
a divine person is morally good, no conflict between divine persons could emerge on the basis of 
disagreements concerning actions that are either morally required or morally impermissible since 
all divine persons will necessarily agree about such actions.  What about actions that are not 
morally required, but are still morally good, like if one of the divine persons wanted to make a 
planet rotate clockwise but another divine person wanted that same planet to rotate 
counterclockwise? 
They cannot both succeed.  The only way in which conflict can be avoided is if 
each of the three persons sees themselves as having at any one time different 
spheres of activity.  Then each could be omnipotent, but there would be no 
conflict because in virtue of their perfect goodness no divine person would try to 
do an act of a kind which would be incompatible with an act which another divine 
person was trying to do.  Each would be omnipotent in that, for example, if he 
chooses to make Uranus rotate in a clockwise direction, he would succeed; but 
only one would choose to do so.  The Father brings about, sustains, and eliminates 
things in one sphere of activity, the Son does this in another sphere, and the Spirit 
does this in a third sphere.  
But what could determine which divine person had which sphere of 
activity?  Persons caused to exist by another person have obligations to the person 
whom caused them.  So the Father, being perfectly good, will seek to avoid any 
conflict by laying down for each divine person his sphere of activity; and the 
others, being perfectly good will recognize an obligation to conform to this rule.  
So there will be no possibility of conflict. 
If divine persons other than the Father did not derive their existence from 
the Father, there would be no one with the authority to lay down the sphere of 
activity for each divine person.201 
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Swinburne sees the various spheres of activity laid out by the Father as the means by 
which “each would recognize a duty not to prevent or frustrate the acts of the other…Only if one 
lays down what the rules are, and his decision is accepted because he has the authority to lay 
down the rules, will the collision necessarily be avoided.”202   
Such an account provides a very coherent explanation of how the desires of three 
omnipotent divine persons can coexist without frustration.  It does not seem that divine persons 
having obligations to the one who is their source diminishes the ontological greatness of those 
generated persons.  They can still be equally eternal, powerful, knowing, good, etc. as the Father 
who is their source.  But would the divine persons be equal with respect to necessity?  Swinburne 
draws distinctions when it comes to necessity.  The bottom line is that necessary things 
inevitably must be.  Swinburne holds that something is ontologically necessary if nothing else 
caused it to exist.203  Swinburne notes: 
I define a being as ‘Metaphysically necessary’ if either it is ontologically 
necessary or it is inevitably caused to exist by an ontologically necessary being.  
Their equal inevitable existence makes the members of the Trinity equally worthy 
of worship. All three members of the Trinity are metaphysically necessary 
persons, but the Father alone is ontologically necessary. And the whole Trinity is 
ontologically necessary because nothing else caused it to exist.204  
 
So will-independent generation of the Son (and Holy Spirit) provides a means by which 
omnipotent persons can avoid conflict and allows all the divine persons to be necessary.  Even 
though the Father is the ontological source of the Son and the Holy Spirit, a will-independent 
understanding of FATHERSOURCE squares nicely with EQUALITY.  It may be possible that 
the Father eternally and necessarily generate the other divine persons according to his will, but 
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that possibility seems to prevent the equality of the persons, as one person exists independent of 
any will, but two are dependent upon the will of the Father.   
If a trinitarian model claims that the generation of the Son is a willed choice, then that 
model abandons EQUALITY even if that generation is eternal and necessary.  Of course, if the 
willful generation of the Son is a choice, the Son would seem to be unnecessary and thus not as 
ontologically great as the first person.  Those who advance volitional person-generation tend to 
promote unitarian rather than trinitarian models of divinity, since three persons are not 
necessary—a second (or third) person would only exist if the first chose to generate that person 
(or persons).  This is Tuggy’s tendency.  In his critiques of various trinitarian models, Tuggy 
advances alternatives that reject the traditional trinitarian orthodoxy and offers up unitarian 
proposals.  This is just what he does when evaluating a priori arguments for the Trinity.   
Recall his Lone God Scenario which argues that a single divine person can be perfect.  
This single divine person could choose to generate another person, but would have no need to do 
so since, according to Tuggy, the single divine person is already perfect.  This stands in 
opposition to the a priori argument advanced on behalf of trinitarianism in Part II, Section III 
and IV above.  That argument contends that a single divine person is not perfect since he cannot 
exemplify maximal omnibenevolence.  A single divine person can only exemplify one of the 
four qualitatively unique aspects of love and thus fails to fully exemplify the great-making 
property maximal love.  According to reasoning like Tuggy’s, since a single divine person, who 
could choose to generate another person, but does not have to can be lauded as perfect, there is 
no need even to bother with trinitarianism at all. 
 The problem with models of divinity which abandon either FATHERSOURCE or 





scriptural interpretation or logical coherence demands breaking with traditional orthodoxy, then 
the break is warranted, but if neither Scripture nor logic demand it, then models of divinity 
should adhere to the traditional trinitarian tenets if they wish to remain orthodox.   
   In order to adhere to the traditional orthodoxy, then, this model affirms the will-
independent generation of the Son by the Father and of the Holy Spirit by the Father (and the 
Son).  Nothing in Will-Independent Mereological Trinity Monotheism hangs on whether the 
Holy Spirit is generated by the Father alone or by the Father and the Son.  The biblical texts 
indicate that the Father and the Son generate the Holy Spirit, and this position is defended in Part 
I, Section IV. 
 Will-Independent Mereological Trinity Monotheism holds that God, who is and is 
composed by the Trinity, is the sole instance of the divine nature, but there are two ways to be 
(robustly) divine—to instantiate the divine nature, or to be an inseparable and distinctive part of 
the divine nature.  How does the generation of the Son and the Holy Spirit produce 
simultaneously inseparable and distinct parts of the divine nature?  Senor notes: 
We can start to address the distinction question if we think of the single particular 
[divine] nature as being multileveled (obviously this is all metaphor).  The 
fundamental level is the Father, the second level is the Son, and the third is the 
Holy Spirit; that is, the Father is the ontological ground of both the Son and the 
Holy Spirit.  This does not imply that the Father creates either the Son or Holy 
Spirit, however, because the means by which the Son and the Holy Spirit are 
produced is will-independent.  In any possible situation in which the Father exists, 
the Son and the Holy Spirit exist, and they are eternally brought about as a 
necessary extension of the Father’s very existence.  Yet there is an important 
asymmetry at work here: the Son and Holy Spirit are ontologically dependent on 
the Father, while the Father is ontologically independent of them.  What does this 
mean?  Let’s say that B is ontologically dependent on A if were it not for A’s 
productive powers, B would not exist.  So even though each member of the 
Trinity exists necessarily and eternally, the Son and the Holy Spirit are 
ontologically dependent on the Father although the Father is not ontologically 
dependent on either of them.205 
                                                          






The will-independent generation tenet of the model addresses how it is that the Father can 
be the source of the Son and (along with the Son) the source of the Holy Spirit, and yet the three 
persons can be equal—there is no superiority since the Father’s generation of the Son and the 
Holy Spirit is will-independent and thus all three are coeternal, necessary, and exist apart from 
anyone’s will.  
 Trinity Monotheism holds that God is the Trinity, that God is one substance/soul with 
three conscious sets of rational powers each sufficient for personhood, that something is robustly 
divine if it is the instantiation of the divine nature, or if it is an inseparable and distinctive part of 
the divine nature.  Will-Independent Mereological Trinity Monotheism affirms these three tenets 
but also adds a mereological tenet (the three persons of the Trinity compose God) and a source-
of-generation tenet (the generation of the Son by the Father and of the Holy Spirit by the Father 
and the Son is will-independent).  The mereological tenet endorses the Composition as Identity 
thesis which holds that the composition relation is the identity relation.  The source-of-generation 
tenet stresses that the generation of the Son and the Holy Spirit is will-independent.  These 
tenets, which distinguish Will-Independent Mereological Trinity Monotheism from Craig’s 
Trinity Monotheism, provide a number of advantages.   
One advantage is that these two tenets help the model adhere to the traditional creedal 
trinitarian orthodoxy.  Specifically, they provide the philosophical mechanisms by which to 
square ONE with THREE and FATHERSOURCE with EQUALITY.  Another advantage is that 
they provide the mechanism to address the difficulty of how it is that the persons of the Trinity 
are somehow parts of God along with the mechanism to address the worry that the desires of 
three omnipotent persons might be frustrated by each other, potentially preventing omnipotence 





 The philosophical baggage of the composition tenet is not nearly as cumbersome or 
worrisome as some scholars argue.  CAI is a defendable thesis that Trinity Monotheism seems to 
imply, so robustly endorsing and defending the thesis (at least insofar as it applies to the Trinity) 
seems advisable.  Not only does the source-of-generation tenet help this model adhere to 
traditional creedal orthodoxy, but it helps preserve the equality, eternality, necessity, and 
omnipotence of the persons and it prevents the proclivity to posit unitarian conceptions of God.   
 Will-Independent Trinity Monotheism is a compelling logically coherent model of 
explication for the doctrine of the Trinity that flows naturally from both a priori and a posteriori 
motivations.  A priori trinitarian consideration notes that God must be three in person to count as 
the perfect being of Anselmian/Perfect Being Theology.  A posteriori considerations (Scripture 
and traditional creedal orthodoxy) note that God is three in person, one in being, that the persons 
are equal in greatness, but that the Father is the ontological source of the Son and Holy Spirit.  
Many trinitarian models provide explanations of how the Trinity works.  Will-Independent 
Mereological Trinity Monotheism can stand among them as a possibly true, logically coherent a 
priori and a posteriori motivated trinitarian model.  
 
 
Part IV—The Language of the Trinity 
 
Section I—The Use of “God” in Scripture and Trinitarian Theorizing 
 
A. W. Tozer claims that “What comes into our minds when we think about God is the 
most important thing about us.”206  Those who ponder or study God certainly want to have right 
thoughts about God.  Right thinking about God requires precision.  Properly writing and 
speaking about God also requires precision.  The doctrine of the Trinity is central to Christianity 
                                                          





and its explication demands precision.  Traditional trinitarian orthodoxy makes four primary 
claims: 
(ONE): There is one God. 
(THREE): The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are distinct divine persons. 
(FATHERSOURCE): The Father is the source of the Son and the Holy Spirit (perhaps  
 with the Son, perhaps not). 
(EQUALITY): The three persons in the Trinity are ontologically equal; none is greater  
 than any of the others. 
 
 It was argued above that a logically coherent understanding of these claims is possible, 
that these claims are consistent with and bolstered by both a priori Perfect Being Theology (and 
an a priori argument for the Trinity was defended) and a posteriori scriptural and creedal 
evidence, and that Will-Independent Mereological Trinity Monotheism is a viable model of 
trinitarian explication.  Precision is key to all of the above arguments.   
 Precision is important not just in the realm of trinitarian philosophical theology but in 
faith settings as well.  A lack of precision in churches when talking about the Trinity aids the 
spread of both heretical and incomplete views of God.  The Christian is compelled by Scripture 
to “See to it that no one takes you captive through hollow and deceptive philosophy which 
depends on human tradition and the basic principles of this world, rather than on Christ.”207  
Avoiding hollow and deceptive philosophy requires having precise understanding of Christian 
orthodoxy.  Christian orthodoxy seems to require grammatical precision.  After all, outside of a 
priori considerations, Christians rely on the text of Scripture to guide their beliefs and practices, 
and on the text of creeds to summarize Christian orthodoxy. 
William Hasker presents some grammatical observations concerning the doctrine of the 
Trinity and explains: 
                                                          





These reflections are needed because the doctrine is both subtle and complex, and 
offers traps for the unwary; apparently minor deviations from standard usage can 
have serious consequences.  Furthermore, the long history of the doctrine has had 
the result that there are apparently conflicting ways of speaking about the Trinity 
that enjoy sanction of usage and cannot simply be rejected in the interest of 
uniformity of expression.208 
 
 The central grammatical issue revolves around the uses of the word “God.”  Hasker 
points to three uses of the word “that occur in the vicinity of trinitarian doctrine, and serious 
confusion can result if they are not properly understood and distinguished.”209   
First, God is used to designate Yahweh the God of the Old Testament, who was known to 
Jesus as Father and whom he taught his followers to address as Father.  Haskers notes that 
identifying God as the Father is the most common usage of “God” found in the New Testament 
and the most common usage of the word by Christians today.  According to this usage, “God,” is 
the Father, the First Person of the Trinity.  This usage posits “God” as a title the Father possesses 
and even seems to function like a proper name for the Father.  Indeed, Christians often refer to 
Jesus as the “Son of God” and prayer to God is regularly offered to “Our Father” or the 
“Heavenly Father.”  This follows Jesus’s teaching and example of prayer known to Christians as 
The Lord’s Prayer: 
Our Father, who art in Heaven, hallowed be thy Name. Thy Kingdom come.  Thy 
will be done in earth, as it is in heaven.  Give us this day our daily bread, and 
forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those who trespass against us.  And lead us 
not into temptation, but deliver us from evil.  For thine is the Kingdom, the 
power, and the glory, forever and ever.  Amen.210   
 
 Christian prayer is often addressed to the Father and closed through Jesus, or “in Jesus’ 
name.”  Because this usage is the most common in the New Testament, Unitarians point to it as 
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definitive and appeal to it as cause to strike other uses that are discussed in trinitarian 
theorizing.211   
 Second, each of the three trinitarian persons can be described as “God” and can be 
referred to, addressed, prayed to, and worshipped as God.  This usage, unlike the first, does not 
function as a proper name but a property which can be ascribed to each of the persons of the 
Trinity.  Saying that each person of the Trinity is “God” is to say that each person has the 
property of being (robustly) divine.  Having this property means that each person of the Trinity is 
omniscient, omnipotent, morally perfect, eternal, and necessary.  While the New Testament often 
identifies the Father as God, the New Testament Scriptures also explicitly refer to Jesus as “God” 
on several occasions.212  The Bible also has texts that describe the Holy Spirit’s exercise of 
divine powers and being involved in divine activities, which indicate his being “God,” (a 
robustly divine person).213  While Christian prayers are most often addressed to the Father, 
Christians also offer prayer directly to Jesus and to the Holy Spirit.214   
This second usage posits “God” as a property which can be ascribed to each of the 
trinitarian persons.  The most famous trinitarian formula in the New Testament is found in 
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Matthew 28:19 whereby Christians are commanded to “go and make disciples of all nations, 
baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.”  The Greek 
construction of this formula indicates that the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit is 
one name.  This formula helped the Holy Spirit to be recognized as a full, co-equal member of 
the Godhead.  Under this usage, even when a particular description is given to a member of the 
Trinity which seems to be given in an exclusive manner, such a description should not be taken 
to exclude the other two trinitarian persons.   Augustine makes this point: 
And when [a man] hears the Father called the only God, he must not exclude the 
Son or the Holy Spirit from that title, for he of course is the only God together 
with whomever he is the one God with; so too when we hear the Son called the 
only God, we must accept it without in any way excluding the Father or the Holy 
Spirit.215 
 
When such descriptions are made, those being excluded are not the other persons of the 
Godhead, but are other beings who are not “God.”  Hasker adds:  
This sort of apparently exclusive reference to one Person only is far more 
common in the case of the Father, so it becomes important to install that when the 
Father is referred to as “God,” this should not be taken as an identity statement 
in such a way as to exclude the Son and the Holy Spirit…the relationship of the 
Father to the “one God” is not simple identity.  The Father is God to be sure, but 
not in such a way that the Son and the Holy Spirit are excluded.216   
 
Third, “God” is used to refer to the Trinity as a whole.  This usage, unlike the previous 
two, finds no explicit sanction in Scripture, yet for the trinitarian, it is unavoidable.  It is, in fact, 
a tenet of Will-Independent Mereological Trinity Monotheism.  In answer to the question, “What 
is God?” or “What do you mean by “God?” answers framed in such a way as to refer to any 
particular person of the Godhead would be correct, and yet incomplete.  A complete answer 
needs to include all three of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit according to a trinitarian 
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interpretation of Scripture and according to the traditional trinitarian orthodoxy.  Since no one 
trinitarian person is all that God is—since no one divine person is the other divine persons, a 
complete answer must mention the Trinity.  The complete answer to the question, “What do 
Christians understand God to be?” requires the answer, “God is the Trinity of the Father, the 
Son, and the Holy Spirit.”   
 This usage of “God” to designate the Trinity which did not come to prominence until 
Augustine, is what Hasker calls “the metaphysical bottom line.”217  Despite this, Hasker contends 
that it “seems infelicitous to try to make this the primary usage of “God.”218  Hasker has 
reticence about: 
[S]aying that the Persons are “are God” because they are parts of God, the 
Trinity.  If we go this route we will face the difficulty of finding some sense of 
“part” such that the Persons are “parts of God” in that sense, and such that their 
being such is necessary and sufficient for the Persons’ being divine.  It is much 
better, I believe, to explain the Godhood of the Persons…in terms of their 
possession of the divine attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, perfect 
goodness, and so on.219 
 
 This concern echoes Howard-Snyder’s concern about questions like, “Is the Trinity 
divine?”  Knowledge, power, and goodness (divine attributes) seem to be characteristics of 
persons, and under Trinity Monotheism and Will-Independent Mereological Trinity 
Monotheism, the Trinity (God) is not a person.  It would be bizarre indeed to claim that the 
persons of the Trinity are divine, but that God is not.  Fortunately, Trinity Monotheism and Will-
Independent Mereological Trinity Monotheism do not couch the divinity of the persons merely 
in terms of being parts of God, as though being a part of the Trinity confers upon the persons 
omnipotence, omniscience, and moral perfection.  Rather, Trinity Monotheism and Will-
                                                          







Independent Mereological Trinity Monotheism hold that the divinity of the persons is in virtue of 
their being inseparable and distinct parts of the Trinity who are each endowed with omnipotence, 
omniscience, and moral perfection.  The difference is crucial.  Consider some mere object like a 
mallet composed of two parts: a handle and head.  The handle could exist apart from the mallet, 
and thus its being a part of the mallet is what allows the handle to participate in the mallet’s 
“malletness.”  The handle is not what someone has in mind when she thinks of what it is to be 
mallet-like.  Each trinitarian person, on the other hand, is a distinct omnipotent, omniscient, 
morally perfect, eternal, and necessary set of rational powers, which is what someone has in 
mind when she thinks of what it is to be divine.  Each trinitarian person is so equipped, but no 
trinitarian person can exist part from the others, which is why there are not three Gods.  Each 
trinitarian person exemplifies the property of being (robustly) divine, but only the Trinity 
instantiates the complete divine nature, a property of which is being triune.   
 So while the Trinity is not a person, Hasker notes that Trinity “can nevertheless be 
regarded in some contexts, and spoken of as if it were a single person, in the way this is often  
done with closely unified groups of human beings.”220  The Trinity is a tri-personal being or soul, 
and a soul is the sort of substance which can be equipped with rational powers sufficient for 
personhood.  Typical human beings are souls which are equipped with one such set and are thus 
also one person.  The Trinity is a soul which is equipped with three sets of rational powers and is 
thus tri-personal.   
 This third usage allows “God” to refer to the Trinity.  When this usage is employed, there 
is an identity claim obtaining.  The Trinity is God.  Various trinitarian models seek to explain 
how it is that the Trinity is identical to God.  Will-Independent Mereological Trinity 






Monotheism explains this identity claim in terms of composition.  The Trinity (the Father, the 
Son, and the Holy Spirit) refers to the same portion of reality as does “God” since the Trinity 
composes God.  Under this usage of “God,” referring to Trinity as if it were a single person is 
allowed.  A statement like “God loves me” emphasizes the unity and singular nature of God.  
Such a statement means The one God, who is the tri-personal soul composed of the Father, the 
Son, and the Holy Spirit, loves me.  Not all Christians are concerned to be as philosophically 
precise in their language as are those engaged in trinitarian theorizing, however.  Traditional 
trinitarian orthodoxy understands The one God, who is the tri-personal soul composed of the 
Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, loves me, as a philosophically precise statement, the 
shorthand for which is “God loves me.” 
 Of course, the only way for language to work well—to be consistent with Christian 
orthodoxy—is for the precise meaning of language, even if not precisely stated, to be based on 
an acceptable philosophical explication of that orthodoxy.  This project seeks to provide an 
acceptable philosophical explication of the doctrine of the Trinity.  That doctrine must be 
logically coherent, and a possible model of how that doctrine works must be advanced.  The 
strength of Will-Independent Mereological Trinity Monotheism rests in its adherence to the 
traditional trinitarian orthodoxy found in the creedal affirmations and its explanation of how the 
Trinity composes God.  Such an explanation fits both the a posteriori motivation for 
trinitarianism and the a priori motivation to understand the Greatest Conceivable Being.  Both 
lines of motivation can be logically explained under this model.   
 The importance of precise language concerning God cannot be overestimated.  Which 
usage of “God” is best for the Christian to embrace?  Hasker claims that all three usages of the 





that context will determine which usage should be understood.  But what of Hasker’s claim that 
it is infelicitous to try to make the third usage the primary use?  Here an important distinction 
must be drawn between Scripture’s primary use of “God” and the Christian’s primary use of 
“God.”  Certainly Christians should want to properly understand the word “God” as Scripture 
uses it, but Scripture is not univocal in its use.  Similarly, the Christian should want to employ 
the best use of the word “God” and seek to be properly understood when employing it.  So how 
should the Christian most often use the word “God?”   
Since the metaphysical bottom line is that the Trinity is God, the Christian’s use of the 
word “God” should primarily be to refer to the Trinity.  “God”-as-Trinity should be the default 
meaning of the word, and context will determine if “God” is meant to refer to a particular 
trinitarian person—if the property of divinity is being ascribed to a particular trinitarian person.  
Such a contention addresses the second and third uses Hasker identifies, but what of the first 
usage? 
 Recall the first usage Hasker identifies.  God is used to designate Yahweh the God of the 
Old Testament, who was known to Jesus as Father and whom he taught his followers to address 
as Father.  This usage can be split apart into two aspects: the name of the God of the Old 
Testament, and how the God of the Old Testament was known to Jesus personally and in his 
teachings.  Concerning the first aspect, “Yahweh” is the most common proper name for God in 
the Old Testament.  Interestingly, in Old Testament usage “Yahweh” refers to God both as a 






Genesis 3:22 “And the Lord God (Yahweh) said, ‘The man has now become like one of 
us, knowing good and evil. He must not be allowed to reach out his hand and take also from the 
tree of life and eat, and live forever.’” 
  Genesis 11:6-7 “The Lord (Yahweh) said, ‘If as one people speaking the same language 
they have begun to do this, then nothing they plan to do will be impossible for them. Come, let 
us go down and confuse their language so they will not understand each other.”   
 Deuteronomy 6:4 “Hear, O Israel: The Lord our God (Yahweh), the Lord is one.” 
Both of the Genesis passages use the name Yahweh when referring to God as a 
plurality.221   The Deuteronomy passage uses the name Yahweh when declaring that there is only 
one God.  The proper name Yahweh certainly refers to the God of the Old Testament, but those 
references do not exclusively apply to a singular person.  This is just what a trinitarian would 
expect.  The Christian doctrine of the Trinity holds that Jesus is the Son—the second person of 
the Trinity.  Trinitarian orthodoxy holds that the Son is eternally a member of the Godhead.  If 
this is so, then the God of the Old Testament is triune because God is triune.  The proper name 
Yahweh applies to the triune God.  Yahweh is the Trinity.  All this, while not fully revealed until 
the New Testament, is consistent with Old Testament linguistics.   
Concerning the second aspect, how is the God of the Old Testament known to Jesus?  In 
other words, to whom is Jesus referring when he says “Father?”  The wording Hasker employs 
(Yahweh…who was known to Jesus as Father and whom he taught his followers to address as 
Father) indicates that Jesus refers to Yahweh as “Father.”  This is not precise, however.  Jesus 
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addressed his prayers to the Father and not to Yahweh because Jesus prayed to the Father and not 
to Yahweh as a whole.  When Jesus prayed, the second person of the Trinity was praying to the 
first person of the Trinity.  Jesus also used the more generic “God” (theos in Greek) when 
teaching about God.  Jesus says in Matthew 4:4, “Man shall not live on bread alone, but on every 
word that proceeds out of the mouth of God (theos).”  And in perhaps the most well-known New 
Testament verse, John 3:16, Jesus says “For God (theos) so loved the world that he gave his one 
and only Son, that whoever believes in him shall not perish but have eternal life.”   
 It seems that when Jesus was praying to or referring to the first person of the Trinity, he 
used “Father.”  In some instances Jesus uses the term “God” (theos) when referring to the Father.  
It also seems that when Jesus was not exclusively referring to the first person of the Trinity, but 
to God as a whole, he used “God” (theos).  It does not seem that when Jesus referred to the 
Father, he had in mind Yahweh, or God as a whole.  In fact, Jesus identifies himself with the 
description Yahweh used of himself (“I am”) in John 8:58.  Yahweh is the proper name of God 
and not a name Jesus uses to refer to the Father.  The more intimate “Father” (pater in Greek, 
abba in Aramaic) was used by Jesus when addressing the trinitarian person who is the Father.  
So what is to be made of this first identified usage? 
 The first usage of “God” Hasker identified is essentially an identity claim, whereby the 
Father is identical to God.  Hasker claims that this is the most common use of “God,” but it is 
vital to recall Hasker’s caveat, When the Father is referred to as “God,” this should not be taken 
as an identity statement in such a way as to exclude the Son and the Holy Spirit.  If referring to 
God as the Father is not an identity statement that should be taken in such a way as to exclude 
the Son and the Holy Spirit, then it seems that an identity claim is being made which equates the 





the Father in such a way that does not exclude the Son and the Holy Spirit an identity claim at 
all?  Perhaps it is doing the work of ascribing the property of being divine to the Father?  If so, 
this is just an example of the second usage Hasker identifies.   
 This analysis indicates that the word “God” actually has only two primary uses in 
Scripture.  The first is to refer to God as a whole—the full nature of God, which is the Trinity.  
This usage is found in both the Old and the New Testaments even though the Trinity was not 
fully revealed until the New Testament.  When the proper name “Yahweh” is used in the Old 
Testament and the proper name “Father, Son, and Holy Spirit” is used in the New Testament, 
those names refer to the triune God.  The second use is to refer to a particular trinitarian person.  
This second use is not a proper identity claim, but an ascription of divinity to either the Holy 
Spirit, the Son (Jesus), or the Father.  When the New Testament Scriptures use “God,” and 
context makes it clear that the Father is intended, such uses are examples of the second variety.  
The Father is most often referred to as “God.”  Jesus (the Son) is referred to as “God” on 
occasion, but more often he is referred to as “Lord,” which is another way of ascribing the 
property of being divine to Jesus.  In fact, referring to Jesus as the “Lord” (Kurios in Greek) is 
merely to refer to Jesus with the Greek translation of the Hebrew Adonai which was written and 
spoken in place of “YHWH (Yahweh)” so Jews could reverently avoid saying the proper name 
for God. 
 When reading Scripture, the use of “God” can be a reference to God as a whole (who is 
referred to as both plural in person and single in being), or it can ascribe the property of being 
divine to any of the trinitarian persons.  Certain New Testament passages using “God” do not 
specifically refer to any particular trinitarian person, but context can make clear if a specific 





Section II—Suggested Use of Language for Contemporary Christians 
 If, as Tozer suggests, that what comes to mind when thinking about God is the most 
important thing about a person, then those committed to traditional trinitarian orthodoxy should 
seek to think about rightly and should help others to think about God rightly.  There is a 
disturbing trend toward imprecision when it comes to speaking about God within the church.  
Haphazard language in Bible teaching, in sermons, in conversation, and even in prayer can 
prevent some people from understanding very important commitments concerning God.  Those 
with precise and orthodox views of God should endeavor to speak rightly about God personally 
and should promote occasions for precision within the congregational church setting.  The 
theological milieu one experiences will have a tremendous impact on one’s theological views.   
 Every opportunity to work the Trinity into corporate liturgy should be taken.  An 
excellent example of this is the pattern that some churches have of reciting the “Doxology:”   
Praise God from whom all blessings flow; 
Praise him, all creatures here below; 
Praise him above, ye heavenly host: 
Praise Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.222 
 
 This very short hymn is easily memorized, especially when recited weekly.  Its power 
resides in its simple cadence, rhyme scheme, and its call to “Praise God…Praise Father, Son, and 
Holy Ghost.”  Other simple choices that can be made to deepen the precision and trinitarian 
orthodoxy of a church’s theological milieu include utilization of specific phrases in lessons, 
sermons, and prayers.  Christians might consider using the following statements and words in 
this manner:  
                                                          





“God”—When Christians hear or read this word they should think Trinity.  The Trinity is 
God.  Therefore, the best usage of the word “God” for the contemporary Christian is as a 
reference to the Trinity.  “God” should mean Trinity unless the reference functions as an 
ascription of the property divine to a particular trinitarian person.   
 Too many Christians hear “God” and think Father.  It is not wholly inappropriate to do 
this, but it is wholly incomplete and somewhat inaccurate.  “God” is not a proper name.  “God” 
is a title or an office that someone holds.  In this sense, “God” functions very similarly to “Mr. 
President” or “Champ.”  There is an office of the President, but “Mr. President” is not the name 
of the person who holds that office and warrants that title.  Likewise, there is a title of 
Heavyweight Champion of the World in the sport of boxing, but “Champ” (an appropriate 
shorthand for Heavyweight Champion of the World) is not the name of the person who holds that 
position and warrants that title.   
 Addressing the person who holds the office of President as “Mr. President” is 
appropriate, but that title belongs to anyone who has ever held that office.  Image an occasion 
where the current and former Presidents gather and someone says, “Excuse me, Mr. President, 
please wave to the gallery.”  It would be appropriate for Donald Trump, Barack Obama, George 
W. Bush, and Bill Clinton all to raise their hands and wave to the gallery since the title “Mr. 
President” stays with the person who held the office.  In the same way, “God” is the title or 
office that the Greatest Conceivable Being holds.  That being is the Trinity of Father, Son, and 
Holy Spirit.  Since “God” is an acceptable ascription of the property being (robustly) divine, 
“God” may be used in reference to any of the trinitarian persons, but when a trinitarian person is 
referred to as “God,” no identity claim is obtaining, since no individual trinitarian person is 





only one current President and there are three omniscient, omnipotent, morally perfect, eternal, 
and necessary persons, but the point stands.  Hearing “God” and thinking Father is like hearing 
“Mr. President” and thinking Donald Trump.  It is appropriate, but not complete since there are 
(two) other persons that also have the property of being (robustly) divine and there are four other 
living Mr. Presidents.  Scripture often says “God” when referring to the Father, but such a use is 
not and should not be interpreted as an identity claim.  After all, Scripture also says “God” when 
referring to Jesus.  When “God” refers to a particular trinitarian person, such references ascribe 
the property of divinity to that person, not identity. 
“God the Father,” “God the Son,” “God the Spirit”—These phrases can provide greater 
precision when ascribing the property of divinity to the trinitarian persons.  Since so many 
Christians hear “God” and think Father, it is wise of Christians to specify which trinitarian 
person is being referred to if indeed God as a whole is not in view.  These phrases emphasize the 
triune nature of God.  Since God is the Trinity of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, saying 
“God the Father” helps reinforce the idea that the Father, while divine, is not all that God is.  
While these phrases rarely arise in Scripture, they can be deployed in summary of scriptural 
content.  For instance, consider the following summary of the Christian faith: 
The story of God is the story of the perfect, all-knowing, all-powerful, all-good, eternal, 
necessary, and triune creator of heaven and earth.  The tri-personal God made all there is, and the 
pinnacle of God’s creation is humankind, who was made in God’s image and thus endowed with 
rationality and freedom.  Unfortunately, humankind used its freedom poorly, choosing to rebel 
against God, deciding to sin.  But since God is perfect, God cannot stand to be around sin, so 
humankind was banished from God’s presence and humankind suffered war, famine, disease, 





system of animal sacrifice to temporarily cover humankind’s sins and make way for God’s 
ultimate act of love.  God the Father sent God the Son (Jesus) to live on earth as a perfect and 
sinless human.  Good News!: Jesus who is God the Son died on the cross, paying for the sins of 
humans who would believe in him, transferring his own righteousness to them.  God the Spirit 
raised God the Son from the dead, validating Jesus’ sacrifice.  By accepting this good news, 
humans are saved, and God the Spirit will indwell them, empowering them to live for and with 
God forever.   
The above paragraph is an acceptable summary of the orthodox Christian story of 
redemption and is acceptably precise.  God is the Trinity, yet each trinitarian person is referred to 
as “God the Father,” “God the Son,” and “God the Spirit,” respectively.  This avoids the 
confusion that comes with hearing “God” and thinking Father.   
  “The Father is God”—This is a statement of ascription which predicates the property of 
being divine of the Father.  This is not a statement of identity because the Father is not 
everything that God is.  He is not the Son, nor the Holy Spirit.  It is better to communicate this 
meaning with “The Father is divine” or “The Father is part of the very nature of God.”   
“Jesus is God”—This is a statement of ascription which predicates the property of being 
divine of Jesus (the Son).  This is not a statement of identity because Jesus is not everything that 
God is.  He is not the Father, nor the Holy Spirit.  It is better to communicate this meaning with 
“Jesus is divine” or “Jesus is part of the very nature of God.”   
“The Holy Spirit is God”—This is a statement of ascription which predicates the property 
of being divine of the Holy Spirit.  This is not a statement of identity because the Holy Spirit is 
not everything that God is.  He is not the Father, nor the Son.  It is better to communicate this 





 “Dear Heavenly Father, Lord Jesus, and Holy Spirit”—This can be a way to open up 
public and private prayer.  It is true that when Jesus instructed his followers to pray, his example 
prayer was addressed to “Our Father,” but Jesus was incarnate at the time and it would have 
seemed bizarre for him to pray to God as a whole since Jesus (the Son) is an inseparable part of 
God as a whole.  When Jesus prayed, he spoke to his Father, so he naturally instructed his 
followers to do likewise.  Because other New Testament prayers are addressed to the Father and 
the Son, and some exclusively to Jesus, the Christian is under no compulsion to pray exclusively 
to the Father.  The address, “Dear Heavenly Father,” however, is the most common prayer 
opening.  This, along with thinking Father when “God” is mentioned, is imprecision that may 
promote subordinationism.  Congregants tend to emulate what they hear corporately.  A simple 
variation in how prayers are addressed can produce significant change in the theological milieu 
of the contemporary Christian.223 
 
Conclusion 
 The doctrine of the Trinity is at the heart of Christian Theology as it is central to the 
Christian conception of God.  Traditional Christian orthodoxy views God as the Trinity of the 
Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.  This most central Christian doctrine is mysterious to be 
sure, but the doctrine of the Trinity can be understood and can be formulated in a logically 
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is regularly used, others will emulate that language and greater contemplative accuracy will 





coherent fashion.  The motivation for the doctrine comes from both a priori and a posteriori 
considerations.   
Perfect Being Theology holds that God is the Greatest Conceivable Being and as such 
God must possess to a maximal degree the essential great-making properties of omnipotence, 
omniscience, omnibenevolence (moral perfection and love), eternality, and necessary existence 
inherently.  The Perfect Being must not need to first create in order to exemplify these properties 
or else that being would be dependent upon something outside of itself to demonstrate 
perfection.  It is reasoned that in order to demonstrate or exemplify perfect love, the Perfect 
Being must demonstrate or exemplify all the aspects of love: self-love, love-given, love-
received, and love-shared.  A singularly personal being can demonstrate self-love, but could not 
give love to another, receive love from another, or share love with another apart from creating 
another with whom to enjoy reciprocal love and creating still another for them to jointly love.  
No aspect of love requires essentially four or more persons, so the Perfect Being need only be tri-
personal.  Thus, to demonstrate all the aspects of love, the Perfect Being must be (at least) tri-
personal.  Recall the specific formulation of an a priori argument for a triune Perfect Being 
above: 
1. God is the Greatest Conceivable Being (GCB). 
2. Any great-making property God/GCB possesses must be possessed to a maximal  
    degree essentially. 
3. Love/benevolence is a great-making property God/GCB possesses. 
4. Maximal love/benevolence includes self-love, love-given, love-received, and love- 
    shared (cooperative love of a third). 
5. A singularly personal being cannot possess love-given, love-received, or love-shared  
    essentially.   
6. A dually personal being cannot possess love-shared essentially. 
7. Therefore, God/GCB must be at least a tri-personal being. 
8. Simplicity is a great-making property. 
9. Being tri-personal is the simplest way to possess maximal love/benevolence.   
10. No other great-making property requires the GCB be multi-personal. 






 This argument stands in the tradition of other a priori arguments for the triune nature of 
God advanced by both ancient (Richard of St. Victor) and contemporary sources (Swinburne). 
Christian Scripture and early Christian creeds provide the framework for the explication 
of the doctrine of the Trinity.  Scripture reveals that there is only one God, but that the Father 
and the Son and the Holy Spirit are all divine and can be called “God,” and yet the Father, Son, 
and Holy Spirit are distinct persons.  The early church wrestled with the doctrine, and managed 
to formulate the essential content of the doctrine in early ecumenical creeds.  The creeds that best 
encapsulate the doctrine are the Nicene and Athanasian creeds.  The Nicene Creed states: 
We believe in one God, the Father, the Almighty, maker of heaven and earth, of 
all that is seen and unseen. We believe in one Lord, Jesus Christ, the only Son of 
God, eternally begotten of the Father, God from God, light from light, true God 
from true God, begotten, not made, one in Being with the Father… We believe in 
the Holy Spirit, the Lord, the giver of life, who proceeds from the Father [and the 
Son]. Who with the Father and the Son is worshiped and glorified. Amen. 
 
The Athanasian Creed states: 
Now this is the catholic faith: That we worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in 
Unity; Neither confounding the Persons; nor dividing the Essence.  For there is 
one Person of the Father; another of the Son; and another of the Holy Spirit.  But 
the Godhead of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, is all one; the Glory 
equal, the Majesty coeternal.  Such as the Father is; such is the Son; and such is 
the Holy Spirit.  The Father uncreated; the Son uncreated; and the Holy Spirit 
uncreated.  The Father unlimited; the Son unlimited; and the Holy Spirit 
unlimited. The Father eternal; the Son eternal; and the Holy Spirit eternal.  And 
yet they are not three eternals; but one eternal.  As also there are not three 
uncreated; nor three infinites, but one uncreated; and one infinite. So likewise the 
Father is Almighty; the Son Almighty; and the Holy Spirit Almighty.  And yet 
they are not three Almighties; but one Almighty.  So the Father is God; the Son is 
God; and the Holy Spirit is God.  And yet they are not three Gods; but one God.  
So likewise the Father is Lord; the Son Lord; and the Holy Spirit Lord.  And yet 
not three Lords; but one Lord.  For like as we are compelled by the Christian truth 
to acknowledge every Person by himself to be God and Lord; so are we forbidden 
by the catholic religion; to say, there are three Gods, or three Lords.  The Father is 
neither made, nor created, nor begotten.  The Son is neither made, nor created; but 
begotten of the Father alone. The Holy Spirit is neither made, nor created, nor 
begotten; but proceeds from the Father (and the Son). So there is one Father, not 





And in this Trinity none is before, or after another; none is greater, or less than 
another.  But the whole three Persons are coeternal, and coequal.  So that in all 
things, as said earlier; we must worship the unity in Trinity, and the Trinity in 
unity.   
 
 This traditional creedal orthodoxy may be distilled into the following affirmations: 
 
(ONE): There is one God. 
(THREE): The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are distinct divine persons. 
(FATHERSOURCE): The Father is the source of the Son and the Holy Spirit (perhaps  
with the Son, perhaps not). 
(EQUALITY): The three persons in the Trinity are ontologically equal; none is greater  
than any of the others.  
 
These four affirmations present a certain degree of mystery and tension, but the charge of 
outright incoherence is regularly levied against the Trinity.  To defend the logical coherence of 
the Trinity, it must be shown that these four affirmations form a self-consistent set.  Tension 
exists between ONE and THREE and between FATHERSOURCE and EQUALITY.  How is it 
that three distinct divine persons are one God?  How can the divine persons be equal if one of 
those persons is in some sense the source of the other two?  These questions require important 
distinctions be made. 
One important distinction is between “being” and “person.”  If the doctrine held that God 
is one being and three beings or one person and three persons, then the charge of logical 
incoherence would stand, but the doctrine of the Trinity holds that God is one being, yet three 
persons.  A being is a soul or substance.  A person is a collection of rational powers like 
consciousness, self-determination, and volition.  A divine person is omnipotent, omniscient, 
morally perfect, eternal, and necessary.  One way to explain how it is that God is one being and 
three persons is to understand that an identity relation obtains between the three persons and the 





the identity relation between the three persons and the one being is with the concept of 
composition. 
Composition as Identity (CAI) is the thesis that the composition relation is the identity 
relation.  Common language uses the CAI thesis regularly when distinguishing between 
something that can be described using various cardinality.  Multiple descriptions invoke different 
cardinality while describing the same portion of reality.  For instance, the description two shoes 
picks out the same portion of reality as the description one pair of shoes.  Similarly, the 
descriptions one deck, four suits, and 52 cards all pick out the same portion of reality.  In the 
same way, the trinitarian description one being and three persons each pick out the same portion 
of reality—God. 
Another important distinction is between “generate” and “create.”  Traditional creedal 
trinitarian orthodoxy holds that the Father generates, but does not create the Son and the Holy 
Spirit.  The generation of the Son is known as begetting.  The Son is said to be eternally begotten 
of the Father.  The generation of the Holy Spirit is known as spiration or procession.  The Holy 
Spirit is said to eternally proceed from the Father (and the Son).  These two forms of generation 
are not creation.  When someone is begotten or spirated, that person is of the same kind as the 
one begetting or spirating.  When something is created, it is of a different kind than the one 
creating.  Since the Father begets the Son, and since the Father (and the Son) spirate the Holy 
Spirit, the Son and the Holy Spirit are not created and thus are of the same kind as the Father.  So 
long as this generation is eternal, necessary, and will-independent, then the ones generated and 
the one who generates can be of equal ontological greatness.   
 These distinctions allow ONE, THREE, FATHERSOUCE, and EQUALITY to form a 





doctrine may be logically coherent, but mere logical coherence does not mean that the doctrine is 
true, just possibly true—not impossible.  Motivation for thinking the doctrine of the Trinity true 
can come from a priori Perfect Being Theology and from a posteriori Scripture and creedal 
considerations.   
 To move beyond motivations for and a demonstration of the logical coherence of the 
doctrine and to try to explain how the Trinity works, explanatory models of the Trinity are 
offered.  Those models fall into two primary camps.  Latin Trinitarianism (LT) which places 
greater emphasis on the unity of God as one being, and Social Trinitarianism (ST), which places 
greater emphasis on the diversity of the three persons.  The central commitment of LT models is 
God’s unicity of will and intellect that is not in any way threatened by the diversity of persons.  
The central commitment of ST is that God possesses three sets of rational powers each sufficient 
for divine personhood.  In keeping with traditional trinitarian orthodoxy, explanatory models 
should avoid the three big trinitarian heresies: tritheism, which posits three divine beings; 
modalism, which denies the distinctness of the three persons; and subordinationism, which 
denies the equality of the three persons.   
 The model defended here is Will-Independent Mereological Trinity Monotheism, a ST 
model.  This model has five tenets: 
(1) God is the Trinity.   
 
(2) God is one substance/soul equipped with three conscious sets of rational powers. 
  
(3) Something is (robustly) divine if it is the instantiation of the divine nature, or if it is  
      an inseparable and distinctive part of the divine nature. 
 
(4) The three persons of the Trinity compose God. 
 
(5) The generation of the Son by the Father and of the Holy Spirit by the Father and the 






 (1) Is the identity tenet.  The Trinity is identical to God.  This means that the Trinity fully 
exhausts the category “God.”  In answer to the question, “What do you understand God to be?” 
the answer is, “The Trinity of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.”  (2) is the social tenet.  
God is one being, but three persons.  This is because God just is a soul that is equipped with 
three centers of consciousness, each sufficient for personhood.   
(3) explains that there are two ways for something to be (robustly) divine.  One way is to 
be the instantiation of the divine nature.  Since there is only one God, there is only one full and 
complete instantiation of the divine nature.  That is to say, only one thing, the Trinity, 
instantiates the divine nature, a property of which is being triune.  The trinitarian persons are not 
instantiations of the full and complete divine nature because none of them is triune, but each is 
(robustly) divine in virtue of being inseparable and distinctive parts of the divine nature.  That is 
to say, each person is necessary for the one being/soul to instantiate the full and complete divine 
nature.  Each trinitarian person is robustly divine because each instantiates the nature of a divine 
person, the properties of which include omnipotence, omniscience, moral perfection, eternality, 
and necessity.  This robust divinity is not merely grounded in the person’s being inseparable 
parts of the Trinity, but in each trinitarian person’s possession of the previously enumerated 
divine attributes.  This distinguishes the person’s divinity from a lesser, separable understanding 
of “being divine,” as in the way a divine plan is divine.   
 (4) is the mereological tenet.  The Trinity composes God.  “God” and “The Trinity of 
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit” pick out the same portion of reality.  The identity relation 
established in (1) is explained, here, in terms of composition.  This tenet embraces the 
composition as identity thesis, which allows for one-many identity relations to obtain.  Classical 





classical understanding of identity is to suppose that each individual part of a composite is 
identical to the whole.  Were this the case, then each trinitarian person individually would be 
identical to God, and either there would be three Gods or there would only be one person with 
three names.  It is better to understand identity using the CAI thesis, whereby the three persons 
taken collectively are identical to God. 
 (5) is the generation tenet.  The Father generates the Son.  The Father and the Son 
generate the Holy Spirit.  Importantly, the begetting of the Son and the procession of the Holy 
Spirit are necessary, eternal, and will-independent.  If the generation of the Son and Holy Spirit 
is not necessary, eternal, and will-independent, then they are not equal in greatness with the 
Father since they are either contingent, temporal, or dependent upon the will of the Father.  If 
their generation is by the will of the Father, then they are not equal in greatness with the Father 
as their existence depends on the Father’s will.  Will-Independent Mereological Trinity 
Monotheism seems to be a viable explanatory model of the triune God. 
 The word “God” has two primary uses: to refer to the Trinity, and to refer to a particular 
trinitarian person, that is, to ascribe the property of being divine to a particular trinitarian person.  
Since the Trinity of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit composes God, when the Christian hears the 
word “God,” she should think Trinity as a default, and can shift to think Father, or Jesus (the 
Son), or Holy Spirit if the context dictates.  God is identified with and named Yahweh in the Old 
Testament.  There, Yahweh is referred to as multiple in person and as singular in being.  In the 
New Testament, God is revealed to be the persons of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.  
There, the word “God” is used most often to refer to the Father, but such reference should not be 





is another way of ascribing the property of being divine to Jesus.  The Christian can and should 
pray to the triune God since God is triune.   
 The doctrine of the Trinity can be motivated by both a priori Perfect Being Theology and 
a posteriori scriptural interpretation and traditional creedal orthodoxy.  The doctrine is logically 
coherent, and Will-Independent Mereological Trinity Monotheism stands as a viable explanatory 
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